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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the implications of State control of citizenship upon the
individual’s ability to choose membership in a given State polity. It briefly examines how States
gained absolute control over the granting, denying and revoking of citizenship and demonstrates
how the acquisition of citizenship and statelessness are both State-determined statuses. The
repercussions of statelessness at the individual, regional and global levels are presented to
demonstrate the severity of being unable to choose a citizenship. Efforts made by States and the
international community to prevent and reduce statelessness are examined in order to illustrate
the lack of prioritization given to the subject of statelessness, and possible courses of action for
States and the United Nations to undertake in order to better address this topic are introduced.
The thesis concludes that citizenship is a human right and that States need to consider individual
choice concerning citizenship matters. If such choice is not taken into account with regard to
State membership, States will be performing a disservice to citizens, the stateless, and the system
of States.

iii

This thesis is dedicated to all those individuals who work tirelessly to make the world a safer and
less hostile place for the stateless.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
As always, I must thank my support group of family, friends and teachers that encourages
me to realize my goals. I owe special thanks to my husband, Jevon Knowles, who keeps me
grounded and shows me that nothing is insurmountable.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................ ix
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................................. 6
Historical Literature .................................................................................................................... 6
Theoretical Literature.................................................................................................................. 9
Location Literature.................................................................................................................... 13
Domestic Location Literature ............................................................................................... 14
Thick vs. Thin Citizenship................................................................................................ 14
Belonging.......................................................................................................................... 15
International Location Literature .......................................................................................... 16
Globalization..................................................................................................................... 17
Human Rights ................................................................................................................... 18
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 21
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 24
CHAPTER THREE: CITIZENSHIP ACQUISITION ................................................................. 27
Primary Means and Trends in Acquisition ............................................................................... 27
Dual (or Multiple) Citizenship.................................................................................................. 31
State Revocation and Control ................................................................................................... 32
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 33
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 36
CHAPTER FOUR: CONSENT, CONTROL AND CITIZENSHIP ............................................ 37
The Social Contract................................................................................................................... 38
Classical Theorists ................................................................................................................ 38
Criticism of the Social Contract............................................................................................ 41
Lack of Choice.................................................................................................................. 42
Consent ......................................................................................................................... 43
Imbalance in the Citizen-State Relationship..................................................................... 45
State Monopoly............................................................................................................. 45
Masculine Conceptualizations ...................................................................................... 47
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 48
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 51
CHAPTER FIVE: THE ACQUISITION OF STATELESSNESS ............................................... 53
Voluntary versus Involuntary Statelessness.............................................................................. 53
Causes of Involuntary Statelessness ..................................................................................... 54
Birth to a Stateless Person................................................................................................. 54
Birth Not Registered ......................................................................................................... 54
Conflict in Laws................................................................................................................ 55
Denationalization .............................................................................................................. 56
State Dissolution ............................................................................................................... 60
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 61
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 64
CHAPTER SIX: THE REPERCUSSIONS OF STATELESSNESS ........................................... 66
The Individual........................................................................................................................... 66
vi

Recognition ........................................................................................................................... 67
Work ..................................................................................................................................... 68
Education .............................................................................................................................. 69
Health.................................................................................................................................... 70
Movement ............................................................................................................................. 70
Other ..................................................................................................................................... 71
The Region................................................................................................................................ 71
Sustenance, Shelter and Membership ................................................................................... 72
Disease and Human Trafficking ........................................................................................... 73
Physical Conflict................................................................................................................... 74
The Globe.................................................................................................................................. 77
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 78
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 81
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE PREVENTION AND REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS .......... 85
Conventions .............................................................................................................................. 86
The Refugee-Stateless Person Distinction ............................................................................ 87
Criticism................................................................................................................................ 88
States ......................................................................................................................................... 92
Reservations and Declarations.............................................................................................. 93
Non-Accession...................................................................................................................... 94
Criticism................................................................................................................................ 95
The UNHCR ............................................................................................................................. 98
Criticism................................................................................................................................ 98
Criticism of the United Nations .............................................................................................. 102
Administration .................................................................................................................... 102
Acknowledgment ................................................................................................................ 103
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 105
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 109
CHAPTER EIGHT: RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................... 111
Conventions and Declarations ................................................................................................ 111
Terminology........................................................................................................................ 111
Article Stipulations and/or Exceptions ............................................................................... 113
The United Nations ................................................................................................................. 114
States ....................................................................................................................................... 117
Cosmopolitanism and Transnational Citizenship ............................................................... 121
Possible State-Based Courses of Action ............................................................................. 124
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 128
CHAPTER NINE: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE .............................................................................. 130
Limited Choice........................................................................................................................ 130
The Need for Choice............................................................................................................... 131
The Practicality of Choice .................................................................................................. 132
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 135
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 139
APPENDIX A: UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ................................. 140
APPENDIX B: CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE WORLD........................................................ 145

vii

APPENDIX C: 2004 GLOBAL REFUGEE TRENDS .............................................................. 153
APPENDIX D: STATE SIGNATORIES TO THE 1954 AND 1961 STATELESSNESS
CONVENTIONS ........................................................................................................................ 158
APPENDIX E: PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE................................................................. 162

viii

LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS
GA

General Assembly: this is the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. All
Member States are represented in this body and have one vote.

OHCHR

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: this organ is
charged with promoting human rights and alerting the international community to
violations of these rights.

UN

United Nations: the only international governmental organization that
exists which promotes peace and seeks resolutions to global humanitarian
problems. There are currently 191 States that are members.

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: this agency is charged with
assisting refugees, internally displaced persons, the stateless and “others of
concern.”
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Every second of every day individuals are born who automatically acquire citizenship
through the accepted practices of jus soli (citizenship obtained via birth on a territory) and jus
sanguinis (citizenship obtained via descent). Most of these people will probably never question
how they obtained their citizenship because they will not have to struggle to acquire one. They
are born, registered, given a passport if necessary, and told that they are a citizen of this or that
State. Consent, at least of the explicit kind, is not required. Citizenship in such instances is an
assumed status and not a participatory role wherein one gets to decide to which State she would
like to be a member. John Locke’s assertion that a person is “born a subject of no country or
government” is therefore no longer true.
There are persons, however, who are citizens of nowhere. They do not automatically
acquire a citizenship at birth or, if they do, they lose this citizenship involuntarily later on. These
are the stateless. These people are non-entities in the legal realm of the State system; they live on
the fringes of society in most States and do not enjoy basic rights or the same life opportunities
that citizens do. There is one similarity between the status of citizens and that of the stateless,
however, and it is that both conditions are a result of State decision-making. States confer
citizenship and States deny and revoke citizenship. Individual choice is not applicable.
This thesis investigates the implications of State control of citizenship upon individuals
and briefly examines the effects of such control at the regional and global levels. It endeavours to
challenge the assumptions that citizenship should denote a relationship of tacit consent to the
State and that only the State should have the legitimate authority to control citizenship. It
demonstrates that the State is doing a disservice to citizens, the stateless, and the system of States
by refusing to acknowledge individual choice in matters pertaining to citizenship.
1

This subject is of crucial import for several reasons: 1) citizenship is an assumed status
that circumscribes every aspect of an individual’s life (from regulations and laws, to travel, daily
opportunities and decisions) without the individual’s deliberately expressed consent to be
constrained by such a status; 2) the citizen-State relationship is the basis of the international
system of States; 3) citizenship is currently the legally recognized manner in which a person is
deemed to be a member of given State; and 4) individual rights and freedoms are conditioned by
membership in a State. Those who bear no citizenship are effectively denied such rights and
freedoms.
In order to discuss the implications of State control of citizenship, and the State’s nonrecognition of individual choice, the thesis proceeds on the following grounds:
Chapter Two presents a review of the citizenship literature. It examines citizenship’s
historical evolution, the three principal theoretical traditions on citizenship within a bounded
State framework, and the literature on “thick versus thin” citizenship, belonging, globalization
and human rights. This chapter illustrates that citizenship is not a static concept and lays the
foundation for the arguments made in the ensuing chapters that citizenship-as-legal status is
necessary and that citizenship is a human right. It also demonstrates how the acquisition of
citizenship is assumed (unquestioned) in much of the literature.
Chapter Three describes the two main ways in which citizenship is acquired around the
globe – via jus soli and jus sanguinis. It provides examples of the restrictions that States place
upon citizenship acquisition through these two means and illustrations of State restrictions upon
the voluntary renunciation of citizenship. It thereby demonstrates the lack of control that
individuals have in deciding their relationship to a State polity.
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Chapter Four analyses how States obtained exclusive control over membership through
an examination of the social contract literature. It points out some of the flaws of social contract
theory and introduces the topic of implicit consent. This chapter shows how the citizen-State
relationship is inequitable as a result of the use of tacit consent by States and their thorough
monopoly of membership considerations.
Chapter Five differentiates between those who have voluntarily renounced their
citizenship and those who have been rendered stateless through no choice of their own. It
examines the main ways in which a person becomes involuntarily stateless and introduces the
instrumental use of citizenship by some States that wish to denationalize or prohibit citizenship
to groups they do not accept (typically on ethnic or racial grounds).
Chapter Six investigates the consequences of statelessness. It demonstrates that the nonrecognition of the stateless as members of a State is associated with problems at the individual,
regional and global levels. It illustrates how States are unable to provide citizenship to all
persons equally even though they are the only entities charged with this duty.
Chapter Seven explores some of the ways in which States and the United Nations have
tried to address the problem of statelessness. It considers whether such efforts have been
successful in preventing and reducing statelessness through criticism of the actions (or inaction
as the case may be) of these entities.
Chapter Eight follows up on the criticism made in the preceding chapter by presenting
suggestions that States, the United Nations and the conventions produced by these bodies, could
implement or incorporate in order to decrease the presence of statelessness globally and thereby
improve the lot of those who are currently stateless. It emphasizes the importance of State action
in this regard.
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Chapter Nine examines more thoroughly the suggestion made in the previous chapter that
States should consider individual choice in matters pertaining to citizenship. It argues that the
recognition of individual choice with regard to citizenship can make for better citizen-State
relations and decrease statelessness. It concludes by stressing the responsibility of all participants
in the international system of States to prevent and reduce statelessness everywhere.
It is important to note that this thesis assumes that the international system of States will
continue to exist in the near future, and that States will remain the principal entities that control
the rules of membership. For this reason, the thesis focuses on the individual-State relationship
regarding citizenship matters because no other entity exists that can grant, revoke and deny
citizenship. Consequently, postnational claims that citizenship does not need to be bound to the
State, while plausible, are not considered because the thesis is concerned with the current plight
of the stateless and the present inability of citizens to actively choose their State membership.
Similarly, this thesis does not examine the degree of choice that a person who becomes a
naturalized citizen of another State has. It only notes that one does not “decide” she wants to
become a member of another State and simply become one of her own volition. She must first
receive the permission of the State to which she wishes to naturalize and, in most cases, cannot
acquire another citizenship without first fulfilling the obligations of the State of her current
citizenship. Choice is hardly the appropriate word to use in such instances.
The literature review that follows demonstrates that this thesis is examining an
understudied area of the citizen-State relationship (citizenship-as-choice) and an undervalued
subject of human and international relations (statelessness). It lays the foundation for the
arguments presented in the following chapters. These arguments are: 1) citizenship is a human
right and citizenship is consequently the right to have rights; 2) States are unable to equitably

4

provide membership to all human beings; 3) those persons who are party to the citizen-State
relationship (citizens) are in an inferior position to the State in determining the characteristics of
their association to the State; and 4) the acknowledgement of individual choice concerning
matters of citizenship is necessary in order to decrease statelessness and to create a more
equitable citizen-State relationship. Finally, the thesis illustrates that although there is a great
divide between the rights, freedoms and opportunities that citizens and the involuntary stateless
may legally enjoy, there is a world of similarity in that neither status is explicitly chosen but is
State imposed.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Citizenship has been a very popular topic for scholars, policy experts and politicians alike
over the past few years. Lamentations concerning the “democratic deficit,” the influx of illegal
aliens onto “national” soil and the discrepancy between the pronouncement of minority rights
and their application have pervaded the literature alongside works that analyse and challenge the
notion that the State should be the preeminent location for citizenship. From notions of
cosmopolitan and postnational citizenship to claims of citizenship as a human right, the literature
on citizenship is as broad and as varied as the term itself. Some general tendencies may be
discerned in these texts, however:
1) the trend to historicize (citizenship’s evolution and use)
2) the tendency to theorize and,
3) the focus upon citizenship’s location (whether it should be centered in the domestic realm
of rights, responsibilities and civic participation, or in the international arena of
transnational citizenship, human rights and globalization).
What follows is a brief overview of the literature in each of these areas.1
Historical Literature
Although the basic definition of citizenship is “membership in a polity,” the historical
literature demonstrates that citizenship is a contested term whose meaning has differed
depending on time and space.2 Initially, in ancient Athens (from whence the term originated),
citizenship referred to exclusively male participation in the public realm. Man was deemed a
“political animal” and it was his highest duty to partake in the city-state’s activities and “rule and
be ruled” in turn. Virtue was determined by fulfilling one’s obligations to the community of
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citizens, and territorial sovereignty did not delimit legitimate membership. Allegiance to the
“imperial center” and “active sharing in the constitution” did instead.3
The Roman Empire took this political and participatory notion of citizenship and
transformed it into a passive, legal status. While citizenship was originally exclusive (as in the
city-states of ancient Greece), as the Empire expanded, Roman citizenship became a much more
inclusive order as the rulers realized that it was a sensible way to readily accommodate and
control conquered peoples (and thereby secure much needed revenues from taxation). It is with
the institution of the legal aspect of Roman citizenship that the idea of the right to protection
under the law was first granted.4
During the Middle Ages, the participatory notion of citizenship largely faded (except for
those few property-owing individuals in the Italian city-republics of Florence and Venice),
succumbing to the pressures of feudalism, subjecthood and guild membership. Capitalism had
begun to flourish in many European cities and political membership could often be bought if one
had enough money.5 In many places, the idea of allegiance to an imperial center or State was
practically non-existent as cities were the important economic hubs and guild membership
conditioned who did or did not acquire citizenship.6 According to Maarten Prak, “[t]o end these
cities’ privileged status was the mission of the emerging modern state” (18), and it was to the
newly emerged French Republic that this mission first presented itself.7
The idea of the “nation-State” and allegiance to it instead of the city-state or noblemen
was born during the French Revolution. The revolutionaries were frustrated with the exigencies
and excesses of the royalty, nobility and religious establishment and consequently desired a
polity that would be governed by, and respect, “the people.” These people constituted a “nation”
not by heritage or common ties of language and race, but by being “[a] body of associates living
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under common laws and represented by the same legislative assembly” (Heater What Is
Citizenship? 106).8
It was this universal and legalistic notion of what it meant to be a citizen of the French
State that permitted the polity to be (what would be considered today) very liberal in granting
citizenship. For instance, mere supporters of the Revolution, such as Thomas Paine, were made
honorary citizens, and the only individuals considered non-citizens (or “foreigners”) at the time
were those who were judged “bad citizens” (Faulks 33). Allegiance to the “nation-State” as
exclusive protector of the laws and the people that abided by these laws became customary after
the French Revolution throughout much of Europe. It was not until the end of the 20th century
that the coupling of the “nation” with the State would be seriously challenged by scholars of
globalization and transnational citizenship.9
The establishment of the welfare State in liberal polities during the last century also
tested the traditional notions of citizenship. As disparities within State populations in terms of
education, health and standards of living became exacerbated, individuals began to claim their
entitlement to basic social rights. Many pointed out that one could not ensure that her civil
citizenship status was protected, or that her political citizenship status could be enacted, without
her minimum social needs being met (adequate food and shelter, access to health care, etc.). That
is, the fulfillment of social rights was prior to the realization of civil and political rights.10
In sum, the literature on the history of citizenship is concerned with the changing
meaning of citizenship in different locales and epochs. It demonstrates the movement of
citizenship as a legal status toward inclusion of more peoples as time progresses and toward the
extension of varied types of rights to citizens. It shows how citizenship was transformed from
voluntary allegiance and constitutional participation in ancient Greece to a status tied to the
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territory of the “nation-State.” The historical literature provides evidence that the term
“citizenship” is evolving and alludes to the possibility that new forms of citizenship may arise in
the future.
Theoretical Literature
The literature that examines citizenship theory is closely related to the historical literature
in that these theories are often based upon analysis of a given time period or constituted by
events occurring while the theories were being formed. Civic republicanism, for instance, is a
theory whose roots are tied to the political participation of citizens during the time of the Greek
city-states. The liberal theory of citizenship was influenced by Enlightenment thought (especially
natural rights theory) and market enterprise. Communitarianism, on the other hand, grew out of a
reaction to what communitarians considered to be the pitfalls of the liberal notions of citizenship.
This section examines how these three theories differ with regard to the description of citizenship
participation in the polity and the relationship between the individual and the State.11
As previously mentioned, civic republicanism has its ties to the ancient Greek city-states.
It is a theory of citizenship that emphasizes formal political participation as a duty of all citizens.
It is a “communally based conception of citizenship; individuals are only citizens as members of
a community” (Oldfield 178). It stresses the ideals promulgated by the citizens of the ancient
city-states – such as military discipline and civic bonds – and values obedience to laws and
constitutional arrangements. Virtue is extolled and finds it expression when someone places the
public’s interests above self-interest. While the individual may “mark [her] place in history by
serving the public community” (van Gunsteren 21), the civic republican tradition of citizenship
does not place much emphasis upon the individual entitled to certain rights.
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Critics of civic republicanism denounce this theory’s lack of individual rights protection,
its non-recognition of the private sphere as an important political domain and its emphasis upon
seemingly masculine traits.12 Herman van Gunsteren criticizes civic republicanism on the
grounds that it “makes one community absolute and shows too little appreciation for the
characteristic values and diversity of other communities” (21); while Derek Heater states that
civic republicanism’s basis upon the Greek city-state has made for a “narrow definition of public
participation” and made citizenship “an elite activity” (What Is Citizenship? 73).
In contrast to the lack of focus upon the individual and her rights in civic republicanism,
liberal citizenship theory centers almost strictly upon such concepts. The individual reigns
paramount in this literature, utilizing the State to protect her from others while at the same time
using it as guarantor of certain rights and services. Whereas in the civic republican tradition the
emphasis is upon fulfilling one’s civic obligations (both to the State and to others), in the liberal
conception of citizenship the performance of such duties is not required. The citizen is an
autonomous being who demands as little State interference in her life as possible. Adrian
Oldfield notes that in this tradition, “[t]he status of citizen imposes no ‘duties’ on individuals,
[sic] beyond the minimally civic and that of respecting other individuals as sovereign and
autonomous citizens” (179).
While liberal theory does not progress very far from civic republicanism’s emphasis upon
the public sphere over the private one, it does provide for certain rights and protections
regardless of ascriptive characteristics such as race, sex and age. Its emphasis is upon the
equality of all individuals regardless of their relationship to the State and its goals are twofold: 1)
to make citizenship “universal” in that all who bear the status should be treated equally and, 2) to
provide the status of citizenship to as many individuals as possible. As Heater points out, “The
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status of citizen was in origin and indeed for by far the greatest portion of its history essentially
the mark of an elite. The implication of the liberal revolution in the concept is that none should
be excluded” (A Brief History of Citizenship 143).
Despite these positive attributes, the liberal theory of citizenship is criticized on two main
counts. Firstly, several scholars point out that no person exists in a vacuum and that the liberal
conception negates the importance and influence of the community in which one lives or grows
up. It denies the reality that “[c]itizenship cannot be purely an individual status because
citizenship only has meaning to the individual in the wider cultural context of the group” (Faulks
90). Mary Dietz laments that the liberal view renders citizenship “less a collective, political
activity” and more “an individual economic activity” (382),13 while Larry Preston criticizes
liberalism’s “unfettered autonomy and value pluralism [which] erroneously claims that
autonomous individuals need not respect any collective criteria in making free decisions” (669).
Secondly, the liberal conception of equality in the juridical-political realm is faulted with
masking genuine inequalities in the real world. Karl Marx was one of the first to challenge the
“false universalism” of the liberal notion of citizenship (Faulks 62), while others such as Keith
Faulks condemn the manner in which liberalism “represents not equality between different
individuals but the domination of the ideal of equality over difference” (85). He proceeds to
assert that “[b]y focusing upon individuals and ignoring the structural aspects of power, liberals
tend to overlook or misunderstand how citizenship fails to serve all persons equally” (86).
Citizenship, therefore, is not as universal in its provision of rights and protections as liberal
theory postulates.
It would appear that the final theory of citizenship examined here, communitarianism,
addresses the first criticism directed against the liberal conception of citizenship. That is,
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liberalism’s failure to acknowledge that people are shaped by given contexts. Sometimes viewed
as a conservative reaction to the dominant individualism of liberal theory, communitarianism is
centered upon group cohesion and activity. Responsibility toward one’s fellow group members is
paramount, and the wishes and interests of the collective are privileged above those of the
individual. Communitarians argue that group solidarity and cultural cohesion are the best ways to
create a polity wherein members will be able to participate in decision-making and that such
communities should be protected from disintegration (whether due to internal or external
factors).
The critics of communitarianism state that this theory is too static and exclusive. The
community is so centered on self-preservation that it fights anything deemed threatening to its
existence. Since it is the collective that reigns supreme, newcomers to the community must
accept the vision imposed by the group or face rejection and expulsion. Change is not readily
forthcoming in the communitarian version of citizenship. This steadfastness in the face of change
is quite serious when some groups within the community are not treated as equals and have yet
to achieve their full citizenship rights. Faulks simply asserts that those communitarians who
denounce “liberals’ assertion of an abstract individualism,” posit “an equally abstract view of
community” (72).
In sum, the theoretical literature on citizenship depicts varying degrees of participation in
political activity (from the practically required duty of participation in civic republicanism to the
minimalist civic activity of liberalism), and differs in its description of the relationship between
the individual and the State (the State being the figure around which everything revolves in civic
republicanism, the protector of rights and the distributor of justice in liberalism, and the guardian
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of the community in communitarianism). These theories thus differ in what it means to be a
citizen and how a citizen should act.14
Location Literature
The term “location” literature refers to whether authors situate their respective citizenship
topic in the realm of domestic or international politics. Domestic themes include those that
examine civic participation, voting, rights versus responsibilities, patriotism, belonging and
immigration among others. International themes consist of those that refer to issues of
globalization, human rights, the role of the State and alternatives to State-bound citizenship.
Since the literature in this area is vast, only a brief sketch will be made of those texts that most
closely relate to the premise of this thesis.
Thus, with regard to the domestic literature, belonging and citizenship-as-status and asactivity are specifically examined because the former sets the stage for how State membership is
acquired and it presents one of the questions raised in this thesis – whether the State should
solely be determining who belongs to the polity. The citizenship-as status or -as-activity topic
pertains specifically to the argument being put forth that citizenship-as-status is central to
obtaining other rights.15 As concerns the International Location literature, globalization and
human rights are studied because globalization is modifying the State’s traditional control over
membership rules and thereby introducing the possibility that current rules of citizenship
acquisition may be changing. The literature on human rights is examined because it provides the
background for the argument made in this thesis that citizenship should be a human right.
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Domestic Location Literature
Thick vs. Thin Citizenship
Many scholars tend to differentiate between “thick” and “thin” conceptions of citizenship
in their work – “thick” citizenship referring to active participation in the polity and “thin”
citizenship referring to a passive, legal status concerned with rights acquisition. There is a
tendency in this literature to denigrate the “thin” conception of citizenship while elevating the
“thick” conception. Some scholars believe that those who focus on the “thin” conception ignore
matters concerning group decision-making and responsibility which leads to an “What am I
entitled to?” attitude that ignores the needs and goals of the larger community. Two authors who
disagree with the position that “good citizenship is ‘thick’ citizenship while poor citizenship is
‘thin’ citizenship” are Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman.
Kymlicka and Norman argue that the two conceptions of citizenship should be kept
distinct from each other since “we should expect a theory of the good citizen to be relatively
independent of the legal question of what it is to be citizen, just as a theory of the good person is
distinct from the metaphysical (or legal) question of what it is to be a person” (353). They note
that:
“[w]hile most theorists respect this distinction in developing their own theories…[there
is] a fairly widespread tendency to ignore it when criticizing others’ theories of
citizenship—for example, by contrasting their own ‘thick’ conception of citizenship-asactivity with an opponent’s ‘thin’ conception of citizenship-as-status” (353-4).
They therefore contend that the two forms of citizenship should not be compared since
they involve two different aspects of citizenship.
To add to Kymlicka and Norman’s critique, it could be argued that the “thin” conception
of citizenship is prior to the “thick” notion since political activity and participation cannot take
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place (legally) if one does not have the right to realize these activities due to her non-legal status.
“Thin” citizenship therefore must be effectively in place before “thick” citizenship can be
enjoyed.16 In fact, one of the main premises of this thesis is to contend that the so-called “thin”
conception of citizenship should not be a merely “passive” status. It ought to be an “active”
status in that individuals deliberately consent to, or choose, the citizenship they desire. It should
not simply be a matter of passively acquiring the status via descent or birth on a given territory.17
Belonging
One of the most important questions posed in the citizenship literature is “Who belongs?”
Some scholars favour the protection of the closed political community (guarded borders, strict
requirements for membership) while others argue for open borders or at least a weakening of
membership requirements.18 The closed ethnic community has had many supporters in recent
years who claim the right of ethnic groups to “self-determination.” The detractors of this position
believe that combining ethnicity and citizenship in this manner is dangerous as it makes for
xenophobic relations and can lead to conflict between groups. Faulks and Antje Wiener are two
scholars who have argued for the separation of ethnically-imbued “nationality” from citizenship
when considering who should be members of the citizenry.19
At the other extreme to the blood-ties of belonging are States and scholars that either
advocate or examine the marketization of citizenship.20 Ulrich Haltern, for instance, investigates
constitutionalism in the context of the European Union and advocates the idea of “consumerism”
as a means of uniting the diverse peoples of Europe instead of some imagined demos.21 Antonín
Wagner discusses how the extension of social rights to non-citizens has caused citizenship to
become “an economic good” (280). This extension of social rights to non-citizens has created a
proliferation of criticism, policy creation and scholarly work on the rights of those who belong to
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a community without the official status of citizenship. A few scholars, such as Etienne Tassin,
advocate the right of foreign residents to vote in local elections so that belonging to the political
community will be premised only on political choice and not on birth or descent.22 The majority
of authors who write about globalization (more on this topic in the “International Location”
section below) suggest that belonging should not solely be a State consideration as multiple
identities, associations and allegiances now exist. They argue that citizenship-as-status should
reflect these new realities.
Manley Hudson and Joseph Carens argue that citizenship should be granted based upon
genuine and effective connections (through residence, work and family ties). That is, instead of
citizenship being granted based upon jus soli (place of birth) or jus sanguinis (via descent),23
Hudson and Carens think that individuals should be entitled to citizenship in the State in which
they have the strongest ties.24 Thus for these two authors, ethnicity and happen-chance birth in a
State do not suffice regardless of kinship ties; factual criteria obtain only.25
International Location Literature
In the legal and policy literature emanating from international organizations and treaties,
“nationality” does not refer to ethnic origin or classification, but to the legal status of
“citizenship” instead.26 Even in the domestic literature the terms nationality and citizenship are
often used interchangeably.27 Thus, unless otherwise noted, where the term “nationality” is used
in this thesis it refers strictly to its usage as “citizenship” according to international legal
practice. The problems associated with using these terms interchangeably in the literature are
addressed in Chapter Eight.
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Globalization
Those authors who study globalization28 and its effects speak of how this phenomenon
“speeds up the world,” makes great distances appear smaller and increases human
interdependence (Held et al.). Numerous scholars examine how globalization has affected the
State’s ability to order its domestic affairs in a sovereign manner. For instance, some cite the loss
of State sovereignty to financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the
State’s inability to control the evolution of the internet, its incapacity to control its borders at all
times everywhere, and the need to consider harmful activities that take place in other parts of the
world (pollution, for example) because of its effect on the home State.
Globalization’s alleged effect upon the citizen-State relationship resides in its ability to
weaken the citizen’s sole allegiance to the State. According to those that investigate this area of
the literature, globalization permits multiple identities and allegiances to form around the globe.
Suzanne Shanahan, for example, purports that individual identities are no longer the sole
purview of the State (83).29 Along these same lines, Richard Ford and Evelyn Glenn discuss
migration, race, gender and culture as transnational factors that have the ability to elicit greater
allegiance and stronger identities than that which is generated by the State.30 Samuel Clark even
notes that the multiple connections engendered by globalization have changed the scope of
citizenship to the degree such that “[t]he importance of national citizenship in the twenty-first
century will be mainly global not domestic” (385).
Not all analysts of globalization believe that the role of the State is being diminished to
the point that it may become inconsequential in terms of controlling citizenship. Gertrude
Himmelfarb and many others believe that “the term citizenship has ‘little meaning except in the
context of a state’” (qtd. in Bosniak 448), and numerous analysts cite how the State is still
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“master” in terms of immigration laws (which are generally becoming more stringent globally)
and continues to be the only entity that decides who may become a member of its polity. As Jost
Halfmann remarks, “While the educational…scientific…and the economic…system have
become more and more global, the political system (of world society) is still dominated by the
ambition of nation-states to control the ‘national’ segments of these systems” (521). Mathew
Horsman and Andrew Marshall note that there are currently “no substitute structures that can
perform all the functions traditionally associated with the nation-state” (264). That said, State
control over citizenship is being “modified,” if not lessened, by international laws and treaties on
human rights.
Human Rights
The literature on human rights and citizenship perhaps rivals in extent the literature on
citizenship as activity (civic participation). With the internationalization of so many aspects of
life, due in part to the advent of globalization, individual rights have not escaped the effects of
global trends and influences. It is generally known that what occurs in one State is no longer
confined to the geographical boundaries of that State. News now travels extremely quickly and
issues concerning human rights (and violations of these rights) are often projected around the
world in a short period of time. This section explores the debate concerning whether or not
citizenship is a human right.
Much of this literature recognizes that the international body of human rights law has
developed to the extent such that “nationality is today perceived as involving the jurisdiction of
the State as well as human rights issues” (Batchelor 167). Of the many legal documents that
pertain to human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is perhaps the most
renowned.31 This document delineates the rights (civil, political and social) to which all
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individuals around the globe are entitled regardless of race, ethnicity, class, gender or religious
preference. Other texts that deal with individual rights include the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (1979) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Of the organizations that
investigate matters pertaining to human rights on an international scale, the office of the United
Nations High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Economic and Social Council
are governmental bodies that do so,32 while Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are
among the more prominent non-governmental organizations.
According to the Universal Declaration, each person is entitled to a “nationality” (Article
15). The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) considers this
to be a “fundamental right” as “many other rights may depend, in practical terms, on nationality
status” (Department of International Protection 16). Hannah Arendt’s 1966 work on
totalitarianism expresses the close association between being a bearer of citizenship-as-status and
basic rights in her study of the citizen-State relationship after World War II. She examines the
situation of those who were displaced because of the conflict, and who consequently lost their
citizenship, and notes that “[n]ot only did loss of national rights in all instances entail the loss of
human rights, the restoration of human rights…has been achieved so far only through the
restoration or the establishment of national rights” (299).
In a more contemporary setting, Jelka Zorn analyses the denationalization of individuals
in Slovenia after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Through interviews with denationalized
persons and analysis of Slovenian laws (such as the Law on Foreigners which was applied to all
those persons who could not prove they were Slovenian residents despite being born and having
lived on the territory for years), Zorn is able to demonstrate that “there is a high co[r]relation
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between human rights and citizenship (rights)” (1). The Youth Advocate Program International,
citing Chief Justice Earl Warren, affirms in its 2002 publication on the situation of stateless
children that “citizenship is a fundamental building block to other human rights—it is ‘the right
to have rights’” (Aird, Harnett and Shah 1).
The assertion that citizenship is a human right to which everyone should be entitled is not
shared by everyone. Clark Hanjian adamantly rejects such a right arguing that it should never be
State-imposed without individual consent. Against the aforementioned Chief Justice’s argument
that citizenship is “the right to have rights,” Hanjian doubts that Warren would “have denied that
every human being possesses certain fundamental rights which exist regardless of whether or not
one participates in a citizen-state relationship” (47). Thus, in his book The Sovrien,33 he proceeds
to examine the fundamental human right to be stateless by setting up hypotheses against this
assertion and then refuting them. That is, no argument based upon utilitarian, territorial, social
order or “State’s rights” conceptions will hold. Instead, Hanjian argues that the bestowal of
citizenship without explicit consent violates an individual’s fundamental human rights of free
association, self-determination and freedom of movement, thought and conscience (58-9).
The contention that universal human rights exist at all (whether it be the right to have
citizenship or to not have citizenship) is one of the questions that arises in this literature.
Although it is argued in Chapter Six that the right to citizenship should be a fundamental human
right (in contradistinction to Hanjian), several scholars have critiqued the idea that there can be
any universal human rights since cultural conceptions of these rights differ. Thus, whereas
Hanjian insists that the existence of fundamental human rights is “is widely accepted” (148) and
that such rights are “inalienable” (149), one just need read authors such as Peter Malanczuk and
Michael Akehurst to understand that this “acceptance” is largely among Western scholars.34
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The existence of a human rights legal framework and of human rights organizations does
not apparently substitute for State support of rights either. Although some claim that
international bodies and laws are now able to protect “individuals irrespective of nationality”
(“Embracing Dual Nationality”), Faulks believes that citizenship-as-status cannot be replaced by
the human rights regime.35 Arendt makes a similar observation in Totalitarianism when she notes
that those rights considered “inalienable” are not, in fact, separate from the State, for “it turned
out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon the
minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee
them” (291-2). Thus, whether one claims that citizenship rights are distinct from, or the same as,
human rights, it appears that the State is needed to protect these rights until such time that some
other entity arises to defend them.36 For now, suffice it to note that some scholars believe that
“rights can be enforced by bodies other than the nation-state” (Horsman and Marshall 232).
Conclusion
In the majority of these works citizenship as a legal status is generally assumed. Few
authors question how or why an individual gains her citizenship. It is simply taken for granted
that one should have a citizenship and studies (with the exception of many texts examining the
human rights aspect of citizenship) subsequently incorporate this assumption. Even fewer
authors question the “tacit consent” nature of citizenship acquisition or challenge the assumption
that State supremacy in controlling citizenship should give way to individual choice and
control.37 That is, serious examination of the individual’s right to elect (explicitly consent to) her
citizenship is rather neglected. The question of why a person, who has the right to a
“nationality,” is unable to choose this very “nationality” is not adequately addressed. The danger
of this omission is made clear in the ensuing chapters.
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NOTES
1

Please note that the literature on social contract theory is addressed separately in Chapter Four.
The works of Derek Heater (A Brief History of Citizenship), Keith Faulks and Douglas Klusmeyer provide a
thorough examination of the term citizenship in a historical perspective.
3
See Richard Ford and Klusmeyer for the non-territorially based conception of ancient Athenian citizenship.
4
See Andrew Linklater, p. 184.
5
Heater states that in the Italian city-states “[a]n inhabitant of the contandino or even a foreigner could enter the
ranks of the citizens by purchasing a house in the city” or by simply reducing the city’s debt (A Brief History of
Citizenship 51 and 54).
6
Maarten Prak’s article is helpful in elucidating the power of the guilds in bestowing citizenship in the medieval
Dutch town of Bois-le-Duc.
7
Jost Halfmann notes that “[t]he thrust of the French Revolution was to eliminate any claims to loyalty outside of
the state[…]With the establishment of the nation-state the political independence of the landed gentry and the cities
came to an end” (519).
8
This quote is attributed to Abbé Sieyès.
9
See the “International” section of the “Location Literature” for more information on how globalization is
challenging the traditional powers of States over membership, and refer to Chapter Eight for information on
transnational citizenship.
10
T. H. Marshall was the first scholar to analyse the evolution of rights from civil to political and then social rights
(within the British context).
11
These three theories represent the conventional ideas on citizenship within a bounded State framework. The
theoretical tradition of cosmopolitanism and the new literature on post- and transnational citizenship examine
citizenship from outside the confines of the State. As noted in Chapter One, this thesis considers citizenship
primarily within a bounded State framework.
12
For instance, the stress upon military activity as a civic duty (something which many women across the globe are
still barred from participating in) is considered a masculine trait. See also the “Masculine Conceptions” section of
Chapter Four.
13
Refer to p. 48 for the feminist perspective on, and critique of, the citizen-State relationship in terms of
relationships and contexts.
14
For an in-depth analysis of these citizenship theories, see Heater (A Brief History of Citizenship), van Gunsteren
and Faulks.
15
See pp. 19-20 below and Chapter Six for an elaboration of the necessity of citizenship-as-status to gain other
rights.
16
Halfmann expresses the same concept when he states that “[c]itizenship as a status comes prior to citizenship as a
role” (522).
17
This argument is presented in Chapter Nine.
18
Joseph Carens’ work is particularly important in this regard.
19
One of the main premises of Faulk’s work is to show that the “nation” ought to be separated from the State (8).
Similarly, in her study on the European Union, Wiener argues for the separation of the “nation” from citizenship
(197).
20
See “Citizenship-By-Investment” for States that grant citizenship based upon investment criteria, and Heater,
What Is Citizenship?, p. 10, for information on the use of “customer” and “client” when referring to citizens in the
British Citizens’ Charter.
21
Consult especially pp. 30-44.
22
See Angus Stewart p. 75 for more details on Tassin’s thought on the right of foreigners to vote.
23
Chapter Three provides more details on citizenship acquisition.
24
Hudson refers to this form of citizenship acquisition as jus connectionis (qtd. in Batchelor 179), while Carens
terms it “ascriptive citizenship” (429).
25
While agreeing with the importance of taking into consideration where people’s ties are strongest with regard to
residence and work in bestowing citizenship, the caveat must be made that if an individual would otherwise be
stateless, such effective ties and ascriptive characteristics should be set aside until the time when the individual is
able to acquire the citizenship where she has such ties.
2
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Refer to Kim Rubenstein and Daniel Adler’s work on “International Citizenship” for this usage (specifically p.
521).
27
Consult the information on “The Renunciation of U.S. Citizenship” from Bureau of Consular Affairs of the U.S.
Department of State to see how the terms are used interchangeably in their work.
28
David Held et. al define globalization as “a process (or set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the
spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and
networks of activity, interaction, and power” (462).
29
It is important to note that such identities have probably never been under the sole control and consideration of
States. Religion, sexuality and sub-State group identities (such as being a unionist or environmentalist) are not
necessarily under the direct purview of the State.
30
See specifically Glenn, p. 10, and Ford, p. 12, for the effects these other factors have upon one’s identity.
31
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is reproduced in Appendix A.
32
According to Article 62 of the Economic and Social Council’s Charter, this body “can make recommendations on
human rights, draft conventions, and convene international human rights conferences” (Malanczuk & Akehurst
213).
33
The ‘sovrien’ is a word coined by Hanjian from the terms sovereign and alien that means “an intentionally
stateless person” (15).
34
For example, in their book, Malanczuk and Akehurst state that “Islamic countries have their own views on the
meaning of the freedom of religion and the rights of women. The universality of Western human rights values,
allegedly associated with excessive individualism and decadence, has been most vigorously challenged recently in
certain parts of Asia” (210-11).
35
Faulks states that “governance requires the exercise of political participation and responsibilities as well as the
preservation of rights” (133) and that the human rights regime lacks “the idea of political community and…effective
mechanisms through which [human rights] can be fulfilled” (146).
36
It should be noted that the State does not always protect the rights of its citizens. As Hanjian points out, “even
within the allegedly safe confines of the citizen-state relationship, human rights violations of all proportions still
happen with regularity. Citizenship provides no reliable guarantee that one’s human rights will be protected” (151).
However, the following chapters demonstrate that citizenship is a more assured method of acquiring rights than
having no citizenship.
37
Hanjian, of course, would be a major exception. Also, the literature on postnationalism often challenges the
assumption that citizenship should solely be State-based.

23

REFERENCES
Aird, Sarah, Helen Harnett, and Punam Shah. Stateless Children: Youth Who Are without
Citizenship: Youth Advocate Program International, 2002. 1-24.
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
1966.
Batchelor, C. Carol. "Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status."
International journal of refugee law 10. 1 (1998): 156-83.
Bosniak, Linda. "Citizenship Denationalized." Indiana Journal of Legal Studies 7. 2 (2000): 447509.
Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State. "Renunciation of U.S. Citizenship." 2005.
1 Oct. 2005. <http://travel.state.gov/law/citizenship/citizenship_776.html>.
Carens, Joseph H. "Who Belongs? Theoretical and Legal Questions About Birthright Citizenship
in the United States." The University of Toronto Law Journal 37. 4 (1987): 413-43.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Embracing Dual Nationality." 13 Oct. 2005.
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=174&prog=zg
p>.
Chan, Johannes. "The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right." Human Rights Law Journal
12.1-2 (1991): 1-14.
Clark, Samuel. "Amending the Whig Interpretation of Citizenship." Contemporary Sociology 41.
4 (2002): 382-85.
Department of International Protection. Final Report Concerning the Questionnaire on
Statelessness Pursuant to the Agenda for Protection: UNHCR, 2004. 1-36.
Dietz, Mary G. "Context Is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship." Feminism & Politics.
Ed. Anne Phillips. Oxford Readings in Feminism. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991. 378-400.
Faulks, Keith. Citizenship. Key Ideas. London: Routledge, 2000.
Ford, Richard T. "City-States and Citizenship." Citizenship Today: Global Practices and
Perspectives. Eds. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer. Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001. 209-33.
Glenn, Evelyn. "Citizenship and Inequality: Historical and Global Perspectives." Social
Problems 47.1 (2000): 1-20.

24

Halfmann, J. Jost. "Citizenship Universalism, Migration and the Risks of Exclusion." The British
Journal of Sociology 49. 4 (1998): 513-33.
Haltern, Ulrich. "Pathos and Patina: The Failure and Promise of Constitutionalism in the
European Imagination." European Law Journal 9.1 (2003): 14-44.
Hanagan, Michael P. and Charles Tilly, eds. Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States.
Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999.
Hanjian, Clark. The Sovrien: An Exploration of the Right to Be Stateless. Vineyard Haven, MA:
Polyspire, 2003.
Heater, Derek Benjamin. A Brief History of Citizenship. New York: New York University Press,
2004.
---. What Is Citizenship? Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999.
Held, David, et al. "Globalization." Essential Readings in World Politics. Eds. Karen A. Mingst
and Jack L. Snyder. 2nd ed. The Norton Series in World Politics. New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2004. 462-71.
Henley & Partners. "Citizenship-by-Investment: Economic Citizenship." 23 June 2005.
<www.henleyglobal.com/m-citizenship5.htm>.
Horsman, Mathew, and Andrew Marshall. After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the
New World Disorder. London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1995.
Klusmeyer, Douglas B. Between Consent and Descent: Conceptions of Democratic Citizenship.
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996.
Kymlicka, Will, and Wayne Norman. "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on
Citizenship Theory." Ethics 104 (1994): 352-81.
Linklater, Andrew. The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the
Post-Westphalian Era. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998.
Malanczuk, Peter, and Michael Barton Akehurst. Akehurst's Modern Introduction to
International Law. London: Routledge, 2002.
Oldfield, Adrian. "Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?" Political Quarterly 61 (1990): 177-87.
Prak, Maarten. "Burghers into Citizens: Urban and National Citizenship in the Netherlands
During the Revolutionary Era (C. 1800)." Hanagan and Tilly. 7-35.
Preston, Larry M. "Freedom and Authority: Beyond the Precepts of Liberalism." The American
Political Science Review 77. 3 (1983): 666-74.

25

Rubenstein, Kim, and Daniel Adler. "International Citizenship: The Future of Nationality in a
Globalized World." Indiana Journal of Legal Studies 7. 2 (2000): 519-48.
Shanahan, Suzanne. "Scripted Debates: Twentieth-Century Immigration and Citizenship Policy
in Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States." Hanagan and Tilly. 67-96.
Stewart, Angus. "Two Conceptions of Citizenship." British Journal of Sociology 46.1 (1995):
63-78.
van Gunsteren, Herman R. A Theory of Citizenship: Organizing Plurality in Contemporary
Democracies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
Wagner, Antonín. "Redefining Citizenship for the 21st Century: From the National Welfare State
to the UN Global Compact." International Journal of Social Welfare 13. (2004): 278-86.
Wiener, Antje. "From Special to Specialized Rights: The Politics of Citizenship and Identity in
the European Union." Hanagan and Tilly. 195-227.
Zorn, Jelka. "The Politics of Exclusion Citizenship, Human Rights and the Erased in Slovenia."
(2004): 1-7. 29 Sep. 2005 <http://www.hsd.hr/revija/pdf/1-2-2004/05-Zorn.pdf>.

26

CHAPTER THREE: CITIZENSHIP ACQUISITION
The acquisition of citizenship is governed by domestic laws enacted by States, and
international law recognizes the State as the only legitimate granter of such citizenship.1
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts the rights of every individual to a
“nationality,”2 to freedom from arbitrary deprivation of such nationality and the right to change
nationality when so desired, 3 there is no international institution that exists which acts as
guarantor of these rights for the individual. Thus, despite the freedom-imbued language of the
right to change one’s citizenship presented in the Universal Declaration, citizenship is not an
elective status that one can simply maintain, change or renounce without the permission of some
relevant State power.
Individual choice is rarely exercised in citizenship acquisition (except for those cases
wherein a person decides to become a naturalized citizen and even then authorizations from the
State to which one seeks citizenship and renounces citizenship must first be received). This
chapter examines the primary methods of citizenship acquisition, the incidence of dual (or
multiple) citizenship possession, and the State’s ability to revoke formerly bestowed citizenship.
These three issues are examined in tandem because it is important to understand the rules for
acquiring State membership and how such membership may be lost in order to better address the
problems associated with statelessness presented in this thesis.
Primary Means and Trends in Acquisition
The majority of individuals around the globe obtain their citizenship automatically upon
birth registration via two primary means: jus soli (citizenship bestowed because of birth on a
given territory) and jus sanguinis (citizenship granted due to descent from an individual of a
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given territory).4 Citizenship may also be obtained via naturalization, adoption, or marriage, or
because of exceptional circumstances such as serving in the army of a State in which one is not a
citizen or because one has simply invested a certain amount of money in a State.5 The most
common form of citizenship acquisition, however, is jus sanguinis. Of the States whose
citizenship laws were coded from data acquired from the 2001 Citizenship Laws of the World
study, 100 percent of those States bestowed citizenship upon individuals via jus sanguinis while
only a third permitted citizenship acquisition via birth upon State territory.6
Of those 58 States that generally permit the acquisition of citizenship via jus soli, there
are several that place stipulations upon this form of acquisition such as: one of the parents must
first be a citizen (Armenia, Australia, Fiji, Kenya, Slovenia, the Russian Federation and the
United Kingdom), or the father must be citizen (Bahrain), or one of the parents must be a longterm resident (Germany). In India and Vanuatu, although citizenship may be obtained via jus
soli, it must be actively sought as it is not automatically given. Most of the States, however,
including those 114 that do not generally permit citizenship acquisition via jus soli, make an
exception in their law (if not necessarily always in practice) for stateless children. That is, if a
child is born on their territory who would not otherwise obtain citizenship via jus sanguinis and
would therefore be stateless, the State in question grants the child its respective citizenship.7
Just as there are often additional requirements to be met before citizenship via jus soli
may be obtained, citizenship acquisition via jus sanguinis must often fulfill certain requirements
as well. Thus, while all the States from which data were obtained permit some form of jus
sanguinis, only three quarters of them allow for automatic citizenship acquisition via descent
from the mother. The only exception to this rule in these States is if a child is born out of
wedlock and the father is either unknown or stateless. It is only in those instances that the mother
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may pass on her citizenship status to her child. Thus, a child born to an Egyptian mother and a
foreign father may not acquire Egyptian citizenship. In a similar vein, according to the
citizenship laws of the Bahamas, Uganda and Mozambique, only the father can legitimately pass
on his citizenship status if his child is born abroad. Thus, despite the widespread campaign for
the rights of women in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (wherein Article 9 stipulates that a mother has the right to pass on her
citizenship to her child), women are far from being on equal footing with men in this regard.8
Some States require that both parents be citizens in order for citizenship to be passed on
to their child (Argentina, Armenia, Bhutan, Chad, Mongolia and Swaziland, for example); while
others demand that either one or both parents be of a certain race (negroes of African descent in
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Malawi), or express their preference for citizens of a particular
ethnicity (Arabs in Jordan) in order to bestow citizenship via jus sanguinis. Other States require
that citizenship obtained via descent be confirmed by a given age or else such citizenship may be
lost (Canada and Venezuela for instance); still other States open their arms to potential citizens
long past the first generation has left the State and acquired citizenship elsewhere (up to the
second generation of descendants for Ireland and Libya and up to the third generation in the case
of Peru).
Citizenship acquisition via the two principal means of jus soli and jus sanguinis thus
differs from State to State and each State may or may not use a mixture of the two systems when
conferring citizenship. According to the literature on the granting of citizenship, States that
employ jus soli in order to organize their membership are typically more open than are States
which center upon citizenship bestowal via descent. The latter are described as embedding an
“ethnic character” that is minimally inclusive of newcomers (Bertocchi and Strozzi). The United
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States and Canada, territories that have traditionally attracted immigrants, are examples of States
that have rather liberal jus soli principles for granting citizenship whereas States that are of
recent formation (many African ones, for example) are generally centers of jus sanguinis
citizenship acquisition as these States seek to disassociate themselves from their former colonial
overlords and maintain a “native” polity.
Despite the differences in citizenship law, some scholars assert that the global trend is
toward convergence. In his analysis of the citizenship laws of 25 States, Patrick Weil found that
those States that are known for their jus soli practices became more restrictive in granting
citizenship over the past years (especially to the spouses of citizens from other States), while
those States whose membership was primarily based upon jus sanguinis practices gradually
accommodated themselves to jus soli citizenship laws (19). Graziella Bertocchi and Chiara
Strozzi, who also examined the Citizenship Laws of the World report, support Weil’s hypothesis
of citizenship law convergence. Based upon their time-series analysis of the varying State
citizenship laws (from 1974 to 2001), they found that mixed regimes were on the increase by
16%, while States that implemented solely jus soli practices decreased by 8% and those that
utilized only jus sanguinis principles decreased by 7% (15).
Although the decrease in the percentage of States who practice only jus soli or jus
sanguinis citizenship granting practices in Bertocchi and Strozzi’s study is not large, any
movement toward convergence in legal practices in this arena is significant as different
citizenship granting practices is one of the primary cause of statelessness globally.9 For instance,
a child who is born to parents from State X on the soil of State Y may not acquire citizenship if
State Y only recognizes the right to citizenship via jus sanguinis and the child is unable to attain
the citizenship of her parents from State X because her parents have been absent from that State
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for a given number of years and therefore are no longer able to confer their citizenship status via
descent to their daughter. Such differences in citizenship acquisition laws result in the potential
for thousands of individuals to be born without this legal status every year.
Dual (or Multiple) Citizenship
These same differences in citizenship acquisition laws and practices often translate into
the reverse scenario, however, whereby a person may become the bearer of more than one
citizenship. For example, an individual born in a State that bestows citizenship via jus soli to
parents from two different States that recognize citizenship via descent to children born abroad
has the potential to hold three citizenships. Many States do not require that their citizens
renounce membership to their State when the latter marry an individual from another State and
acquire the spouse’s citizenship status (although there are exceptions to this practice).
Of the 174 States for which dual citizenship acquisition information is available from the
Citizenship Laws of the World report, 47 of them (approximately 27%) recognize dual
citizenship.10 Several of these States limit this acquisition to non-naturalized citizens, however
(such as Uruguay, Mauritius, Paraguay and Trinidad & Tobago), and many States that do not
generally recognize dual citizenship make exceptions for certain States with which they have
historic ties (such as that which exists between Spain and some of its former South American
colonies). Some States, such as Sri Lanka, blatantly declare that exceptions to the non-allowance
of dual citizenship will be made if “it is felt to be of benefit” to the State concerned (United
States 185).
Despite the rather small percentage of States that explicitly recognize dual citizenship in
their laws, many States simply turn a blind eye to such multiple status acquisition and do not
necessarily revoke their respective citizenship status from persons who acquire more than one.
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This is evidenced by the growing number of dual citizens around the globe11 and the policy
changes in some States, such as Mexico, when it is recognized that dual citizenship is a pertinent
political tool which can permit State X’s interests to be heard in the State of immigration (Y) (the
United States [Y] in the case of Mexico [X], for example).
Thus, whereas dual nationality used to be viewed as an “evil” that could arouse
disloyalty12 and the 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality was
convened simply to decrease its presence internationally, dual or multiple citizenship is now
increasingly accepted among States (especially those with large émigré populations such as
Mexico). In fact, some scholars assert that such multiple citizenship statuses may potentially
pave the way for increased democratic principles to be shared among the world’s populace
(“Embracing Dual Nationality”) or may even promote peaceful interactions among States
(Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 85).13
State Revocation and Control
States do not always turn a blind eye to what they consider to be offenses worthy of
citizenship revocation committed by their citizens, however. The majority of States in the
Citizenship Laws of the World report maintain the right to revoke the citizenship status of their
members for various reasons (this is involuntary citizenship loss since it is not the individual that
decides to renounce her citizenship). Only a handful of States (Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, North Korea, Kuwait, Mongolia, New Zealand, Oman, Poland, Romania and Togo) do
not recognize the involuntary loss of citizenship. That is, these States stipulate that there is no
reason for one of their citizens to lose her citizenship status against her will; she may only lose
her citizenship if she renounces it voluntarily.
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While a minority of States, such as Costa Rica, do not recognize citizenship loss in any
form (whether voluntary or involuntary), the majority of States provide for voluntary
relinquishment of citizenship. International law requires that a person must already have another
citizenship available before she can voluntarily relinquish her original citizenship.14 Several
States do not abide by this ruling, however, and individuals have been rendered stateless when
their State has revoked their citizenship without finding out whether those individuals have
acquired the citizenship of another State first. Some of the reasons for involuntary loss of
citizenship in the Citizenship Laws of the World report range from failure to renew one’s
passport (Myanmar), inability to “adapt to the country’s custom” (Sao Tome & Principe),
residing more than three years abroad without government permission (Lithuania) and
converting to a religion other than Islam (Libya).15
Although the provision exists for changing one’s “nationality,” many States do not make
citizenship renunciation and acquisition of a new one an easy procedure. In Bhutan, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Jordan and the Maldives, to name just a few, special
permission must be sought from the respective Head of State or multiple government entities in
order to renounce one’s citizenship. In States such as Austria, Iran and Latvia, the State can
potentially refuse a renunciation request if it decides that military obligations have not been
fulfilled. In all cases, however, an individual cannot simply choose to renounce her citizenship
and be done with it, for the State (whether via a court decision or the approval of an ambassador
at an Embassy) generally must authorize this decision.16
Conclusion
Thus citizenship, whether pertaining to its renunciation or acquisition, is rarely about
choice or the desires and needs of individuals. It is almost entirely about State control and State
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power to decide who will obtain membership within its polity and how this membership may be
acquired. The following chapter explains how the State acquired the absolute authority to control
individual choice in this regard.
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NOTES
1

Article 1 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws asserts
that “[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals” (qtd. in Geske).
2
This is stated in Article 15.
3
This is taken from Article 16.
4
Acquisition by descent typically only goes as far back as one’s parents, although some States allow such
acquisition to extend to the third generation (see p. 29).
5
Known as “citizenship-by-investment,” Dominica, Grenada and St. Kitts and Nevis are the only States to grant
citizenship to those individuals who invest a given quantity of money into their respective economies while a few
other States, such as Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Switzerland and the United States offer residence to such
investors. See Henley & Partners for further information.
6
See Appendix B for an explanation of how the Citizenship Laws of the World report was coded and the table
containing the data on citizenship acquisition.
7
However, it should be noted that in some States, like Mongolia, the granting of citizenship to stateless children is
not automatic and the children must apply to the specific authorities (such as the President in the case of Mongolia)
in order to obtain it.
8
Algeria, the Bahamas, Bahrain, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Malaysia, Morocco, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia have reservations
concerning Article 9 of this Convention. These reservations typically state that citizenship may only be passed on
via the father (exceptions noted on pp. 28-29 of this chapter) or that this article of the Convention does not trump
that State’s own nationality code (Division for the Advancement of Women).
9
Various UNHCR publications such as Guidelines and the “Information and Accession Package” concerning the
1954 Convention cite conflicting citizenship laws as a main source of statelessness globally. Other scholars such as
Sarah Aird and her colleagues mention this in their text as well. One only need read the examples presented in
Chapter Five to understand how varying citizenship laws leave individuals in legal limbo.
10
Many States permit dual citizenship until a person reaches a given age (21 or 22 in the majority of cases) and then
require that the individual chooses which citizenship she wants to keep. Such States were not coded as permitting
dual citizenship simply because once the age of maturity is reached only one citizenship is allowed. Bertocchi and
Strozzi also found that 27% of the States “fully recognized” dual citizenship (16).
11
See “Plural Nationality” by T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, and “Embracing Dual Nationality”
by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for more information on this trend.
12
Refer to Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, especially pp. 70-76, for an overview of the traditional (often negative)
perspective regarding dual citizenship. Also, in A Brief History of Citizenship Heater relates how as far back as
imperial Rome dual citizenship was seen as a source of disloyalty. He notes that Cicero argued that “a man had to
choose” one citizenship because it placed too much of a strain on a person’s loyalty otherwise (35).
13
Karen Knop notes, however, that studies that point to the increase in dual citizenship around the globe rarely
include non-Western States in their sample (91).
14
This is according to Article 5.1 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. It should be noted that
this article only refers to the involuntarily stateless (those who did not choose to renounce their citizenship but had it
revoked anyway).
15
Chapter Six investigates in more detail the involuntary loss of citizenship and its implications for individuals and
regions.
16
Hanjian argues, however, that state permission is never necessary in order to relinquish one’s citizenship status.
He discusses the right to be voluntarily stateless in The Sovrien.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONSENT, CONTROL AND CITIZENSHIP
In the previous chapter it was noted that citizenship acquisition is largely controlled by
the laws and policies of States, sanctioned by international law. Aside from those persons who
naturalize and the rare individual that renounces her citizenship and voluntarily chooses to be
stateless, people are not typically free to decide to which polity they may belong. This has not
always been the case, however. For example, during and immediately after the American and
French revolutions, citizenship was an explicitly elective matter, and members of the polity were
expected to either reject or accept consensual allegiance to the newly formed State.1
It might be ventured that such a direct expression of consent to citizenship on the part of
the individual during that epoch was merely a product of revolutionary fervor and for that reason
it no longer forms part of the activity of the citizenry in these States.2 However, consent to
citizenship was not merely a fad of revolutionary republics in the 1700s. Even in the city-states
of ancient Greece, although these were highly exclusionary bodies, citizenship was not
automatically granted to males simply because they lived on the territory of, or were descendants
of citizens from, these city-states. Citizenship was based on the ideal that a (qualified) male
would want and choose to take part in the “highest form of human association” possible
(Klusmeyer 13).
By examining the social contract literature and its proponents, this chapter investigates
how the notion of individual free will was subsumed under the will of the State. It discusses
some of the criticism directed toward the social contract ideal, such as lack of individual choice
and the imbalanced nature of the citizen-State relationship, and examines the implications of the
use of the social contract for relations between individuals and States.
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The Social Contract
The social contract is presented as the basis for the citizen-State relationship in most of
the literature on citizenship.3 This contract provides for the legitimization of State authority over
people (subjects or citizens), and generally discloses the rights and duties of each party to the
contract (each “party” being the State and every respective citizen or subject).4 The social
contract has invariably been described as a set of promises, an account of political obligation,
and the source of lawful government among other things. It basically requires that individuals
cede certain rights to the State in order to receive benefits from and protection (of their selves
and their goods) by the State. Patrice Canivez summarizes the function of the contract as
“solv[ing] a fundamental problem: the reconciliation of security and liberty” (396).
Although many scholars and policy analysts write of the social contract as if it were a
concrete document that existed at some point in time (especially at the founding of a State), this
is not the case. The social contract is a heuristic device employed by some scholars to aid them
in their study of the citizen-State relationship and the allocation of power between these two
parties. Thus, when individuals speak of the breaking of the social contract, illusions may be
dashed, but a formal, tangible contract is never broken. As Robert Ginsberg remarks, “The
Contract is a priori, not empirical” (115).
Classical Theorists
The notion of the social contract has existed in some form at least since the time of
Socrates,5 but it is with the advent of Thomas Hobbes’ writings that it really gained currency in
political thought. Hobbes developed the idea of the social contract in order to explain how
government (or the sovereign as he termed it) originated, and also to provide an account of the
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legitimacy of government. He utilized the description of the “state of nature” (wherein life was
brief and cruel, and the potential for a war of all against all always existed) to justify the rise of a
sovereign power and its concomitant authority to demand obedience from its subjects in
exchange for protection from “brutish” acts. According to Hobbes, individuals transfer any rights
that they might have had in the state of nature to the sovereign (except for the right to selfpreservation).6 The sovereign thereby commands absolute authority and demands absolute
obedience in return for maintaining social and political order.
In Hobbes’ version of the social contract, the sovereign is supreme judge as well as ruler.
Rightness is equated with the judgment of the sovereign, and expressed consent is not a
necessary condition for instituting a citizen-State relationship.7 A movement away from such a
restrictive and State-focused relationship is presented in the work of John Locke. One of Locke’s
primary concerns is to secure the rights of people in the face of the growing power of the State.
Thus Locke introduces a more volitional conceptualization of the citizen-State relationship
wherein individuals voluntarily surrender themselves to the will of the sovereign and maintain
rights that they would have previously held in the “state of nature.”8 Should the sovereign be
unable to protect these rights, the people are permitted to rebel against it.
As opposed to Hobbes, Locke does not believe that any social contract based upon
slavery or force is valid, and he also rejects birthright citizenship as a means of entering the
citizen-State relationship precisely because political choice is a null issue in such instances.9
Even though Locke introduces the notion of people as rational beings who enter citizen-State
relationships of their own volition, he does not permit allegiances to change once a person has
committed herself to a given State: “He maintained that anyone who gave express consent to a
commonwealth was perpetually and indispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably a
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Subject to it” (Schuck and Smith 32).10 Thus, although the individual may retain certain rights
against the State in Lockean social contract theory, she is not always as free to contest State
authority as Locke would have it be believed.
It is with Jean-Jacques Rousseau that the idea of a State’s political legitimacy being
challenged is most forthrightly asserted. In Rousseau’s writings there is a more collectivist as
opposed to individualist understanding of the relationship of citizens to the State. Rousseau
introduces the concept of the “general will” which is comprised of each individual subordinating
her will and rights to constitute a collective will which is consequently able to “judge and
rejudge” the actions of the sovereign.11 Rousseau states, “only the general will can direct the
powers of the State in such a way that the purpose for which it has been instituted, which is the
good of all, will be achieved” (Social Contract 190).
The authority of the general will to direct actions has a more sinister aspect, however, in
that the general will is permitted to coerce people to be “free.” Rousseau asserts that,
“In order, then, that the social compact may not be but a vain formula, it must contain,
though unexpressed, the single undertaking which can alone give force to the whole,
namely, that whoever shall refuse to obey the general will must be constrained by the
whole body of his fellow citizens to do so; which is no more than to say that it may be
necessary to compel a man to be free” (Social Contract 184).
Individual volition therefore is dangerously subsumed under what is deemed to be the
“real” will of all.12 Thus, despite the introduction of the equality of all under the social contract
(or Compact as Rousseau calls it), and the idea that citizens not only have a relationship (and
obligations) to the State but to their fellow citizens as well,13 Rousseau’s writings on the social
contract demonstrate that individual rights, while provided for in civil society, do not find
adequate protection against the supreme “general will.” Absolute State control therefore appears
to have been replaced by the absolute control of the amorphous “general will.”
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Immanuel Kant believed that a republican form of government could constitute the most
appropriate balance between the sovereign’s power, the general will, and the rights of the people
that lived under the sovereign’s jurisdiction. He felt that the division of sovereign powers into
executive, judiciary and legislative sectors could best prevent any State excess and render the
State more accountable to the citizens. Although Kant agreed with Hobbes that the State (or
sovereign as the case may be) was the absolute judge in all matters concerning the citizen-State
relationship, his version of the contract permitted citizens to voice their concerns via public
criticism against any presumed injustice on the part of the State.14 In contrast to Hobbes, Kant
“refurbished the Contract to account for the practical power of moral principles in politics,
whereas Hobbes’ Contract equates rightness with whatever is practiced by the absolute political
power of the sovereign” (Ginsberg 118).
Despite this last theorist’s inclusion of moral principles into the political realm and his
support of citizen rights, the social contract that he promulgated was not that much different at
the core than that promulgated by Hobbes and the other earlier theorists. The State is still the
ultimate ruler (justified in different ways by the varied theorists) and the social contract still lays
down the rules of relations between the citizen and the State (mostly in favour of the State). It is
with David Hume that the tradition of social contract criticism begins. To such criticism this
investigation now turns.
Criticism of the Social Contract
Hume considered invalid the use of the social contract to explain why citizens generally
follow the laws of the State and work in tandem with their co-citizens to achieve common goals.
According to Hume, such activity is not due to some hypothetical social contract, but to that
which comes prior to the contract and upon which such a contract must be based – convention. A
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convention, as described by Hume, is “the artifice or mechanism enabling social and political
order to become established” (Lawrence 138). It is the performance of an action due to simple
interest or utility (and not because of a promise to realize such an action stipulated in a contract).
Dario Castiglione states that Hume wants to demonstrate “the essentially non-legal idea that
there are forms and principles of coordination which human beings hit upon in the course of
pursuing their own interests” (99). Social contracts do not arise naturally whereas cooperation
and coordination toward a common goal do. Thus, it is simply convention and not the social
contract that really drives people to work together in civil society and to adhere to the State’s
injunctions.
Hume also pointed out another fallacy with regard to the social contract thesis – some
authors who supported this tradition wrote of the contract as if individuals could readily
manoeuvre in and out of contract-based alliances with the State (as if people’s political
allegiances were really a choice). Hume was quick to point out that one could not simply decide
that the State to which she was a citizen no longer satisfied her political interests and move to
another State that better suited her beliefs for there were “practical constraints” such as “a basic
freedom to move” that readily deterred such a possibility from actualizing.15 This lack of choice
concerning to which State one could give her political allegiance was to become one of the major
criticisms of the social contract literature.
Lack of Choice
Aside from the inability to just pick up and move to another State due to practical
concerns such as a lack of transportation and money, one’s ability to relocate is also
circumscribed by the laws and actions of States themselves. As noted in Chapter Three, States
control who will be members of their polity and how individuals will gain entrance via
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naturalization and ascription laws (jus soli and jus sanguinis). Hanjian feels that such laws
amount to dictating where an individual’s political allegiance should be placed and “unabashedly
deny individual liberty, self-determination, and freedom of association” (46). Johannes Chan
agrees, adding that “[t]o perpetuate human bondage by anchoring people in a particular territory
through nationality is offensive and inhuman, and is usually accompanied by a violation of
freedom of movement” (13).
Hanjian notes that although myriad laws exist that demarcate the boundaries of who may
become a citizen, no laws exist that permit an individual to choose to become a citizen of
nowhere (stateless). Thus, one has no right not to belong to the club of States according to
international law even though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that “[n]o one
may be compelled to belong to an association” (Article 20.2).16 This degree of compulsion by
States to make individuals citizens without their direct acquiescence is a result of the State’s
largely unquestioned use of “tacit” consent.
Consent
For the purposes of this thesis, implicit consent refers to assent given to the State via
indirect methods (such as residency in a State and non-renunciation of citizenship acquired
through birth or descent). In comparison, explicit consent requires that a member of the State
directly express her assent to be a citizen (as when an oath to that effect is taken at a given age,
for example). Hobbes was a stalwart supporter of the doctrine of implicit consent to bestow
citizenship17 and other social contract theorists, such as Rousseau, readily ascribed to citizenship
acquisition via implicit consent as well. According to Rousseau, residence in a State acts as
acquiescence to the social contract since the resident will receive benefits from the State (such as
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property protection and the use of roads and utilities maintained by the State). In return, the
resident must oblige to the State’s laws and offer the State her support in times of need (or else
face expulsion).18
That the social contract is taken as binding upon individuals born to citizens of a given
State or born on the State’s territory is also criticized. Adam Smith vehemently rejected the
notion that descendants of people who initially agreed to a given social contract should be bound
by that contract. In a similar vein to Hume’s argument that one cannot simply leave a State due
to “practical constraints,” Smith believed that “[n]o inference of tacit consent could be drawn
from the mere fact that the subjects remain living in the land of their birth, because they had no
choice in where their birth occurred and rare prospects of resettling in a different country”
(Klusmeyer 35).19
As concerns the granting of citizenship to those who happen to be born in a territory
under the jurisdiction of a State (whether of citizen parents or not), Locke held that “[a] Child is
born a Subject of no country or government. He is under his Father’s Tuition and Authority, till
he come to Age of Discretion; and then he is a Free-man, at liberty what Government he will put
himself under; what Body Politick he will unite himself to” (Klusmeyer 32). Locke is therefore
advocating that a person choose her political membership once she has come of age to recognize
the import of such a decision. This precept is largely disregarded today, however, since no State
requires that a person who acquires citizenship via jus soli or jus sanguinis take an oath or
“choose” to remain a citizen of that State at a given age or after a set time period.20
There are several consequences of the use of tacit consent for citizenship acquisition.
Firstly, the use of tacit consent may result in a body politic that is unaware of the policies and
obligations of the State institution that it supposedly supports or its own responsibilities to that
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State.21 Secondly, citizenship acquisition via tacit consent could lead to an apathetic citizenry
that may demonstrate a lack of commitment to the State. Finally, such involuntary consent could
cause the body politic to become openly hostile toward the State because the former has not
agreed to the premises or policies of the latter.22 As Hanjian points out, without the explicit
consent on the part of individual (and not just the State) to the citizen-State relationship, “one is
more likely to: feel no commitment to making the relationship work, reject responsibilities that
one allegedly bears as party to the relationship, make no effort to perpetuate the relationship, and
make every effort to dissolve the relationship” (76).
Regardless of whether one holds to the premise that individuals may attempt to dissolve
the citizen-State relationship as Hanjian posits, it is clear that any relationship that is patently
one-sided in terms of deciding who may or may not enter and leave, and the “when and how” of
the relationship, is likely to produce less than optimal outcomes, especially for the party that is
left in a non-decision-making capacity due to assumed tacit consent. What follows are some
examples of the imbalanced nature of the citizen-State relationship.
Imbalance in the Citizen-State Relationship
State Monopoly
As noted previously, Hobbes’ version of the social contract was tilted decidedly in favour
of total obedience to the State. Although absolute obedience to a State, no matter how good or
bad at governance, is not readily promulgated today, the citizen-State relationship is still biased
toward fulfilling the needs and interests of the State before the citizen. In the Citizenship
Acquisition chapter it was noted that the State is the preeminent legal entity in international law
with the capacity to determine membership via domestic laws. The State’s rights and privileges
trump any rights that an individual might have in human rights treaties as well. For example,
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even though Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone has
the right to a “nationality,” it no where delineates how this right will be obtained (that is, which
State will grant it and how).23 Thus, any rights that might be attained through the bearing of
citizenship (such as the right to work, to speech, to protection from bodily harm, etc.) depend
entirely on whether the State grants an individual the basic status of citizenship or not.
Even in terms of the definition of what a citizen is or is not, international law is described
as being slanted in favour of States. Says Hanjian, “the UN definition presumes that an
individual’s citizenship status depends solely on whether or not some state considers that
individual as one of its own. The will and consent of the individual are irrelevant. Only the will
of the state is recognized” (4).24 He adds that,
“A state believes that it has the prerogative to dissolve a citizen-state relationship
under whatever conditions it sees fit (via denationalization laws) and the prerogative
to impose on individuals the conditions under which they may dissolve a citizen-state
relationship (via expatriation laws). Of course, states deny that individuals have any
reciprocal prerogatives: individuals are denied the freedom to opt out of the citizenstate relationship as they see fit and individuals cannot impose on states conditions for
denationalization. This contrived inequity, which disproportionately affords one
party more freedom than the other in the dissolution of their relationship, is patently
dismissed in the context of other human relations” (199).
The “contrived inequity” of which Hanjian speaks has been a part of the citizen-State
relationship since Hobbes justified the absolute power of the sovereign and made it the judge and
executor in its relations with citizens. One of the greatest inequalities in this relationship
according to Sanford Wood is perhaps the fact that the State can rid itself of the citizen in
Hobbes’ social contract theory, but the citizen cannot rid itself of the State. Says Wood,
“Hobbes…arg[ues] that subjects can never ‘cast off’ the sovereignty that they once instituted”
(197). Aside from absolute control in determining membership, Williamson Evers comments that
any citizen-State relationship built upon the social contract “entail[s] in practice a contract of at
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least partial self-enslavement to Socrates’ Athenian regime, to Hobbes’ sovereign, to Locke’s
majority, [and] to Rousseau’s popular law-making assembly and administrative government”
(193). Thus, a citizen may never be truly free in a relationship that is based upon the traditional
notion of the social contract.
Masculine Conceptualizations
Other scholars have pointed out that the imbalance in this relationship exists because of a
decidedly masculine conceptualization of the terms “citizen” and “State.” These masculine
conceptions in turn render the interpretation of the citizen-State relationship masculine in
expression (acknowledging “rational and public considerations” as the appropriate citizenship
domain, for instance, at the expense of the private realm or what are deemed “women’s”
considerations).
Several feminist authors, such as Nira Yuval Davis and Iris Marion Young, have
challenged readers to move beyond this interpretation of the citizen-State relationship. A few of
the suggestions that they have made to rectify the imbalance in the citizen-State relationship are
the incorporation of a politics of difference (which recognizes group and individual diversity
without trying to subsume everyone’s identity under a “universal,” typically masculine-defined,
citizenship)25 and “maternal thinking” (which stresses an ethic of care and responsibility, as
opposed to strict individualism and a rights-focus).26
Castiglione, examining Hume’s arguments against the social contract, observes that
contract theorists ignore the importance of the feminine and how many relationships evolve
from, and are bound by, the private sphere: “By excluding the simple proposition that social and
political relationships are the outgrowth of natural, mainly familial, relationships and patterns of
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behaviour, contract theories clearly implied an artificial conception of the forces which hold the
social fabric together and which establish and reinforce political obligation” (96).
Communitarians, briefly discussed in Chapter Two, also criticize the social contractarian
notion that individuals are rational beings who make political decisions outside of a given
historical and socio-cultural context. That social contract theorists speak of the citizenry as if
they only make up a coherent and functional body when under the jurisdiction of the State
ignores the fact that humans are social beings who have united in groups in different social
contexts for thousands of years. The State has not been, is not, and will not be the only
association to which they belong.
Conclusion
Citizen-State relations are decidedly inequitable in terms of the ability of both parties to
opt in and out of the citizen-State relationship on the same grounds or to create the rules of polity
membership. Social contract theory is largely responsible for justifying the State’s dominance in
this regard with its claims of State protection in exchange for a given degree of obedience by the
people. This literature ignores that other forms of political membership are possible that can
generate social order without the threat of force that inheres in the citizen-State relationship27 and
it also ignores the implications of this imbalanced relationship upon citizens. As is illustrated in
the following chapters, the dominance of State membership decision-making over that of
individuals has even more dire consequences for those who are unable to acquire any citizenship
at all.
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NOTES
1

Apparently nationality was not a concern in France as honorary citizenship was granted to individuals like the
American Thomas Paine who supported the revolutionary movement. Faulks states, “Tallien’s comment in 1795 that
‘the only foreigners in France are bad citizens’ [i]s an example of how the rights declared in the revolution were
intended to reach beyond boundaries of states and to apply to all men regardless of nationality” (33). See also
Klusmeyer pp. 51-56 for a description of the volitional character of these two republics and the civic oath that had to
be expressed in France before citizenship could be acquired.
2
France has apparently been considering the reinstatement of the revolutionary notion of citizenship as choice.
According to van Gunsteren, the French government would like citizenship to be acquired through “explicit choice
rather than quasi-automatically” (9).
3
What follows is an extreme simplification of the social contract literature. For a more detailed examination of the
different types of social contracts that have existed (moral, civil and constitutional) see the overview presented by
David Boucher and Paul Kelly in The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls.
4
Although Williamson Evers holds that “[t]he sovereign is really a beneficiary rather than a party to the Hobbesian
social contract” (187).
5
See Evers, pp. 185-187, and David Boucher and Paul Kelly p. 2 (specifically concerning Socrates’ Crito).
6
See Jeremy Jennings, p. 117, for more on Hobbes stance on rights transferal.
7
Evers notes that “[i]n cases of conquest, kidnapping, or capture, Hobbes contends that contracts made under such
conditions are entirely valid” (188).
8
Refer to Evers p. 188 and Patrick Pharo p. 345 for further explanation.
9
See Evers p.188 and Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith p. 11 for Locke’s beliefs concerning birth-right citizenship.
10
Pharo concurs stating that “[i]n Locke, the unique moment of the initial compact creates legal conditions of
political legitimacy that are valid for ever” (346).
11
This information is obtained from Pharo, p. 346.
12
For a critique of Rousseau’s “general will” see Canivez, especially pp. 403-406, and Evers p. 191.
13
Rousseau states, for example, that citizens are “all equal by reason of the Social Contract” (Social Contract 263)
and denotes in Book II of his work how the contract is an equalizing force. With regard to each citizen’s duties to
her co-citizen, consult chapter VII of Book I (especially p. 181 of Social Contract).
14
Refer to Ginsberg, p. 117.
15
See note seven of Douglas Klusmeyer, p.32.
16
Hanjian argues that the State is an association and that “if it is not reasonable for some association (with the best
utilitarian intentions and the most democratic means) to impose membership and corresponding responsibilities on
an individual, then how can it be reasonable for a state (with the best utilitarian intentions and the most democratic
means) to impose citizenship and corresponding obligations on an individual [?]” (69).
17
This is stated in Evers, p. 188.
18
Hanjian is particularly adverse to the notion that residence infers consent to a State’s policies and rules. “By any
reasonable standard, the fact that one intentionally maintains close connections to a certain people and to a certain
place on the earth has nothing to do with whether or not one consents to participate in a citizen-state relationship
with a state that attempts to rule over that particular people and that particular place[…]one’s habitual residence
within a certain territory may well be motivated by concerns other than one’s political interests or affiliations” (115).
19
In another place Smith asserted, “Such is the case with every subject of the state. They came into the world
without having the place of their birth of their own choosing, so that we may say they came asleep into the country;
nor is it in the power of the greater part to leave the country without the greatest inconveniences. So that there is
here no tacit consent of the subjects. They have no idea of it, so that it can not be the foundation of their obedience”
(qtd. in Lemmens 8).
20
The topic of electing one’s citizenship (“citizenship-as-choice”) is addressed in the final chapter.
21
Castiglione and Jeremy Waldron make this argument in their respective works.
22
Hanjian makes both the second and third arguments in The Sovrien.
23
Johannes Chan states that as long as this Article does not delineate such rules of procedure and acquisition, “the
right to a nationality is largely meaningless” (3).
24
Hanjian is referring to Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons which defines a
stateless person as one “who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.” This
renders membership explicitly a State, as opposed to individual, consideration.
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25

See specifically Young’s article, “Polity and Group Difference,” for more on this subject.
Consult Elshtain’s work “Antigone’s Daughters” for a review of maternal thinking in the context of citizenship
practices.
27
John Hoffman, for instance, notes that “[s]tateless societies maintain order through non-statist sanctions,
economics and moral pressures, ostracism, etc.” (5). Evers points out that while Socrates argued for the necessity of
rules for social order he did not say that the rules “have to be political in the narrow sense of being authorized and
imposed by a government” for “rules may be accepted as a matter of custom, habit or rational insight” (185).
26
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE ACQUISITION OF STATELESSNESS
A stateless person is an individual who is not recognized as a citizen “by any State under
the operation of its law” (Article 1, “Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons”).
This definition has been criticized because: 1) it is State-based and does not consider individual
choice or preference in determining membership1 and, 2) it does not take into account persons
who are not de jure but are de facto stateless (that is, persons who nominally hold a citizenship
but are not able to exercise all the rights to which that citizenship should entitle them).2
For the purposes of this thesis, the definition articulated by the United Nations (UN) in
the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons is maintained while referring to
stateless persons for simplicity (several references are made to UN documents and scholars using
this definition) and because de jure citizenship is currently the first step toward acquiring other
rights. That is, for those who hold no citizenship, it is not a question of whether they are enjoying
all the rights to which they are entitled, but whether they have any rights at all. Once one at least
bears a citizenship, and is therefore legally recognized by a State, one is then in a better position
to make a stand for other rights. In this regard, de jure citizenship is essential.
Voluntary versus Involuntary Statelessness
While statelessness is statelessness in the eyes of the law, there is a major distinction
between those who are voluntarily stateless and those who are not. A voluntary stateless person
refers to someone who has chosen to renounce her citizenship, while an involuntary stateless
person is one who either lost or never obtained citizenship through no choice of her own.
Individuals may choose to give up their citizenship for a variety of reasons, some of which are:
they do not agree with the policies of the State to which they are citizens;3 they do not want to be
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part of the State system;4 they are trying to escape citizenship obligations (whether financial,
penal or military);5 or they want to become citizens of another State. Involuntary statelessness,
on the other hand, is not a choice. It is a result of factors beyond an individual’s control such as
birth to a stateless person, lack of birth registration, conflicting citizenship laws,
denationalization or holding citizenship to a State that no longer exists.
Causes of Involuntary Statelessness
Birth to a Stateless Person
Birth to a stateless person may render a person automatically stateless unless the State on
whose territory the individual was born either practices jus soli procedures regardless of the legal
status of the child’s parent(s), or adheres to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness which explicitly states that “[a] Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a
person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless” (Article 1). Many States do not
grant citizenship to stateless children if the citizenship status of their parents is unknown or in
“legal limbo,” however. In the first global study on State practices concerning statelessness, the
UNHCR surveyed 74 of the 191 Member States6 and found that 20.3% of the States do not grant
citizenship to children born in their State even if failing to do so would render them stateless
(Department of International Protection 14).
Birth Not Registered
Absence of birth registration is another important source of statelessness; for without
registration, a child does not typically have the opportunity to acquire a citizenship. As Carol
Batchelor points out, “Registration of birth is a critical factor in establishing the right to a
nationality in all legal systems, for the birth certificate will indicate where the child is born,
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making acquisition of nationality by jus soli possible, and to whom the child is born, making
acquisition of nationality by jus sanguinis possible” (166).
Although Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child stipulates that a child
“shall be registered immediately after birth” and have “the right to acquire a nationality,”7 birth
registration does not automatically confer citizenship to children in all States. The UNHCR
observes, for instance, that in most of Asia, “registration at birth does not give a child a right to
citizenship in their country of birth if the parents are not nationals of that state” (“Statelessness
and Citizenship”).8 They also note that in Russia “non-Russian or stateless parents are unable to
register the births of their children if they are not themselves legally resident in the country.”
It is estimated that some 50 million births each year go unregistered, with the highest
percentage of unregistered births occurring in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Aird, Harnett
and Shah 4). Reasons for not registering the birth of a child include: absence of a mandatory
birth registration system in a State;9 fear of discrimination, persecution or expulsion;10 ignorance
of State registration requirements; inability to access registration centers;11 and cost.12 Even
when a group does not fear persecution, race and ethnicity often hinder birth registration in some
States when the ruling party refuses to register the birth of groups that it does not “deem fit” for
citizenship by ignoring its own citizenship laws.13 For instance, in 2002 the Thai Ministry of the
Interior specifically directed district officials not to register the births of children born to
undocumented parents (Physicians for Human Rights 29).
Conflict in Laws
Statelessness may also be the inadvertent result of the application of different State
citizenship laws to a person. As noted in Chapter Three, sometimes an individual is born in a
State which grants citizenship based upon jus sanguinis practices to parents who were not born
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in that State. Thus, unless the State that the parents were born in readily provides citizenship to
children of their citizens born abroad, statelessness may result. For instance, if a child is born to a
Bahamian or Ugandan mother while in another State, unless she is able to acquire the citizenship
of the State of her father (which may be tempered by residency and marital requirements), she
will become stateless. Also, a child born out of wedlock to an Austrian father and a non-Austrian
mother whose State does not recognize citizenship acquisition via the maternal line will be
rendered stateless. There are myriad other ways in which individuals may be rendered stateless
through such differences in State citizenship laws.14
Denationalization
Statelessness can also occur when a State revokes the citizenship of one of its members
(denationalization). Although the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness calls on all
States to refrain from revoking a person’s citizenship until she has obtained another one (Articles
5 and 7), the UNHCR observes that some States “will not grant [their] nationality until the
individual has first renounced nationality” of the State to which she currently holds membership
(Guidelines 6). For instance, prior to changes in Ukrainian citizenship laws, the Crimean Tatars15
had to first “renounce the citizenship of their country of previous forced residency” without any
guarantee of receiving Ukrainian citizenship in return (European Commission & the UNHCR 9).
Other States, such as Bhutan, allow for the loss of citizenship without first making the loss
contingent upon the acquisition of another citizenship (Heffernan 4).
Reasons for denationalization include acquisition of another citizenship, political activity
in another State (voting, holding office, and serving in the military), failure to renew one’s
passport, residency abroad, obtaining citizenship via fraudulent means, divorce, being deemed a
“security threat” or failing to adapt to a State’s “customs,” among others.16 Women are often
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particularly susceptible to statelessness because of laws that permit revocation of citizenship due
to changes in marital status. Thus, despite the Conventions on the Nationality of Married Women
(1957), on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) and on the
Reduction of Statelessness (1961) which all “seek to ensure a woman’s nationality will not be
detrimentally affected by a change in her civil status” (UNHCR Guidelines 5), statelessness
continues to result precisely because of changes in marital status. For example, some States (like
Mali) revoke citizenship upon a woman’s marriage to a foreigner because they assume that she
will obtain the citizenship of her husband’s State. Other States revoke citizenship from
naturalized women when they become divorced from their husbands without first ensuring that
she will regain her original citizenship (South Korea and Swaziland, for instance).
Sometimes citizens are denationalized for purely political reasons or because of a fear
that they might threaten a State’s customs or a governing regime’s privileges. The UNHCR
observes that “[g]overnments may amend their citizenship laws and denationalize whole sections
of society in order to punish or marginalize them or to facilitate their exclusion from the state’s
territory” (“Statelessness and Citizenship”). The Biharis are one such group that has been
rendered stateless as a form of punishment. Descendants of people who sided with West Pakistan
when East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) attempted to secede from the Union and form its own
State, the Biharis have been consistently denied citizenship from both Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Despite their predecessors’ siding with Western Pakistan during the secessionist movement, the
Biharis are not considered citizens of Pakistan because they are born in Bangladesh. Bangladesh,
however, will not grant the Biharis citizenship because “elements within the government and the
people still hold them accountable for 1971 abuses perpetuated by the Pakistani regime” (Khan
15). Thus, some 230,000 Biharis remain stateless in camps in Bangladesh (Khan 14).
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The Kurds and ethnic Russians are two groups that are oftentimes refused citizenship in
their States of residence for purposes of marginalization. Some Kurdish groups are situated in
areas that are resource rich (such as those who live around Kirkuk, Iraq), while others are
considered a threat to State sovereignty because of their desire to form their own State. Thus, the
State utilizes the denial of citizenship to render them legally impotent against any incursions it
may make upon them or upon their land for resources. Under Saddam Hussein’s regime, for
example, more than one million Faili Kurds were stripped of their citizenship and deported to
Iran because they were Shia, Kurd and deemed “Iranian” (by Hussein).17 Syria has also
denationalized some of its Kurdish peoples,18 while Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iran, along
with Iraq and Syria, refuse to recognize the right of the Kurdish people to an independent
Kurdistan, rendering them the largest stateless population in the world.19
Many ethnic Russians in the diaspora, while nominally possessing a motherland to which
they could belong (Russia), are instead kept in a condition of statelessness due to their birth in
territories that no longer form part of what was then the Soviet Union. These ethnic Russians
were considered illegitimate residents or “occupiers” and consequently denied citizenship in
many of the newly formed or liberated Eastern European and Central Asian States. Estonia and
Latvia were particularly criticized for their citizenship laws that effectively excluded from
citizenship any one who was not a descendant of a citizen prior to Soviet occupation.20 Since the
late 1990s both States have relaxed their citizenship laws to grant citizenship to legally resident
Russians, although a sizeable number of stateless people remain.21
Fear of “foreign elements” sometimes plays its role in State decisions to denationalize as
well. The Estate Tamils in Sri Lanka, a group that was brought over by the British from India
during colonial rule to work on the tea plantations,22 have until recently been denied Sri Lankan
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citizenship. While India opened its arms to many of these ethnic Indians in the early days after
the end of the British Empire, Sri Lanka was not as receptive. Gerrard Khan notes, “The NehruKotelawala Pact in 1954 provided that India would accept the repatriation of those Indian Tamils
who wanted Indian citizenship but did not accept the Sri Lankan position that those who did not
meet criteria for Sri Lankan citizenship would be automatically given Indian citizenship. This
left over 900,000 Tamils still stateless in Sri Lanka” (9).
That is, many Estate Tamils, born and raised in Sri Lanka, their families having tilled the
land for generations, did not consider themselves Indian and wished to become citizens of Sri
Lanka instead. Sri Lanka, however, felt that the Estate Tamils represented a threat to Sinhalese
identity (they were lower caste and a remnant of the colonial past that it wished to ignore) and
refused them citizenship. It was not until 2004, driven by fear of further civil unrest should the
Estate Tamils join the Tamil Tigers in the secessionist movement, that Sri Lanka began to admit
some Estate Tamils to State membership.23 Khan notes, however, that many Estate Tamils
continue to be barred from Sri Lankan citizenship because of applications for Indian citizenship
that their parents or grandparents sent in years ago (12).
The ethnic Nepalis (also known as Lhotshampas) are another stateless group whose
condition is a result of ethnically motivated fear. Once welcomed to settle in Bhutan when it was
suffering labour shortages, and having been migrating to Bhutan for generations, the
Lhotshampas are now the object of retroactive citizenship laws that denationalize them because
of elite fear that they are a threat to Ngalong cultural identity.24 Certain members of the Russian
Duma have also been toying with the idea of denationalization as a means of protecting “the
gene pool of [the] nation” (“Russians Who Wed Foreigners Should Be Exiled?”). In June, for
example, a bill was drafted by conservative elements of the Duma that stipulated that Russians

59

who married foreigners would be denationalized and “forced to live in the country where their
spouses were from” in order to protect Russia from “an invasion of alien elements” (“Russians
Who Wed Foreigners Should Be Exiled?”).
Thus denationalization may occur in a number of ways – from laws that assume a woman
will take on the citizenship of her husband to purposeful group action against a perceived threat
from another ethnic group. Except for the few States that were mentioned in Chapter Three that
do not involuntarily denationalize on any grounds,25 most States retain the right to revoke
citizenship from their members without their consent.
State Dissolution
Finally, a person may lose her citizenship when the State of which she is a member
ceases to exist and she does not obtain the new citizenship of the successor State. This happened
to many people who were citizens of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
during the 1990s. These States, of which they held membership, simply ceased to exist and new
States formed to take their place that did not necessarily grant their membership to all previous
Soviet, Yugoslav or Czechoslovakian citizens.
The stateless condition of many ethnic Russians in the diaspora was briefly addressed
above, and the UNHCR provides a concise example of the issues that former Czechoslovakian
and Yugoslav citizens faced upon their States’ dissolution: “Was a former Czechoslovak citizen
now Czech or Slovak? Was someone born in Belgrade, raised in Sarajevo, now married to
someone from Zagreb and living in Ljubliana, a Yugoslav, Bosnian, Croat or Slovene citizen?”
(“Displacement in the Former Soviet Union” 189). Despite having been born and having lived in
a territory their entire lives, many of these people were not guaranteed membership in the new
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States where they resided because of their ethnicity. Others faced administrative battles in
proving their birth or demonstrating that they were not citizens of a neighbouring State.26
Conclusion
Statelessness is a condition of legal invisibility. Without a citizenship, stateless people are
not entitled to legal standing within a State and all the concomitant rights and protections that
this bestows. While some people voluntarily renounce their citizenship, the majority of stateless
individuals around the globe have acquired this status involuntarily. They were either rendered
stateless because of conditions they were born into (birth to a stateless parent, birth in a State
whose laws do not cover the individual) or because of manipulation of citizenship laws by those
that govern States (citizenship as an instrument of State policy). The sources of statelessness are
as varied as the groups that suffer from this lack of standing. The following chapter examines the
myriad implications of statelessness at the individual, regional and global levels.

61

NOTES
1

As mentioned previously Hanjian states that “the UN definition presumes that an individual’s citizenship status
depends solely on whether or not some state considers that individual as one of its own. The will and consent of the
individual are irrelevant. Only the will of the state is recognized” (4).
2
Both Batchelor and Francis Deng argue for including the de facto stateless in the UN definition. As noted by the
UNHCR in their 1998 report, “[t]he Final Acts of both the 1954 and 1961 Conventions recommend to Contracting
States that persons who are stateless de facto (who have a nationality in name which is not effective) should as far as
possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an effective nationality” (Guidelines 3), but this is
not forthrightly stated in an Article of either of the statelessness conventions.
3
For example, several hundred Israeli Jews renounced their Israeli citizenship because they did not condone Israel’s
policies toward Palestine (“Jews Renounce Legal Right to Israeli Citizenship”).
4
One of the authors discussed in this work, Clark Hanjian, gave up his United States citizenship because he does not
agree with the State system.
5
Bobby Fischer, the famous U.S. chess player who violated international sanctions in 1992 when he played a match
in the former Yugoslavia, is an example of someone who renounced his citizenship because he did not want to face
possible criminal charges in his home State (see “Chess Legend Renounces U.S. Status”).
6
UNHCR sent the questionnaire to all Member States of the United Nations, but only 74 responded.
7
Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Malaysia and Monaco had reservations to this article stating that it would not override the
prescriptions of any citizenship laws already in place (see “Convention on the Rights of the Child”).
8
This quote and the one that follows come from Box 6.4 of the cited text.
9
Aird et. al note that Afghanistan, Cambodia, Eritrea, Namibia and Oman do not have such birth registration
systems installed (5).
10
For example, women of Korean descent who live in Japan often do not register their children for fear of
repatriation (Lynch 36). The Roma of Europe are severely discriminated against and fear that registration will set
them up for further persecution. Thus, of the 60,000 to 100,000 Roma that live in Croatia, approximately 7,000 are
registered (Aird, Harnett and Shah 11). Also, due to apartheid era policies, in 1993 only 13% of black South
Africans were registered (Aird, Harnett and Shah 11).
11
Some States have specific requirements for registration such as returning to the mother’s birthplace within a
specific time period in order to register a child (China, for instance). As Aird et. al note, “This poses a significant
problem for families who migrate great distances for work” (17). In addition, many indigenous peoples are often
unable to access registration centers due to transport and terrain difficulties.
12
Aird et. al discuss the effect of poverty on birth registration in “Stateless Children.” They observe that “in at least
50 countries, families must pay for either the registration or the birth certificate” and this greatly reduces the
likelihood of birth registration (16).
13
Both Gerald Neuman and Deng discuss the case of the Banyamulenge who are being denied citizenship in the
majority of cases by the Democratic Republic of the Congo on ethnic grounds. Neuman describes how Congolese
citizenship is “the subject of ongoing dispute and political manipulation” (515), and Deng provides the historical
context and implications for the region of this ethnically-based citizenship manipulation.
14
For a more in-depth examination of conflicts of citizenship laws and their role in rendering individuals stateless,
see The Regulation of Statelessness Under International and National Law by A. Peter Muthraika (specifically pp.
106-129a).
15
The Crimean Tatars are a group who were expelled from Crimea in Ukraine by the Communist regime of the
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). They have been trying to return to Ukraine for decades.
16
These reasons for denationalization may be found in the Citizenship Laws of the World report.
17
Refer to Dr. Amin Malak’s work “The Forgotten Fate of the Faili Kurds of Iraq,” and the report on the Faili Kurds
from Refugees Magazine (“The Road Home: The Faili Kurds”) for more information on this stateless Kurdish
group’s plight.
18
In 1962 Syria denationalized 200,000 Syrian-born Kurds and has yet to reinstate their citizenship (Zoepf).
19
This is according to the Kurdish Human Rights Project.
20
There are 160,000 stateless ethnic Russians in Estonia (Lynch 17), while they make up approximately 22% of the
population of Latvia (“EU Enlargement Chief”).
21
Quite a few ethnic Russians have not sought Estonian or Latvian citizenship because they feel that they will
remain socially excluded by society regardless of whether or not they become citizens. Many of them refuse to learn
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the language of these States, and this bars them from citizenship since part of acquiring citizenship consists of
passing an exam demonstrating proficiency in the State language.
22
The Estate Tamils are a different group to the Sri Lankan Tamils (the “Tamil Tigers”) who have been engaging in
separatist activity from Sri Lanka for decades.
23
190,000 Estate Tamils were granted citizenship that year (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s
Programme 7). See John Heffernan for Sri Lanka’s “change of heart” toward granting the Estate Tamils citizenship.
24
See Khan and Heffernan for a detailed analysis of the situation of the Lhotshampas in Bhutan as well as the
stateless in other South Asian States.
25
See p. 32 of this text.
26
Refer to Michael Geske’s work “State Building, Citizenship and Statelessness” (specifically the section on
“Situations of Statelessness”) for the problems that former citizens of dissolved States encounter.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE REPERCUSSIONS OF STATELESSNESS
In the previous chapter several groups were mentioned in examples of how statelessness
results; these included the Biharis, Roma, Kurds, Lhotshampas, Estate Tamils, Crimean Tatars
and Banyamulenge. This list does not include the Palestinians, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia,
Rohingyas, Tibetan nationals in Nepal, Bidoon, Thailand’s Hill Tribes, and various other peoples
who make up some of the more than nine million stateless people around the globe.1 From this
catalog of stateless groups it is clear that statelessness is not a problem confined to one or two
groups living in a certain area of the world; as the Acting Chief of UNHCR’s Mission in New
Delhi, Carol Batchelor, succinctly states, “No region hasn’t faced it” (Refugees International
“Fifty Years in Limbo”).2
But what does it mean to be stateless? How does a lack of citizenship affect a person’s
life, and are the problems associated with statelessness only confined to the individual level or
are the repercussions even greater? This chapter examines these questions by analyzing
statelessness from an individual, regional and global standpoint.
The Individual
While Hanjian argues that rights must exist outside of a citizen-State relationship,3 any
analysis of the situation of the stateless reveals that rights are not readily obtained outside of this
forum. Despite international conventions and declarations that provide for civil and economic
rights, rights to a “nationality,” and freedom to leave and return to one’s State, it is up to the
States concerned, and no other entity, to ensure that these rights are effectively extended to the
people within their territorial confines. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, while the international body mandated to prevent and reduce statelessness,4 has no
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authority to ensure that people are acquiring the citizenship to which they have a right under
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration. As the UNHCR points out, it “does not have either the
authority or the expertise to make declarations on nationality status or independently to issue
documentations attesting to nationality status. States alone determine who are their citizens”
(Guidelines 8).
Thus it would appear, much to the chagrin of Hanjian, that citizenship is indeed the
“right to have rights” (at least as long as the State system exists in its current format). For the
absence of citizenship renders a person nearly invisible in terms of her legal standing
domestically (as will be seen below) and internationally (diplomatic protection is generally only
extended by a State to its own citizens, and typically no other State will move to protect the
rights of a non-citizen in another State).5 A person without citizenship faces limited access to
State protection and services, often confronts discrimination in the socioeconomic sphere, is
strictly limited in terms of movement and yet must live with the possibility of forced expulsion at
any time. A stateless person, while not necessarily experiencing all of the following areas as
problematic, will have to deal with issues in any number of them.
Recognition
Most of the problems that stateless people encounter stem from the lack of legal standing
that they have in the State in which they reside. If they had citizenship they would not have to
worry about not being able to own property, accessing public health benefits, the courts, or
education. They would be able to leave and return freely to the State without fear of being denied
reentry for lack of proper documentation. They would also be able to reside legally on the land
they consider home and participate in events that shape their lives politically. Legal recognition
would permit some of the stateless to bury their loved ones officially,6 prevent their property
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from being seized,7 and put a stop to the abuse they suffer in detention centers.8 In effect,
citizenship would legitimize their presence and render their claims politically and legally
consequential; they could no longer be considered non-entities formally.
Work
Due to their illegal standing in the State, those who have no citizenship (and have not
received some sort of documentation from the government permitting them to work and reside)
are not likely to find jobs in the formal sector. Since this is the sector that usually provides better
pay and job security, many stateless people find themselves working in jobs that do not allow
them to escape poverty. Many of the Estate Tamils still toil on the tea plantations that their
ancestors were brought over to work on and their pay is “among the lowest in any sector of the
Sri Lankan economy” (Subramanian). Biharis make up the rickshaw-pullers, peddlers and
garment factory workers in Bangladesh;9 while many Rohingyas are paid with food10 and Roma
are denied jobs because of their ethnicity.11 Unemployment is generally high among the stateless,
especially those who are confined to camps. Less than 40% of the Crimean Tatars who have
been able to return to Ukraine are employed,12 and the Kurdish regions of Turkey and Iran suffer
extremely high unemployment rates compared to other regions in those States.13
Employment is often hard to come by because proper documentation is first needed (such
as a passport, residence permit or birth certificate) and many of the stateless never had, cannot
afford, or lost this documentation (reports of the discriminatory destruction of their documents
by others is not unheard of either). Thus, a “catch-22” cycle originates: without adequate
documentation many stateless persons cannot get jobs, and without jobs they cannot afford the
services necessary to obtain the documentation that will allow them to work and rise from
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poverty.14 The lack of education that stateless people often suffer from is another hindrance to
obtaining decent employment.
Education
Despite the provision of Article 22 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons that stateless individuals should receive the “same treatment as is accorded to nationals
with respect to elementary education,” education, especially for those who live in camps, is not
easily attained. Most of the case reports on the stateless published by the UNHCR describe the
aspirations of stateless parents for their children to receive an education and perhaps enhance
their prospects at a better life. The States where these stateless individuals reside do not always
extend their public education to stateless children, however. In Egypt, for example, there are a
minimum of 400,000 children who “cannot attend public schools or state universities, [and] are
barred from certain professional schools” because they are stateless (Lynch Lives on Hold 28)
Education for the stateless is almost everywhere limited. The stateless Nubians, who have
been living in Kenya for decades, have few educational opportunities15 and in Bangladesh the
Rohingyas are banned from attending university in the state of Rakhine.16 The Roma face
discrimination in access to education in most States. Those who reside in Macedonia, for
example, receive an education inferior to that given to Macedonian citizens and face uphill
obstacles in learning because they are not taught in their own language.17 Illiteracy is high among
the Roma of the Russian Federation,18 the Rohingyas of Rakhine state,19 and the Estate Tamils
among other groups. Thus, these stateless groups are not only ignored in the legal sense, but they
are rendered invisible in the realm of learning as well. It appears that one must be a citizen or a
legally resident alien in order to have the opportunity to receive an equal education or any
education at all.
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Health
Without the proper documentation, stateless people can be effectively denied access to
public health services, and without sufficient money, they cannot afford non-public health
services. They must therefore rely on the generosity of local health organizations and charities to
assist them with their health-related problems. These problems run the gamut of exposure to
contaminated water in unsanitary and overcrowded camps, susceptibility to sexually transmitted
diseases (especially as concerns the vulnerability of stateless children and women to
trafficking),20 lack of pre- and post-natal care,21 malnutrition,22 drug addiction23 and a host of
chronic ailments such as diarrhea and asthma.
Specifically, skin diseases, respiratory infections and gastro-intestinal problems have
been observed among the Biharis in Bangladesh.24 Beriberi, AIDS, heart disease and kidney
failure were among the causes of death of more than ninety Rohingya living in camps in
Malaysia,25 and reports of untreated tuberculosis, high-blood pressure, mental illness and
bronchitis have been noted among the Romani women in Macedonia.26 Sarah Aird and her
colleagues observe in addition that “[i]n at least 20 countries, stateless children cannot be legally
vaccinated…In many other countries, children without citizenship documents cannot receive
treatment in health centers or participate in food programs” (6).27 The status of statelessness
therefore affects people of all ages and conditions whether individuals may obtain food, clean
water, vaccinations, hospitalization, or medicine.
Movement
Stateless people do not necessarily have the ability to move within States at will. Many
are circumscribed to camps or shanty towns on the fringes of society and must seek special
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permission from the relevant local authorities to leave these areas. Such authorities often seek
“on-the-side” monetary recompense for providing travel documentation, and even though Article
27 of the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons stipulates that Contracting States “shall
issue identity papers to any stateless person in their territory who does not possess a valid travel
document,” such documentation is not always provided.28 The possibility of deportation or
forced removal from one’s residence are also potential threats to the freedom of movement of
stateless people, and no stateless person has the right to protection from any State whether
traveling within the State where they reside or outside of it.29
Other
Aside from discrimination in terms of accessing health services, education, and
opportunities to find work, stateless people may not be able to own property (even if the land has
been in the family line for generations), open a bank account, or get married to a citizen without
facing the possibility that children born from such a union will be stateless.30 Thus, daily
activities that may be taken for granted by citizens in many parts of the world (such as enrolling
a child in school, visiting family in another area, living securely in one’s home and seeking legal
advice when one’s rights have been infringed upon) may not even be possible when one is
stateless.
The Region
The issues generated by statelessness are rarely confined to the individual level. Stateless
peoples often attempt to move into another State (whether they feel this State to be their true
homeland or whether they think their prospects of obtaining citizenship there might be better)
and this generates a host of regional questions and conflicts since more than one State becomes
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embroiled in their condition. The Rohingya, for example, have dispersed among Bangladesh,
Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Gulf States; the Roma are scattered across Europe; and
the Bidoon are spread throughout Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and other States of the
Arabian Peninsula.31 John Heffernan observes that,
“the denial of citizenship has played a major role in the constant flows of people
throughout South Asia. In a period of 15 years, over 500,000 stateless Rohingyas of
Myanmar twice fled back and forth between Bangladesh and Myanmar. In a forty-year
period, over 500,000 stateless Estate Tamils in Sri Lanka were repatriated to India and an
estimated 100,000 Lhotshampas fled to Nepal from Bhutan” (iii).
Sustenance, Shelter and Membership
Such continuous movement across borders forces States to enter into relations with one
another, especially when resources are scarce within one or both States. Tensions may arise
between such States as regards to which State should be providing food, water and shelter. Nepal
is already feeling the strain of having to provide for the Lhotshampas, for instance, as it is
placing pressure on Bhutan to sort out this stateless group’s predicament (G. Khan 24-5).
Bangladesh, which had been providing food aid to the Bihari camps for years, ceased such aid
(and cut financial assistance) in 2004 in order to focus upon its own impoverished citizens.
Bangladesh has not yet asked Pakistan to aid the Biharis who now face a lessened food supply,
and Pakistan has not attempted to fill the shoes of Bangladesh. Tensions may arise between these
two States, however, should the Biharis seek provisions from individuals and organizations
within both States while agitating for their citizenship rights.
Opportunities for conflict arise when States must decide which State should be granting
citizenship to the stateless. In Eastern Europe, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Roma
encountered difficulties in obtaining citizenship in many of the successor States because those
States would try to pass them off as being resident of a neighbouring State at the time of
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dissolution. The case of the Lhotshampas in Bhutan is an example of the regional complexity of
granting citizenship to the stateless since India has the clout to negotiate an agreement between
Nepal and Bhutan concerning this stateless group but will not do so because of the huge number
of ethnic Nepalis within its own borders. As Gerrard Khan points out, “India is no longer
particularly anxious to be associated with Nepali minority rights movements in third countries
for fear of its own vulnerability on the matter” (21). India also has a large ethnic Tamil
population within its borders which forces Sri Lanka to carefully consider how it treats the
stateless Estate Tamils. Thus, statelessness in one State affects neighbouring States who often
harbour their own minorities who are of the same ethnicity as the stateless in the other State.
Disease and Human Trafficking
Aside from questions of which State will provide sustenance, shelter and citizenship to
the stateless group concerned, neighbouring States must realize that whereas they may
distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, disease does not. As noted in the individual
repercussions section, many of the stateless live in overcrowded and unsanitary camps with no
access to health care or health education. Such an environment is conducive to the incubation
and spread of disease. One of the greatest scourges of this century and the last one is the AIDS
epidemic and the stateless have not been spared this affliction.
Refugees International notes that stateless mothers, who often acquire the HIV virus from
being raped, cannot obtain the necessary medication to prevent the transmission of this virus to
their children while breast-feeding. It states that “within stateless communities, screening and
surveillance measures to track the spread of disease remain woefully inadequate. Lacking access
to even the most fundamental of prevention tools – such as insecticide treated bed nets and
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condoms – disease continues to spread within these vulnerable populations” (“Combating
HIV/AIDS, Malaria & Other Diseases”).
The Karen, one of the stateless Thai Hill Tribes, suffers from a high rate of HIV
infection; eighty percent of those infected with HIV in Estonia are ethnic Russians,32 and the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “is deeply concerned that the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in [Nepal] is spreading at an alarming rate due to commercial sex and trafficking of
women and children, and sex tourism.”
Stateless women and children are vulnerable to human trafficking because of their abject
poverty and the lack of legal standing that they possess in their State of residence. The sexual
trafficking of these stateless persons who may become infected with the HIV virus is a serious
concern for those individuals and for neighbouring States. The trafficked are rarely kept within
the territorial confines of their State of residence. Instead, they are moved across international
borders and this consequently embroils many States in negotiations of how to prevent trafficking
and reduce the human security ills that this practice generates.
Physical Conflict
Apart from the regional insecurity that statelessness may generate in terms of assisting in
the spread of infectious disease, States must deal with the risk that prolonged periods of
statelessness may lead to physical conflict that will not necessarily contain itself within one
State’s borders. The possibility of violence spilling over into another State due to statelessness is
not without precedent. Whereas Lynch predicts that long-term stateless individuals and families
“may seek to enter another country illegally or in time, may resort to the use of violent means”
(“Statelessness”), one study demonstrates that some Rohingyas have already traveled to
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Afghanistan and sought military training from the Taliban in order to seek redress in their State
of residence (Ahmed 12).
A recent report on Nationality and Statelessness by the UNHCR and the InterParliamentary Union contains an example of the frustration and sense of worthlessness that
statelessness may generate:
“Lara, a formerly stateless woman, describes the corrosive effect of statelessness on the
morale of the individual: ‘Being said ‘No’ to by the country where I live; being said ‘No’
to by the country where I was born; being said ‘No’ to by the country where my parents
are from; hearing ‘you do not belong to us’ continuously! I feel I am nobody and don’t
even know why I’m living. Being stateless, you are always surrounded by a sense of
worthlessness” (6).
It is often precisely these sentiments of worthlessness or feelings of “having-nothingelse-to-lose” that make individuals susceptible to taking part in militant activities. The stateless
have no rights and freedoms to lose, or any State obligations to fulfill. They fall under the
jurisdiction of no State and are considered members of no State polity. It could therefore be
argued that some of the stateless are vulnerable to recruitment by militants to take part in
activities aimed at generating intra- and inter-State conflict.
Thus, whereas Dr. Amy Sands, Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, recognizes that U.S. counterterrorism strategy must “include investing in states that are
in danger of collapse in order to prevent the spiral into statelessness that creates a haven for
terrorism,” States would do well to focus upon the plight of stateless groups and not merely
States “in danger of collapse.” It would not be far-fetched to envision a situation wherein
prolonged periods of statelessness drive some individuals or groups to seek redress against the
State polity that refuses them citizenship.
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Muthraika observes that “[w]here political enemies have been expelled and
denationalized, they may continue to engage in activities aimed at overthrowing the ruling elite”
(17). Such was the case of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a group composed of largely
disenfranchised Tutsis who sought Rwandan citizenship under a non-Hutu controlled
government. They utilized the States surrounding Rwanda to recruit members and to stage their
re-entry into Rwanda to gain power.33 That neighbouring States may “even be drawn into
attempts by some stateless persons to subvert the state of origin” (Muthraika 19) is not
unprecedented either. Uganda played an important role in overthrowing the Hutu controlled
government in Rwanda. In addition, States should not forget that what is deemed to be the
greatest conflict of the last century – World War II – was a result of the denationalization of
German citizens. As Arendt observes, “the Nazis started their extermination of the Jews by first
depriving them of all legal status” (296).
Statelessness may therefore generate problems that surpass the territorial confines of one
State. History has demonstrated that the spread of disease and physical conflict recognizes no
State-imposed boundaries, and many of the stateless, due to their inadequate health care,
standard of living, and lack of basic rights and protections, are vulnerable to contracting
contagious diseases. The stateless may also be at risk of recruitment into militant groups as they
are effectively non-entities in their State of residence and generally possess no rights or freedoms
to lose.
In a keynote address this year commemorating the tenth anniversary of the United
Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women, senator Hillary Clinton noted that “[t]oday, we
face new and daunting enemies – from stateless terrorism to the global pandemic of HIV/AIDS
to the scourge of human trafficking.” That some stateless groups and individuals have taken part
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in militant activities, that some of them suffer disproportionate rates of HIV infection, and that
stateless women and children are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking, all demonstrate
the seriousness of addressing these people’s plight. The problems that result from statelessness
are not only a matter of individual insecurity, but in a multitude of different ways they are
matters of regional insecurity as well.
The Globe
As the section on globalization in Chapter Two discussed, the reverberations of what
occurs in one State or area is often felt in another because of the way the world is now
interconnected through advances in telecommunications and technology. The plight of some
stateless groups, such as the Palestinians and the Kurds, has an international ear and various
scholars, organizations and governments are concerned with the outcome of these people’s
citizenship status. Other groups, such as the Rohingyas and the Faili Kurds, have yet to capture
such an audience, but with the rising preeminence of human rights regimes they will probably
soon gain such attention.
The legal structure of the international system is built upon the present State system. In
order to be classified as a State, each State must maintain a permanent population.34 This
permanent population is generally referred to as citizens, although they may also be subjects
depending on the State of concern. These citizen-subjects form part of a determined legal order
that permits States to control membership, “protect,” and provide services and certain rights to
citizens in exchange for a given amount of allegiance and the performance of certain duties.
Anything that exists outside of this legal order is a potential threat to the citizen-State
relationship and to the entire international regime that is based upon legal relations between
States and between States and their citizens.
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Stateless people exist outside the realm of any citizen-State relationship and are thereby a
potential disturbance to the apparently legitimate order of the State system. That the international
system is made up of States composed of citizens, and that it is through the citizen-State
relationship that an individual’s rights are currently enforced, the presence of stateless persons
leads one to question whether the current State system is adequate and/or beneficial for all
members of the human race. One of the main repercussions of statelessness on a global level,
therefore, is to bring to light the inadequacy of the current system to benefit all human beings
equally.
Conclusion
The status of statelessness severely circumscribes an individual’s ability to enjoy basic
rights and freedoms. It poses a human security dilemma and risks drawing neighbouring States
into conflict with each other. The threat that statelessness presents to State system credibility, in
addition to its effects upon human beings, has not gone unnoticed by States and the United
Nations. The following chapter examines the different attempts that have been made to reduce
statelessness globally and whether such efforts have been successful.
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NOTES
1

This number is an estimate. The UNHCR cites nine million stateless persons (“Statelessness: Nine Million
Ghosts”), while Maureen Lynch and Refugees International place the figure at 11 million (Lives on Hold 7).
2
To demonstrate how widespread statelessness is, Lynch’s study Lives on Hold describes the situation of the
stateless in 70 States.
3
See Chapter Two, p. 20.
4
The General Assembly gave the agency this mandate in its 29th session on December 10th, 1974 (G. A. United
Nations).
5
As Arendt observes, “government protection” and the recognition of one’s legal status is not only lost in one’s own
State of residence when one is stateless: “Treaties of reciprocity and international agreements have woven a web
around the earth that makes it possible for the citizen of every country to take his legal status with him no matter
where he goes[…]Yet, whoever is no longer caught in it finds himself out of legality altogether” (294).
6
This has been documented as a problem for some of the Crimean Tatars (UNHCR “The Problem of
Statelessness”).
7
Stateless Indians residing in Burma witnessed the “nationalization” of their property (G. Khan 10), and tribal hill
people in Thailand have had their land converted into forest preserves by the State (Ritchie).
8
The UNHCR is aware of stateless people who are held “in detention in a number of countries whose release is
virtually precluded by having been made conditional on identification of a country which will accept responsibility
for the individual in question” (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme 7). Such individuals
have been known to be held for decades because no State will recognize them as citizens (UNHCR Guidelines 11).
9
Refer to “Pakistanis in Bangladesh” (S. Khan) for a report on the situation of the Biharis in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
10
Medecins Sans Frontiers reports, “For many, food is the only source of income, as employment is prohibited. In
the absence of cash, rice, for instance, might be bartered or sold to obtain green vegetables or clothes, or other items
that are not included in the ration package” (14).
11
For a report on the treatment of the Roma, consult “Report on The Council of Europe Project ‘Roma Access to
Employment in SEE’” by Ina Zoon and Judith Kiers (specifically section 5.3).
12
Information found in “Repatriation and Integration of the Tatars of Crimea” by Lord Ponsonby.
13
The Southeast area of Turkey where the majority of the Kurds are found has an unemployment rate close to 60%
(Schleifer) and in Iran, “Kurdish cities are among the least developed in the country with the highest levels of
unemployment” (Fathi).
14
The European Commission and the UNHCR, for example, reports that Crimean Tatars faced such a conundrum.
“To receive temporary certificates, find jobs and earn money, they needed passports. At the same time they could
not get passports, because of their dearth of cash” (27).
15
For a report on the stateless condition of the Nubians, consult “Nubians in Kenya” by the Open Society Justice
Initiative.
16
Chris Lewa notes that “Sittwe has the only university in Rakhine State. Since a travel ban to Sittwe has been
enforced on the Rohingya population in February 2001, Rohingya students are not allowed to join university on a
full-time basis. They can only study university level courses through distance education and they have been facing
serious difficulties in obtaining permission to pass their examination in Sittwe” (4).
17
For a report presented to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women on
the status of Romani women in Macedonia, consult Critical Issues for Romani Women in Macedonia by the
Women’s Network Program, the Roma Center of Skopje and the European Roma Rights Center.
18
Consult Lives on Hold, specifically p. 43.
19
Refer to Lewa’s work for more on the situation of the Rohingya in this state.
20
The plight of stateless Thai Hill Tribe and Rohingya women is examined with regard to trafficking in “No Status:
Migration, Trafficking & Exploitation of Women in Thailand” (Physicians for Human Rights) and “Migration &
Trafficking of Women & Girls” (Belak). Also, consult Lives on Hold, p. 38, for the trafficking of stateless
Vietnamese women in Cambodia and stateless North Korean women in China.
21
Refugees International remarks on the high morbidity rate of stateless mothers in “Maternal Health”.
22
Rohingya children, for instance, suffer from a 60% rate of chronic malnutrition (Lewa 4).
23
In Estonia the prevalence of drug use is much higher among the ethnic Russians than non-Russians (Refugees
International “Left Behind”).
24
See Lives on Hold, p. 15.
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25

Refer to chapter four of Human Rights Watch’s report “Living in Limbo: Burmese Rohingya in Malaysia.”
This information was obtained from “Action on Romani Women’s Rights in Macedonia” by the European Roma
Rights Centre.
27
Plan International similarly observes that “[e]very year, millions of children die of preventable diseases before
reaching the age of five. Ineffective systems of birth registration play a role in this crisis since some countries do not
give unregistered children access to health care services or insist that they pay more than the registered child. In
countries such as Kenya and Thailand, a child without proof of identity is also denied access to free or subsidised
vaccination programs” (“Universal birth registration” 3).
28
Finland for example, one of the signatories to this Convention, openly states that it will not provide any travel
documents to stateless people (United Nations 3).
29
Citizenship bestows diplomatic protection to members of a State, without it stateless people are not entitled to
such protection (Rubenstein and Adler 525).
30
Children born of the marital union of a Haitian and a Dominican in the Dominican Republic have been refused
birth registration and are consequently “deprived of any official recognition” (UNHCR “Statelessness: Nine Million
Ghosts”).
31
The word Bidoon literally means “stateless person” in Arabic; it refers to groups of Arabs who hold no
citizenship.
32
This statistic is taken from Lynch and Thatcher Cook’s article.
33
For an account of the Rwandan genocide, the consequent organization of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and its
subsequent rise to power, refer to When Victims Become Killers by Mamood Mamdani.
34
See Malanczuk and Akehurst for the four criteria that define a territory as a State (75).
26
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE PREVENTION AND REDUCTION OF
STATELESSNESS
The post-Wesphalian international system is made up of States that govern given
territories and peoples. Aside from the open seas, there are relatively few places in which a
person can reside that do not form a part of some State’s territory and wherein an individual is
not subject to some State’s laws. All forms of membership in the State system (such as citizen,
subject, permanent resident, temporary alien and illegal alien) are determined by an individual’s
relationship to the State. In the case of citizens, for example, there is full legal membership based
upon the laws of citizenship acquisition. At the other end of the spectrum, illegal aliens,
membership is extremely limited because one has not formally garnered permission from State X
for one’s presence and activities within it (although one maintains citizenship from State Y).
The presence of stateless persons, however, is an anomaly for the State system because
these individuals exist outside of the State-member relationship altogether and cannot be located
along the citizen-illegal alien continuum. Even though no State wants to claim these individuals
as members (citizens), efforts to prevent and reduce statelessness have been made because the
repercussions of statelessness (both at an individual, regional and global level) are great and have
costly implications in terms of human life, the possibility for inter-State tension, and the
legitimacy threat that statelessness poses to the State system.
As the previous chapter illustrated, repercussions for individuals include lack of legal
recognition in the State of residence; inability to find work, access an equal education or health
care; and limited freedom of movement. At the regional level, repercussions consist of trying to
provide food and shelter to the stateless; deciding which State should provide the stateless
membership; the possibility for conflict between States when the stateless or the State of sojourn
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tries to manipulate political activity in the State of former residence; and the problem of human
trafficking. At the global level, the repercussions of statelessness center mainly on the challenge
that this group poses to the State system as the stateless fall outside of its legal confines. This
chapter examines the two statelessness conventions and the actions taken by States and
international organizations to prevent and reduce statelessness to determine whether their efforts
have been successful.
Conventions
The two conventions whose subject is statelessness are the Convention on the Status of
Stateless Persons (1954) and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961). The 1954
convention was born out of the events of World War II when thousands of people lost the right to
live as citizens in the territories that they had once considered home. The purpose of this first
convention, therefore, was to increase international awareness of the plight of stateless people
who were not refugees and to provide for the rights of these people in the absence of formal State
affiliation. Such rights included freedom to practice religion (Article 4), freedom of association
akin to that given to aliens (Article 13), free access to the courts (Article 16) and freedom of
movement (Article 26), among others. The obligations of the stateless toward their State of
residence and the standards of treatment that the stateless were due by that State were also
delineated in this convention.
The second convention aimed to fulfill the goals of its title – to prevent and reduce
statelessness – by outlining measures to diminish the incidence of statelessness at birth and by
demarcating the boundaries within which statelessness could occur.1 This convention was
controversial because some committee members thought the text of the convention should center
on the elimination of statelessness, while others sought only to reduce it. In the end, it was
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decided that the convention would focus on the prevention and reduction of statelessness, and
even fewer people signed on to this convention in comparison to the 1954 one. Thus, whereas the
1954 convention initially had 23 signatories, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
only had 5, and whereas 65 States are now party to the 1954 convention, only 32 States have
acceded to the 1961 convention.2 In both cases, the number of States agreeing to accede to these
conventions pales in comparison to the number of States that are party to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (145 as of July 1st 2003).3
The Refugee-Stateless Person Distinction
The 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons was originally intended to be a
protocol to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Due to time limits and other
extenuating circumstances, however, the 1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries that met to
discuss the conditions of both stateless persons and refugees decided to postpone considerations
of the stateless until a later date. In 1954 the Conference reconvened and decided that the issue of
statelessness deserved a convention in its own right and should not be limited to an addendum to
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
While the refugee convention and the 1954 statelessness convention are quite similar in
language due to their historical connection, the 1954 convention makes the important legal
distinction between a refugee and a stateless person. Aside from the fact that a refugee may bear
a citizenship (and a stateless person has none),4 the element of persecution and displacement
outside of one’s State of membership are crucial in obtaining recognition as a refugee.5 Both
refugees and the stateless may lose many of the rights associated with citizenship, but it is the
refugee who crosses into another State while the stateless person continues to reside in the same
State. A further distinction was later made for those individuals who reside and are persecuted
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within their State of membership but who are consequently forced to move around within that
State as a result of this persecution – they are known as “internally displaced persons.”6
Criticism
Despite the legal recognition given to the stateless in the creation of the 1954 and 1961
conventions, stateless persons are not afforded the same opportunities and aid as refugees. This is
partly due to the fact that although the UNHCR’s second mandate is considered to be the
prevention and reduction of statelessness,7 nowhere in these conventions is the UNHCR
officially charged with this role. Article 11 of the 1961 convention only states that “[t]he
Contracting States shall promote the establishment within the framework of the United
Nations[…]of a body to which a person claiming the benefit of this Convention may apply for
the examination of his claim and for assistance in presenting it to the appropriate authority.” It
was the General Assembly (GA) in resolution 3274 that asked the UNHCR to
“provisionally[…]undertake the functions foreseen under the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness in accordance with article 11” (G. A. United Nations 93).
Thus, the UNHCR mandate over the stateless was initially an interim measure put forth
by the GA several years after the ratification of the statelessness conventions because no other
body had been formed to which the stateless could turn. The UNHCR’s provisional mandate
therefore turned into a de facto mandate which is not always recognized by the agency. The
Executive Committee of the UNHCR, for example, once stated that there was an “absense [sic]
of an international body with a general mandate for these [stateless] persons,” and therefore had
to call “upon the High Commissioner to continue her efforts generally on behalf of stateless
individuals” (A Thematic Compilation 383).
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Whereas refugees are directly appointed the assistance of the UNHCR in Article 35 of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the stateless are not afforded any such body in
either of the conventions concerning statelessness. This difference has resulted in the stateless
being treated differently to refugees by the agency. The Executive Committee notes, for
example, that refugees “benefit, in general, from a specific infrastructure guaranteeing protection
and assistance, while the situation of the [stateless] remains vulnerable in that no specific
provisions have been made for protection or assistance for this group. States which have not
acceded to the international instruments generally tend to consider and to treat non-refugee
stateless persons as illegal aliens” (Stateless Persons 9).
That is, in comparison to refugees who cannot be formally penalized for unlawfully
entering a State,8 the rights of the stateless are often predicated upon legal entry or lawful
residence: from the rights of association and freedom of movement, to securing a residence,
working and receiving public assistance, identity and travel documents, a stateless person must
be “lawfully staying in [the State of concern’s] territory” in order to obtain such rights.9 Thus,
many of the stateless who cannot obtain permanent or lawful residence from the State where they
reside (precisely because many States recognize legal residence as one of the principal steps on
the path to a citizenship that they do not wish to grant) are unable to obtain the basic rights that
international conventions grant them.
Whereas the granting of refugee status is not conditioned by circumstances of birth, prior
refugee status, age or place of habitual residence, the granting of citizenship to a stateless person
is conditioned by such factors. Article 1 of the 1961 convention makes clear that time and age
limits, State residence requirements, laws pertaining to jus soli and jus sanguinis as well as the
stipulation “[t]hat the person concerned has always been stateless” may restrict whether a
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stateless person obtains the “nationality” to which she has a right under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.10 That a State may deny citizenship to a person because she has
not “always been stateless” is an unfortunate requirement that should not be included in a
convention that aims to reduce statelessness.
Regardless of whether one was born stateless or rendered stateless later on due to State
dissolution, regime change, incompatible citizenship laws and the myriad other ways that
statelessness is acquired apart from birth, citizenship should always be a right to which a person
is entitled and not based upon conditional factors beyond an individual’s control. A refugee is
not required to “always have been a refugee” in order to acquire this status and the concomitant
protections that are attached to it. It is therefore unfair that the granting of citizenship to the
stateless, who lack the same legal protections and opportunities as refugees, be made conditional
upon bearing the status of “stateless” their entire lives.
If the goal of the 1961 convention is indeed to prevent and reduce statelessness, the
acquisition of statelessness should not be made less serious because it is not acquired at birth.
Statelessness at any age is a denial of a person’s legal being and her ability to enjoy given rights
and protections. The stipulation that an individual must always have been stateless, therefore,
needs to be removed and the authors of the convention would do well to remember that children
born to stateless parents often become stateless themselves.11 Thus, allowing the acquisition of
citizenship regardless of how long one has been stateless will prevent many children from being
born into statelessness.
Also, even though the 1961 convention stipulates that a person shall not be deprived of
her “nationality if such deprivation would render [her] stateless” (Article 8), it also lists several
exceptions to this rule that may unreasonably perpetuate statelessness. For instance, a naturalized
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citizen may lose her citizenship if she resides abroad for more than seven consecutive years
without specifying to the relevant authorities that she does not wish to lose her citizenship
(Article 7). This is problematic if such citizens are unaware of the rules and regulations that
govern citizenship in their State of naturalization and decide to reside abroad for work purposes
or to join their spouses overseas without notifying the appropriate authorities.12 These
individuals may not possess the citizenship of the State of their current residence and yet still
face the possibility of being rendered stateless because they failed to assert that they wanted to
keep their citizenship in their State of naturalization. Denationalization in such circumstances
should only occur if it can be proven that the individual left the State of citizenship knowing full
well that she could potentially lose such citizenship (the “knowledge principle”).
Denationalization should never occur on the presumption that prolonged absence from a State
equals renunciation.
That this exception to citizenship loss should only apply to “naturalized” citizens is also
unfair. How does one measure which member of a State is more “citizenly” than another in order
to revoke her citizenship because of residence abroad? Consider the following example: Emily is
born in State X to parents from State X and becomes a “naturalized” citizen of State Y, along
with her family, at the age of two and resides in State X the rest of her life. Kara, a citizen of
State Y because of descent through her parents resides in State Z until she is 18 and heads to
State Y for college and work. What makes Kara that much more of a “citizen” that she cannot be
denationalized on the same grounds of residence abroad as Emily? Distinctions between
naturalized and non-naturalized citizens should not be made for the residence abroad exception.
This exception should either be removed from the convention, or it should be amended so that
the “knowledge” principle applies equally to all citizens.
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Finally, these conventions are the products of the discussion and ideas of member States
to the United Nations. As these conventions’ wording makes clear, these States do not recognize
an individual’s desires or will with regard to State membership: “a Contracting State may retain
the right…” “A Contracting State shall grant…” “The Contracting States shall accord to stateless
persons…” The omission of a person’s will in making citizenship choices in these conventions is
rather illogical when other UN documents give individuals the rights to freedom of association,
movement, thought and conscience (all actions involving the free use of one’s will and ability to
make choices). These conventions, therefore, while a step in the positive direction toward
addressing the problem of statelessness, still lack some fundamental features that could make
them both more equitable and likely to achieve their goal of preventing and reducing
statelessness.
States
States are in charge of granting, denying and revoking citizenship. While some States
have made laudable attempts to reduce statelessness within their own borders13 and have signed
on to the statelessness conventions, a large percentage of States (several of which contain
stateless persons on their territory who need assistance) has not ratified either of these
documents. Only 27 States out of 191 (14.1%) have signed both the Convention Relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Thirteen of
these States are in Europe, while six are in Africa. Thus, of the 65 States that acceded to the 1954
convention, less than half backed up their recognition of the status of the stateless by acceding to
the convention that aims to prevent and reduce the presence of statelessness globally. In both
cases, many of the States made reservations to the conventions.
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Reservations and Declarations
As regards the declarations and reservations to the 1954 convention, several States had
reservations to Articles 24 and 25. Article 24 stipulates that the stateless should be treated the
same as citizens concerning labour laws and social security, while Article 25 asks that
Contracting States provide assistance to the stateless and waive any fees that might be attached
to providing administrative aid. The majority of the States asserted that they would only give
travel documents to those who are lawfully on their territory,14 and many States stipulated that
certain articles would apply only “so far as the law allows” (that is, their domestic law). As the
Executive Committee observed in its 1992 report, such “law” is not very amenable to the
Articles of these conventions as several Contracting States have “not introduced corresponding
municipal legislation or administrative measures for the implementation of these instruments
within their territories” (Stateless Persons 8).
Concerning the reservations of some specific States, Germany held that it would not issue
identity papers to the stateless despite Article 27’s stipulation that the State should do so, and it
also refused to provide public assistance to the stateless on par with its own citizens as delineated
in Article 23 unless the stateless were also refugees. In response to Article 32, Mexico
forthrightly declared that “it does not consider itself obliged to guarantee stateless persons
greater facilities for their naturalization than those accorded to aliens in general” (United Nations
7); and Zambia stated that it would not provide elementary education to the stateless on par with
its citizens (Article 22).
With regard to the declarations and reservations made to the 1961 convention, France and
Tunisia declared that they were not bound by whatever body would originate from Article 11 of
the convention.15 Tunisia also stated that it was not bound by Article 14 “which provides for the
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competence of the International Court of Justice to rule on disputes concerning the interpretation
or application of the Convention” (Declarations and Reservations to the 1961 Convention 2). A
few States declared that their domestic law provided reasons for the denationalization of
naturalized citizens that were not found in the conventions (the United Kingdom and Ireland, for
instance). Finally, Article 8, which asserts that “[a] Contracting State shall not deprive a person
of his nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless” was the object of several
reservations.
Non-Accession
The reasons for the fewer number of State accessions to the two statelessness conventions
in comparison to the 1951 refugee one are unknown, although Hanjian speculates it is because of
the breaches into State sovereignty that the former conventions make. He notes how statelessness
has not been prohibited by international law because “States realize that any effort to legislate
the policies necessary to eliminate statelessness would inevitably result in mutual infringement
of each other’s sovereignty” (121). He also observes that there is no international body to
standardize the various State citizenship laws which are the source of so many cases of
statelessness (122). It has also been posited that since refugees are only seeking temporary
asylum until they are able to return to their State of citizenship, and not permanent membership
like the stateless, they are less of a threat to the State that they have entered.
Regardless of the exact reasons for the non-accession of the other 86% of States to both
statelessness conventions, it seems evident that general apathy regarding statelessness and its
solution is prevalent among States. In 2003 the UNHCR realized the first global study on
statelessness to gage what States have been doing to prevent it and reduce its presence
internationally. Only 74 (38.7%) of the States to which the survey was sent responded, and
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nearly half of these States (43.2%) acknowledged that there was no mechanism in place for them
to identify stateless persons on their territory (Department of International Protection 3). Even
more alarming, 21.9% of this group that stated they had no mechanism in place were
“Contracting States” to the 1954 convention (Department of International Protection 26).
Complete ignorance of State accession or non-accession to these instruments was apparent
(Department of International Protection 12), as was the denial of some States that they had ever
encountered problems of statelessness when the UNHCR had explicitly provided subject
expertise to over half of such States (Department of International Protection 11).
On a more positive note, even though a little over a third of the States responded to the
survey and not all of these States are Contracting Parties to the conventions, almost 80% of them
said that they granted citizenship to children born within the State who would otherwise be
stateless (Department of International Protection 14); 78.4% provide identification and travel
documents to “lawfully resident” stateless persons (Department of International Protection 5),
and 59.5% facilitate the naturalization process of the stateless in accordance with the articles of
the 1961 convention (Department of International Protection 4).
Criticism
Notwithstanding the efforts of these States in this regard, the general lack of accession to
the statelessness conventions by Member States of the United Nations is not conducive to
resolving the issue of statelessness. Albeit some States claim that they have already signed on to
other instruments that address the problem of statelessness,16 this should not preclude accession
to the only two international conventions that exist concerning the subject. As discussed
previously, the repercussions that result from a lack of citizenship are not confined to the
individual level. Statelessness is a global phenomenon and therefore requires a concerted
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international effort to address it. Thus, acceding to local instruments, while a commendable step,
is not enough. States should sign on to the international conventions because to do otherwise
would be to assert that statelessness is limited to parochial concerns and that individual States
should deal with it in the manner they deem fit.
While acknowledging that statelessness arises in various contexts in States and that the
means (and the remedies suggested) to address statelessness may therefore differ depending on
the State, there should still be a concerted effort by all States to officially recognize that the
stateless are human beings who are entitled to certain rights (as illustrated in the 1954
convention) and to adhere to a standard for preventing and reducing statelessness (this standard
being embodied in the 1961 convention). If States do not sign on to these conventions,
particularly the one produced in 1961, the problem of statelessness will not be readily resolved.
That is, global recognition of the problem (accession to the convention[s]) is necessary to
acquire sufficient international funding and manpower to realize projects geared toward the
prevention and reduction of statelessness. It is also needed to “minimize” the opportunities that
individuals have to become stateless (the convention, while not flawless as noted above, delimits
the ways in which a person may be rendered stateless involuntarily). Thus, if most States adhered
to the Articles in this convention upon accession, the acquisition of statelessness could be greatly
reduced on a global scale.
Of course, States do not necessarily adhere to the regulations put forth by the treaties,
conventions and other international legal documents to which they accede or are signatories.
Zimbabwe, for example, a Contracting State to the 1954 convention (it acceded in 1998), has
actively sought to denationalize entire portions of its population because of their ethnicity despite
this convention’s admonition of discrimination on such grounds.17 The United Kingdom admits
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that no arrangements have been made “for the administrative assistance for which provision is
made in Article 25” concerning the stateless (United Nations 9), and, as previously noted,
Contracting States are often slow in implementing the necessary changes at the domestic level to
accommodate the Articles of these conventions.
According to Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law , “If a state violates a
rule of customary international law or ignores an obligation of a treaty it has concluded, it
commits a breach of international law and thereby a so-called ‘internationally wrongful act’”
(254). Although accession to conventions and the subsequent disregard of the obligations set
forth in their Articles is not specifically included as an “internationally wrongful act,” it does
appear unjust that citizens of States are held accountable for ignoring the rules and laws of the
States to which they are members, yet States are not held accountable for acceding to
conventions and then failing to adhere to the conventions’ mandates (especially when such
conventions grant individuals the right to citizenship).
There is no entity other than the State to which an individual may turn if denied
citizenship: “States have the sovereign right to determine the procedures and conditions for
acquisition and termination of citizenship, but statelessness and disputed nationality can only be
addressed by the very governments that regularly breach protection and citizenship norms”
(Lynch Lives on Hold 1). Thus States, which sometimes deny citizenship to people based upon
ethnicity or out of political motivation, are the sole judges of citizenship applications and the sole
executors of citizenship laws. Chapter Nine investigates how State acknowledgement of
individual choice could ameliorate this current inequity in the structure of the citizen-State
relationship.
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The UNHCR
The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has assumed the
responsibility for overseeing the situation of the stateless and providing assistance where
necessary. Duties include technical and legal aid to States, agencies and individuals, and the
supply of Surge Protection Officers to crisis areas.18 Another one of the functions of the UNHCR
is to disseminate information concerning the 1954 and 1961 conventions and to promote
accession to them. The Executive Committee of the UNHCR first issued a conclusion (No. 78
[XLVI]) in 1995 to formally request that the UNHCR actively promote accession and provide
advice to States to modify their citizenship laws in accordance with the conventions, and in 1999
it reiterated its request due to the “persistence of statelessness problems” (No. 87 [L]).
Since the issuance of that 1995 conclusion, the UNHCR has provided assistance in more
than 141 States and “cooperated directly with more than 60 States in reforming national laws to
prevent and reduce cases of statelessness” (Department of International Protection 33). In Sri
Lanka, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan alone, several hundred thousand stateless people were able to
obtain citizenship through the assistance of the UNHCR.19 With regard to following the
Executive Committee’s suggestion of promoting awareness of the conventions and the issue of
statelessness, the agency produced a questionnaire in 2003 (the “Final Report,” the findings of
which were published in 2004) to determine where best to focus their future activities and to
analyse how States are dealing with statelessness in their respective territories.
Criticism
Despite the UNHCR’s progress in assisting certain States to grant citizenship to the
stateless and its activity in the promotion of the statelessness conventions and of awareness of
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statelessness in general, the UNHCR has been slow to fulfill the obligations of its second
mandate. It recognizes that for the first fifteen years after receiving responsibility to assist
stateless persons, “the organization devoted relatively little time, effort or resources to this
element of its mandate” and that it has been unable to provide the same services to the stateless
as it does to refugees (“Statelessness and Citizenship”). While the questionnaire that it produced
and sent to all States concerning statelessness is a positive step toward increasing the agency’s
ability to target problematic areas in fulfilling this area of its mandate, other areas in which the
UNHCR needs to improve include: public information and outreach, the treatment of
statelessness as an addendum to the situation of refugees, and the lack of personnel it dedicates
to preventing and reducing statelessness.
The UNHCR does not provide teaching materials on stateless persons as it does on
refugees. If one visits the “Teaching Tools” section of the official UNHCR website, for instance,
no lesson plans, videos, books, education kits or other materials will be found on statelessness –
it is all geared toward learning about refugees. This is disappointing since preventing and
reducing statelessness is part of the UNHCR’s mandate and the “Teacher’s Corner” specifically
states that “[e]ducation is one of the four pillars of UNHCR’s Public Awareness work” and yet
there are no teaching tools on this subject.20 It is especially disconcerting when one considers
that refugees and stateless persons are defined in two different manners by the United Nations
and are covered by different conventions (thus demonstrating the need for materials [“teaching
tools”] specifically geared toward the stateless).
The “Teaching Tools” portion of the website is not the only area in which the subject of
statelessness is not given its full due. Even the Executive Committee subsumes the problems
associated with statelessness under the rubric of refugees. For example, in its “Final Report
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Concerning the Questionnaire on Statelessness” the committee concludes “that the prevention
and reduction of statelessness and the protection of stateless persons are important in the
prevention of potential refugee situations” (Department of International Protection).21 It does not
state that the prevention and reduction of statelessness is essential in itself so that stateless people
may enjoy the legal status of citizenship and concomitant rights. Also, prior to the publication of
the most recent Statistical Yearbook (2004), all statistics concerning the stateless were
incorporated under the heading “Others of concern” while refugees had their own category.
The dedication of a table to stateless populations in the 2004 Statistical Yearbook is a
definite improvement over prior publications, but the UNHCR failed to uphold this new standard
in its budget report for 2006. The stateless are merely placed in a category called “Various”
along with other “persons not coming within the ordinary mandate of UNHCR, but to whom the
Office extends protection and/or assistance pursuant to a special request by a competent organ of
the United Nations” (UNHCR Annual Programme Budget 2006 10). This statement seems to
belie the seriousness of the UNHCR in fulfilling the mandate given to it by the General
Assembly in 1974 concerning statelessness. That the stateless are mentioned in a footnote in
Annex II and in a comment concerning “possible” new sites of engagement in the Asia-Pacific
region in a 113 page budget report also raises questions of the attention that statelessness will
garner in the UNHCR’s coming year’s activities. The fact that issues pertaining to statelessness
do not figure among the agency’s “Policy Priorities” for 2006 is also illustrative of this point
(UNHCR Annual Programme Budget 2006 78).22
An examination of Table 14 in the 2004 Statistical Yearbook (reproduced in Appendix C
as Table 2) illustrates that the UNHCR has been unable to assist many of the stateless. According
to the UNHCR there are 42 known States that have stateless persons living on their territory
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(Population and Geographical Data Section 7).23 Of these States, the table demonstrates that the
UNHCR was able to provide full assistance to stateless persons in eight of them (Bangladesh,
Egypt, Kuwait, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slovenia) and
partial assistance to stateless persons in six others (Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Belarus,
Estonia, Germany and Nepal). The other 28 States that contain stateless persons were not
assisted. More disquieting still, of the 13,892 stateless persons that the UNHCR included in its
“begin year” population for 2004, only three of these individuals obtained citizenship.24
The UNHCR acknowledges that the statistics provided on the stateless in its reports are often
incomplete and estimates. This lack of accuracy may be partially due to the lack of resources (both

monetary and in terms of number of personnel) that is available to the agency to collect the
necessary information.25 As of April 2005, for instance, there were only two full time employees
at the UNHCR headquarters assigned to address the subject of statelessness (Lynch
“Statelessness: A Forgotten Human Rights Crisis”). It is difficult to imagine how the UNHCR is
able to compile information on all the cases of statelessness around the globe with only two fulltime employees, let alone provide technical and legal assistance to States and to the stateless as
advised by the Executive Committee in its numerous Conclusions.26
Although the UNHCR needs to improve in the areas of public information and awareness
concerning the stateless (providing materials on statelessness for educators and the public,
maintaining statistics that separate the stateless from “others of concern,” etc.), and employ more
staff, it is currently the only international agency that has the mandate to prevent and reduce
statelessness. Thus, present weaknesses should not be taken to mean that the UNHCR is failing
in addressing this portion of its mandate – as noted above, it has aided hundreds of thousands of
people gain their citizenship in particular States, advised States and other entities regarding
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technical matters, and generated its first global survey on the subject – but it does mean that the
agency could be doing more to promote the problem of statelessness and to seek responses to
resolve it.
Criticism of the United Nations
In order for the UNHCR to focus more attention on its second mandate, it needs the
support of the United Nations as the latter is the body made up of States that produce and enforce
citizenship laws. According to Lynch, however, “Statelessness is a very low priority on the
agenda of the United Nations” (“Statelessness: A Forgotten Human Rights Crisis”). This low
priority is evidenced by the minimal funding that the UN provides to the UNHCR, what it
considers to be “global issues” and worthy of discussion at the World Summit, and its nonprioritization of citizenship (or “nationality”) as a human right within the UN body or within its
2005 Treaty Series focus.
Administration
As concerns funding, approximately 3% of the UNHCR’s total resources in 2005 came
from the United Nations Regular Budget (UNHCR Annual Programme Budget 2006 16). The
rest of the funds were obtained from outside voluntary contributions such as corporations,
individuals, governments and other organizations. The funding received from the United Nations
is strictly delegated toward “administrative costs” which are considered “expenses other than
operational expenses and related management costs” (UNHCR Annual Programme Budget 2006
16-17). Thus, UN funding does not cover the agency’s general programs such as protection of
and assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons or the stateless; nor does it cover any
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special programs that may arise in crisis situations such as mass refugee movements during civil
war.
Budget cuts and shortages have been a problem for the UNHCR over the past few years.
In 2002 the General Assembly’s Third Committee stressed the “chronic UNHCR budget
shortages” at its 47th and 48th meetings (“Burden of Hosting Refugees”), and numerous texts cite
the diminished funding that various UNHCR programs have endured in the past decade.27
Although the agency’s Annual Budget Programme for 2006 does not state how much of the
UNHCR’s budget is typically dedicated toward programs to assist the stateless, the
“Strengthening Asylum in Ukraine” report illustrates that budget shortages are affecting stateless
programs in Crimea. For instance, the UNHCR had “tried to move from relief to more
sustainable assistance measures” for the stateless Tatars but budget cuts in 2001 prevented them
from doing so (European Commission & the UNHCR 17).
Acknowledgment
In addition to the small percentage that the UN contributes to the UNHCR from its
Regular Budget, it does little to promote the issue of statelessness in its addresses to the public.
For instance, it does not list the problem of statelessness among its pressing “Global Issues” (but
it does mention “refugees”),28 and the prevention and reduction of statelessness are not
mentioned as a facet of the Millennium Development Goals.29 At the World Summit this year
statelessness did not find itself on the agenda for discussion, either on the official schedule30 or
within the Secretary General’s remarks to the Executive Committee of the UNHCR.
In fact, Kofi Annan commended the Summit for taking “a step forward on the question of
internally displaced persons…some of the world’s most vulnerable people,” but did not mention
the vulnerability of millions of stateless persons around the globe (Department of Public
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Information). He praised the UNHCR’s humanitarian efforts concerning refugees and the
internally displaced, and spoke of the “intellectual breakthrough” that occurred at the Summit “as
the Member States accepted, or acknowledged, for the first time the indivisible links between
security and the development of human rights” (Department of Public Information). He
continued, “It was clear that security cannot be enjoyed without development, that development
cannot be enjoyed without human rights, and neither can be enjoyed without respect for human
rights” (Department of Public Information).
While commending the Member States’ realization that security and human rights are
fundamentally connected (security is jeopardized whenever human rights are violated), neither
they nor the Secretary-General should be applauded for failing to recognize the import of
statelessness in this regard. Annan specifically states in his address to the Executive Committee
that “[t]hough the number of refugees has declined, the number of people of concern to UNHCR
has increased” (Department of Public Information). As seen above, and as section III of the
UNHCR Annual Programme Budget 2006 makes clear, “people of concern” include the stateless
(10-11). It is therefore unfortunate that this group is not mentioned in the Secretary-General’s
remarks to the committee, especially in light of the fact that the stateless generally do not enjoy
any rights and have been blatantly denied “respect” when it comes to their human right to a
“nationality.”
The lack of consideration given to citizenship as a human right within the United Nations
is also evidenced by the lack of authority that the Office of the United Nations Commission for
Human Rights (OHCHR) has in this arena (the entire mandate concerning statelessness
belonging to the UNHCR). The office of the OHCHR does not even list statelessness as a topic
on its “Human Rights Issues” page31 despite the myriad human rights concerns the stateless

104

confront daily, and it does not have a representative for the stateless as it does for internally
displaced persons (IDPs) either.32 Even the “Focus 2005 – Responding to Global Challenges” of
the United Nations Treaty Series does not list the statelessness conventions among the nine
human rights conventions presented (although the 1951 Convention on the Status Refugees and
its related protocol are included within their own “Focus” category).33
Conclusion
The subject of statelessness is not high on the list of priorities for States, the United
Nations or the international community in general. The topic of statelessness is often subsumed
under refugee concerns and consequently does not receive the same support as refugee
considerations. The separation of these two issues is essential because: 1) not all refugees are
stateless and not all stateless peoples are refugees (the stateless continue to live within the
borders of their State of residence); 2) refugee conventions and laws do not protect the stateless
unless they are also refugees; 3) statelessness sometimes generates the movement of people
across borders where they become refugees (thus making statelessness in this instance a source
of refugeehood and not a consequence, or “sub-theme,” of it).
The UN and its Members States have failed to follow in the footsteps of the 1954
Conference of Plenipotentiaries by recognizing that statelessness should not be an addendum to
(or “protocol” of) the subject of refugees. Publications, addresses, general information, and web
pages within the UN body (with the exception of the UNHCR) rarely mention statelessness, and
it is not considered a “Global Issue” despite the millions afflicted by this status. The UNHCR has
a difficult road ahead in terms of increasing awareness if it has been unable to impact even the
Secretary-General with the plight of these peoples (as demonstrated in his address to the
Executive Committee). It is extremely important, however, that this agency be given all the
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support it needs in order to help the stateless and to prevent and reduce statelessness globally.
The majority of these individuals are already rendered legally invisible within the States in which
they live; the United Nations should not perpetuate this invisibility. The following chapter
presents some suggestions for reducing statelessness.
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NOTES
1

Initially the 1954 Conference of Plenipotentiaries had intended to produce a binding document that would
eliminate statelessness, but “this was felt too radical a step” (Batchelor “Stateless Persons” 257).
2
See Appendix D for a table of the Contracting States to the 1954 and 1961 conventions.
3
Data collected from “The 1951 Refugee Convention” (UNHCR 17).
4
The UNHCR observes that “[i]n the majority of cases, refugees retain the nationality of their country of origin”
(Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 15).
5
The UNHCR makes clear that “[t]he refugee may have a nationality or may be stateless, but the element of
persecution must be present” and, “it is also possible for persons to be stateless without facing persecution…Some
countries have legislation which allows individuals to renounce their ‘established legal bond’ or ‘nationality’
without a guarantee of acquiring an alternative nationality” (UNHCR Guidelines 4). Finally, the UNHCR states that
“not all stateless persons are refugees. [T]hey must be outside the country of their former habitual residence for the
reasons indicated in the definition. Where these reasons do not exist, the stateless person is not a refugee”
(Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 17).
6
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “internally displaced
persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of
habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of
generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized State border” (“Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” 3).
7
Refer to the UNHCR publication “Statelessness and Citizenship” and Lynch’s work Lives on Hold, p. 11.
8
Article 31 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that “[t]he Contracting States shall not
impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory
where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their
illegal entry or presence” (“Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees” 31).
9
These rights are delineated in Articles 13, 17-19, 21, 23-24, 26 and 28 of the 1954 convention.
10
In addition to the reasons why a refugee may be denied her refugee status – she has “committed a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity…a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to
[her] admission to that country as a refugee” or she has “been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations” ("Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees" 18) – a stateless person may
also be denied her right to a citizenship if she has been imprisoned for more than five years on a “criminal charge”
(Article 1 of the 1961 convention).
11
As Chapter Three pointed out, one of the main ways in which people become stateless is through being born to a
stateless person.
12
This could be especially problematic for women naturalized in States that automatically assume that the wife will
obtain the citizenship of her spouse’s State.
13
Promising examples include those of Sri Lanka and the Estate Tamils, Lithuania and the ethnic Russians, and
Lebanon with regard to the Palestinians.
14
As mentioned in Chapter Six, Finland openly remarked that it would not provide travel documents at all.
15
That is, the establishment of a body “to which a person claiming the benefit of this Convention may apply for the
examination of his claim and for assistance in presenting it to the appropriate authority.”
16
Some regional bodies, such as the Organisation of American States, the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, have made concerted efforts to address statelessness in their
regional instruments (Batchelor “Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status” 158).
17
Prior to the 2002 presidential elections Zimbabwe created the “Citizenship Act” which “threatened specific ethnic
groups such as white farmers who often held European as well as Zimbabwean citizenship, and farmworkers with
‘non-Zimbabwean’ surnames. Some of these individuals are now stateless, having been deprived of Zimbabwean
nationality without having the right to any other” (Open Society Justice Initiative 5).
18
The “Protection Surge Capacity Project,” also known as the “Surge Project,” is an agreement between the
UNHCR and the International Rescue Committee to provide “crucial staff support to UNHCR during crises
requiring protection services” (International Rescue Committee). These protective services are extended to refugees,
internally displaced persons and the stateless.
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19

Consult Lynch’s testimony to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in “Statelessness: A Forgotten Human
Rights Crisis”; the European Commission and the UNHCR’s report “Strengthening Asylum in Ukraine” and the
UNHCR Executive Committee’s 2005 Progress Report (specifically p. 7).
20
As a side note, a letter was written to the email address provided for at the bottom of the page on the UNHCR’s
website (hqpa00@unhcr.ch) in order to inquire whether the agency has teaching material on statelessness that was
not placed on the website (see letter in Appendix E), but no response was ever received.
21
This quotation is taken from Annex D of the cited report.
22
It is of note that under the title “Role of the UNHCR” no mention is made of the “second mandate” given to the
agency by the General Assembly through resolution 3274.
23
This number is nearly 30 States less than the one provided by Refugees International in their report Lives on Hold.
24
Refer to Table 3 of the 2004 report (Population and Geographical Data Section 25).
25
It may also be partially due to the fact that statistical data is simply not available from all States on the stateless
contained within their borders.
26
These conclusions include Nos. 78 (XLVI), 81 (XLVIII), 90 (LII), 95 (LIV) and 99 (LV) (UNHCR “Executive
Committee Conclusions”).
27
Amnesty International has suggested that the United Nations needs to increase the percentage that it gives to the
UNHCR to 6% of its regular budget (11).
28
Refer to http://www.un.org/issues/ for the list of issues of particular concern to the UN.
29
The Millennium Development Goals may be accessed at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.
30
Consult http://www.un.org/summit2005/events_schedule.pdf to view the schedule of panels and discussions at
this year’s World Summit.
31
See this webpage at http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/index.htm.
32
The current representative for the internally displaced is Walter Kälin (UNCHR “Representative”).
33
Consult http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent2005/List.asp for the listing of the UN’s 2005 Global
Challenges “Focus.”
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CHAPTER EIGHT: RECOMMENDATIONS
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, much still needs to be done by both States and
the United Nations to address the concerns of the stateless. The statelessness conventions do not
officially charge the UNHCR with the mandate of the prevention and reduction of statelessness;
they permit the stateless to be penalized for not being stateless their entire lives; they allow
naturalized citizens to face statelessness for residence abroad, and nowhere do they consider the
will of the individual in citizenship matters. The United Nations underfunds the UNHCR, does
not publicize the subject of statelessness, or include stateless peoples among those who need the
aid of its human rights agency (the OHCHR). The UNHCR does not accord much attention to its
second mandate in terms of human resources, increasing public awareness of the plight of the
stateless or fully separating the subject from refugee concerns. The majority of Member States of
the United Nations simply do not accede to the statelessness conventions and those that have
acceded generally fail to accommodate their domestic laws to the Articles of those conventions.
Based upon the criticism presented in Chapter Seven, this chapter proceeds to make some
general recommendations that could potentially assist in the resolution of the problem of
statelessness. The chapter progresses from changes to the language of the statelessness
conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to concrete steps that the United
Nations and Member States can take to alleviate the problems associated with statelessness.
Conventions and Declarations
Terminology
The use of the term “nationality” and “national” (as in everyone has the right to a
“nationality”) in the statelessness conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
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problematic for two reasons. Firstly, membership in a State is governed by domestic laws that
typically refer to members as “citizens.”1 As noted in Chapter Two, once the discussion of
citizenship leaves the domestic realm and enters the domain of international relations the
terminology changes – citizens become nationals and citizenship becomes nationality. This
change in vocabulary is not particularly helpful when one considers that a “national” may refer
to a person that is a member of a particular State or someone who belongs to a certain ethnic
group. For instance, an individual may be of Arab nationality (in terms of being a member of that
ethnic group), but not hold the citizenship of States such as Kuwait, Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
Nationality does not clearly translate into citizenship in such instances.
In order to dispel any confusion with regard to the use of the terms “national” and
“nationality” they should be replaced with (or written in tandem with the words) “citizenship”
and “citizens.” Thus, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should either
read, “Everyone has the right to a citizenship” or “Everyone has the right to a nationality and a
citizenship.” The incorporation of such explicit language in these pertinent documents would
clarify exactly what it is that the stateless lack – citizenship – and not necessarily a
“nationality.”2
Secondly, the use of the terms “citizenship” and “citizen” instead of “nationality” and
“national” removes State membership away from any basis upon ethnic criteria. As noted in
Chapter Five, it is not uncommon for States to use citizenship laws and policies in an
instrumental fashion to denationalize portions of their population because such persons do not
“fit” the ethnically derived conception of what a member of that State should be.3 The use of
“citizen” and “citizenship” in these conventions and the Declaration would aid in the reduction
of statelessness by making it clear that citizenship is a legally-derived (as opposed to ethnically-
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derived) status. That is, the change in terminology would stress citizenship-as-legal-status and
eradicate the notion that citizenship means belonging to a particular “national” group.4
Article Stipulations and/or Exceptions
To reiterate the point from the previous chapter, statelessness is not always acquired at
birth. People may be rendered stateless at any age and the stipulation that States may require
individuals to have “always been stateless” in order to obtain assistance should be removed. If
the purpose of the 1961 convention is truly to reduce and prevent statelessness then the
convention should not only be forward-looking in the sense of reducing future statelessness at
birth,5 but it should consider the present situation of the stateless around the globe. Likewise, the
conventions should not provide States the option to denationalize naturalized citizens because of
residence abroad without first requiring that States inform their citizens of this possibility (the
“knowledge principle”).
With regard to the exceptions placed on extending rights to the stateless, the 1954
convention emphasizes that States may require the stateless to be “legally resident” in order to
secure the rights given to them under this convention (Articles 13, 17, 19, 21, 23-24, 26, 28 and
30). Since the stateless are almost entirely outside of the realm of “legality” it is most
unfortunate that their ability to secure such basic rights are predicated upon their legal standing
in the State of residence. Such exceptions in the 1954 convention should be reconsidered,
especially in view of the fact that States may deny “legal” residency precisely on ethnic, racial
and “place of origin” grounds.
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The United Nations
It would be beneficial for the United Nations to make an amendment to the 1961
convention that states that the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is
formally charged with the prevention and reduction of statelessness. As illustrated in Chapter
Seven, the UNHCR has not always realized actions to carry out the mandate granted to it by
General Assembly resolution 3274. The declaration that the UNHCR is the body charged by
Article 11 of this convention with the mandate of the prevention and reduction of statelessness
would facilitate the prevention and reduction of statelessness in two main ways: 1) it would
cause the UNHCR to treat the subject of statelessness as seriously as that of its mandate
pertaining to refugees,6 and 2) it would guide Contracting States (and potential new signatories)
directly to the aid of this agency. Such a formal declaration would raise awareness of the fact that
there is a body charged to assist States in the mission of preventing and reducing statelessness.
As observed in the previous chapter, the UN needs to better publicize the subject of
statelessness. Statelessness is not simply an issue because it may lead to refugee movements. It is
a problem because individuals are denied basic rights. It is a concern because disease and
physical conflict do not respect territorial boundaries and because tensions may be generated
between States. It is an issue because the international system of States is denying millions of
people the right to be members of this system. The UN, therefore, should consider making
statelessness the subject of one of its “International Years” or incorporate the theme in a decadelong campaign on human rights. If the number of stateless people is expected to increase,7 and
this year microcredit and sports education were the 2005 “International Year” topics, then a
subject as serious as statelessness should be accorded the same publicity.8 There should be an
“International Year of Statelessness” or an “International Year of the Right to Citizenship.”
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The UN should also take a more proactive step in the creation of birth registration
programs within States. By the estimates of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), over
48 million births are unregistered every year (The ‘Rights’ Start to Life 3). This is particularly
serious when one recalls that birth registration is the essential first step in acquiring citizenship.
Although UNICEF has taken commendable steps to try and aid States with their birth registration
process, this agency cannot be expected to promulgate free birth registration and free birth
certification “for every child in every country” (“Factsheet: Birth Registration” 2) without more
UN-wide involvement.9
As Nicola Sharp, a policy researcher at Plan International,10 points out, much more needs
to be done in this regard: “the issue of birth registration is rarely incorporated into international
programs and policies, nor is it commonly made a condition of international aid and
partnerships” (32). Sharp recommends that international bodies like the United Nations make
birth registration reporting a requirement for Member States that seek financial assistance. She
also argues for the creation of an International Birth Registration Day and the recognition that
lack of birth registration is a child’s rights issue.
The United Nations should wholeheartedly incorporate birth registration requirements in
its policies at all levels. Since only two States did not sign on to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, the promulgation of birth registration should not meet with resistance. The UN needs
to garner more monetary support to aid those States that have low rates of birth registration
(especially those in Asia and Africa). It also needs to seek the necessary support from States that
have high rates of birth registration to lend their technical expertise to those States that need
assistance. Thus far it appears that it is the action of non-governmental organizations, like Plan
International, that have had the greatest success in placing birth registration on the global
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agenda.11 The UN, therefore, needs to increase its support of UNICEF in its endeavour to reduce
the incidence of births that are unregistered.
It goes without saying after the criticism presented in Chapter Seven that the United
Nations needs to increase its support of the UNHCR’s General Assembly-assigned mandate to
prevent and reduce statelessness. The promotion of State accession to the statelessness
conventions is crucial in this regard, for “non-ratification of the Statelessness Conventions
results in situations where stateless individuals are not protected or recognized” (Department of
International Protection 35). The stateless exist and they are accorded specific rights by the 1954
and 1961 conventions. When the majority of the UN Member States refuse to recognize
statelessness as a global problem in need of an international solution (via their non-accession to
these conventions) they are effectively abrogating the rights of the stateless and rendering the
stateless legally invisible.
Other than supporting the UNHCR in its bid to garner more State accessions to the
statelessness conventions, the United Nations should consider the creation of a body either
within, or separate from, the UNHCR that is charged solely with judging citizenship disputes put
forth by individuals against States. The stateless rarely have access to local judicial forums
despite the 1961 convention’s stipulation that such access be freely granted (Article 16). Thus
the “local remedies rule” which requires that “aliens[…]exhaust local judicial and administrative
remedies before they[…]invoke the protection of their own government or institute international
proceedings” (Greiper 442-3) is not always applicable to the stateless. They need an extra-State
forum wherein they can press their citizenship claims.

116

The institution of such an agency to hear the claims of individuals (in this case the
stateless) is not without precedent within the UN body. There is a Human Rights Committee
whose sole purpose is to monitor Contracting States’ implementation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). According to the OHCHR, all Contracting States
must submit reports on the progress of their implementation of the Covenant to the Human
Rights Committee which then makes recommendations and observations to the Contracting
States. In addition to examining the mandatory State reports, the Committee may hear individual
complaints concerning Contracting State violations of the articles of this Covenant.12
An Optional Protocol to the 1961 Convention could institute a Citizenship Review
Committee with much the same functions as that of the Human Rights Committee: the
examination of Contracting States’ obligatory reports on the progress of accommodating their
domestic law to the Articles of the statelessness conventions, and the hearing of the stateless’
claims for a given citizenship. At best, such an organ could dramatically reduce cases of
statelessness as it would aid in the naturalization of the stateless; at a minimum it could drive
Contracting Parties to alter their citizenship laws to better accommodate the needs of the stateless
because they do not want extra-State assistance in their domestic affairs.
States
If the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is indeed a “United Nations priority,”13 and
if it is to be expected that Member States share in this priority since they freely joined the
association of the UN (and can freely leave the organization if they do not agree with its
priorities and principles), then Member States should not balk at the idea of protecting the
individual rights stipulated in this document. They ought not only to respect that everyone is
entitled to a citizenship, as articulated in Article 15, but they should accede to the statelessness
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conventions and accommodate their laws to take this group into account. If the current
international system is composed of States made up of permanent populations of “citizens” (and
States determine these populations), and if being a citizen is currently the only way to secure
basic human rights and protections, then it appears that to deny citizenship to millions of people
is a human rights violation.
The Universal Declaration persuades States to bestow the individual rights articulated
within its Articles to everyone regardless of race, ethnicity, sex, or other birth factors (Article 2).
It stipulates that everyone has the right to freedom and security (Article 3), to recognition as a
legal being before the law (Article 6), to freedom of movement within the borders of every State
(Article 13), to own property (Article 17), to work and freely choose one’s employment (Article
23), to food, housing and medical care (Article 25) and to free elementary education (Article 26).
As Chapter Six illustrated, the stateless are deprived of these rights every day. There is no such
thing as freedom of movement or the ability to freely choose one’s employment. Medical care,
food and education are not always easy to obtain, and property may be arbitrarily seized. The
majority of the stateless live in acute insecurity and their recognition as legal entities before the
law is largely ignored by the States in which they reside. Many of these rights are violated
precisely because of race or ethnicity, or distinctions made on political, national, or “social
origin” grounds.
Article 28 of the Declaration sets forth the right of every person “to a social and
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized.” Yet the present State system does not provide such an order. There are some nine
million or more stateless persons eking out their existence around the world. How are States
forming an order that permits the realization of these peoples’ “rights and freedoms” as
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articulated in the Declaration? Some States will not even provide the stateless membership much
less protect them or grant them basic rights. One-hundred and sixty-four States have not even
acceded to the two conventions that provide legal recognition to the stateless and guarantee them
rights and freedoms before the law.
In order for States to maintain legitimate control of membership decisions, they need to
show that they are at least willing to make an effort in the direction of ameliorating the condition
of the stateless by acceding to the statelessness conventions. Otherwise, they will not be fulfilling
the duty for which they are charged. Take the following analogy as an example: in a Human
Resources Department of Company P, Dorothy is the sole person charged with creating job
applications, reviewing such applications when they have been filled by potential employees, and
authorizing the employment of such people if they meet the criteria set forth by her in the job
application. If Dorothy does not perform these functions adequately, several outcomes may
result: potential employees may be denied the opportunity to find a job at company P; Dorothy
may be given a warning for not realizing the role for which she is the sole person charged; she
may be given an assistant to aid her fulfill her responsibilities; or she may be fired and replaced.
Although the analogy may not be perfect, like Dorothy, States are the sole entities
charged with the creation of membership criteria (via domestic laws), the review of applications
for citizenship filled by potential members, and the acceptance or rejection of such individual
petitions for citizenship. What happens when States do not adequately fulfill these duties when
they are the sole entities authorized to do so? Obviously, like the potential employees that are
denied a job because Dorothy is not performing her functions, some individuals will be denied
citizenship (as occurs in the case of the stateless).
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Whereas Dorothy may be given a warning that she will lose her job if she does not fulfill
her duties in the Human Resource Department, there is no entity in the State system that may
enforce such a warning if pronounced to States. However, it is possible that a group of concerned
States comes together and creates a body (such as was suggested earlier with the Citizenship
Review Committee) that issues remarks denouncing a State that violates the rights of the
stateless. This Committee could be viewed as the “assistant” that aids Contracting States (or
State bodies like the UNHCR) to prevent and reduce statelessness.
While Dorothy may be fired from the Human Resource Department if she does not
perform her job, States obviously cannot be fired. One cannot simply say that the State system is
failing to provide for all peoples equally and is therefore discharged of its duties and functions.
The system has been hundreds of years in the making and will not likely be replaced by
something else in a period any shorter than its creation. It is possible, however, that the authority
of States in determining membership decreases as the years progress. As was asserted by the
Permanent Court of International Justice in 1923, “The question whether a certain matter is or is
not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the
development of international relations” (17). International relations may develop to the degree
such that citizenship is no longer tied to the idea of the sovereign State. Citizenship, after all, is
membership in a polity and nowhere does it specify that this polity must be a State. As Heater
points out, citizenship “can be associated with any geographical unit from a small town to the
whole globe itself” (qtd. in Stewart 64). The next section briefly examines two alternatives to
State-based citizenship that are presented in the literature.
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Cosmopolitanism and Transnational Citizenship
Cosmopolitan and transnational scholars typically argue for the separation of citizenship
from the confines of the “nation-State.” Such a proposition is not altogether radical when one
considers that citizenship’s ties to the present State system are of recent origin. Chapter Two
noted that men were citizens of city-republics in Ancient Greece and citizenship was conditioned
by guild membership in the powerful towns and cities during the Middle Ages. It was not until
the French Revolution that citizenship became tied to the “State” as it is currently known. While
some cosmopolitans argue for the creation of a global State to which all people could belong
regardless of political and affiliative ties or biological characteristics, the majority of
cosmopolitans simply seek to foster a world community wherein justice is granted equally to all
and human rights are universally respected. In fact, the three basic tenets of cosmopolitanism are:
individualism (people are the units of concern), universality (all people are equal) and generality
(everyone is of concern to each person regardless of personal ties) (Pogge 48-9).
Individuals in this cosmopolitan view are “world citizens” in that they recognize the
interdependence of all peoples and do not necessarily look more favourably upon their ‘co-State’
citizens than individuals who live in another State. For instance, Andrew Linklater asserts that
“[t]he cosmopolitan belief in the moral equality of persons holds that sound reasons have to be
offered for treating individuals differently[…]On this premise, there are no prima facie reasons
for privileging the interests of another person just because she or he is a fellow-citizen –
conversely, there are no obviously compelling reasons for disregarding the interests of outsiders
simply because they happen to have been born in or belong to another society” (57).
Many cosmopolitans (and scholars who seek to remove the State from its position of
unqualified preeminence) argue for the dispersion of sovereignty along vertical and horizontal
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lines. Thomas Pogge advocates a multi-layered version of sovereignty wherein “persons could be
citizens of, and govern themselves through, a number of political units of various sizes, without
any one political unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of [the] [S]tate”
(58). Horsman and Marshall similarly discuss the development of an international system “where
states, regions, international organizations and transnational companies vie more equally for
power” (166). According to these authors, such a system would be “redolent of the pre-modern,
where spheres of responsibility overlapped and overrode according to the occasion” (166).
Almost all cosmopolitans seek a citizenship that is not bound by the current notion of the
State (either territorially or normatively). They want to “to counteract the parochialism of
national citizenship by introducing a new set of rights and obligations, applicable to the whole
human race and not just to individual nation-states” and “replace at the global level authority and
coercion – the defining characteristics of nation states – with dialogue and consent” (Wagner
284). Such a cosmopolitan view readily lends itself to the protection of stateless peoples,
especially as concerns the equal promulgation, and respect, of everyone’s human rights.
One of the suggestions made by some authors is to strengthen the human rights regime in
order to ameliorate the condition of the stateless and to remove the determination of their status
from States. Yasemin Soysal argues, for example, that “the logic of personhood supersedes the
logic of national citizenship” (qtd. in Bosniak 460) and that human rights regimes should take
precedence over State norms for this reason. Similarly, Bryan Turner believes that the human
rights regime is a more appropriate venue for securing rights than State-based citizenship for it
can “meet the needs of transnational migrants and indigenous people who do not wish to be
incorporated [in the State] at the cost of loss of language and culture” (Glenn 14).
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As demonstrated by the previous chapters, however, legal “personhood” is decided by
States. That a stateless person is a human being does not always mean that they will be treated
according to the human rights postulated in international laws and conventions. States are often
more concerned with the rights and protection of “their” citizens than non-citizens that reside
within their borders.14 Thus, strengthening the human rights regime without seeking the
concomitant aid of States in this endeavour is largely futile at present.
While cosmopolitan scholars typically move in the realm of “what ought to be” and focus
upon globally-minded individuals who treat all peoples the same and respect everyone’s human
rights, transnational authors generally focus on the “here and now” effects of globalization upon
citizenship.15 Such scholars note the weakening of the State’s capacity to maintain an
individual’s sole allegiance in this regard, but they do not resign States to the scrapheap of
history. As Wagner points out, “transnational citizenship recognizes that the nation-state is a
reality and that in the international arena a majority of citizens will continue to claim a national
affiliation” (285). Transnational citizens include the global business elite16 and migrants who
labour and reside temporarily in one State while maintaining ties in another. Transnationalists
argue for the creation of an institution that will take into account the mobility and multiple
allegiances of such peoples and that will grant “them rights in all the countries with which they
identify” (Wagner 285).17
As pertains to statelessness, the idea that transnational institutions could arise that grant
individuals their rights no matter their State of origin is appealing. However, do such
transnational institutions only grant rights to people who are “legally resident” or who have a
legal identity? If so, then such transnational institutions are of no help to the stateless. Two
conventions and a Universal Declaration of Human Rights already provide the stateless their
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rights. Provision is not the problem; the protection of such rights is. Thus, again, until such a
time that the State system is modified to the degree that States no longer determine membership
or guarantee rights to individuals, the States of this system are the entities to which the concerns
of the stateless must be primarily addressed.18
Possible State-Based Courses of Action
While it is important for the language of the statelessness conventions and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to explicitly refer to citizenship and clearly separate ethnicity from
citizenship-as-legal status, and even though it is necessary for the United Nations to make certain
administrative and institutional changes to better address statelessness, States are currently the
key players in deciding who will or will not become a citizen of their territory. States have the
primary responsibility in preventing and reducing statelessness. Thus, it is recommended that
States:
1) actively seek information and advice from the UNHCR on the meaning and
implications of ratification of the statelessness conventions
2) accede to the conventions where it is deemed feasible and modify their domestic
citizenship law accordingly
3) accommodate all those articles stipulated within the conventions that they can
implement in domestic law until such time that they can accede if accession is not
currently possible
4) create a national birth registration unit or department, if they have not already done
so, that is charged with the maintenance of a birth registry and the promotion of birth
registration awareness campaigns while providing registration at little to no cost
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5) permit citizenship to be acquired via maternal descent if they do not already allow
for this form of acquisition
6) ensure that every individual, regardless of legal standing, has access to the Courts
and a fair hearing when they are charged with a specific act or if they wish to bring a
charge against someone or some entity
7) make certain that any individual who may be denationalized on the grounds of
residence abroad, marriage or other cause, is duly notified in writing of the
possibility of such a loss of citizenship before such denationalization occurs (the
“knowledge principle”), and provide solutions to remedy the situation that do not
infringe upon her basic rights as stipulated in international law
8) delineate before a domestic tribunal the reasons for denationalization of a person on
the grounds of “national interest” and provide the person who may lose her
citizenship upon such grounds legal assistance to make her counter case
9) make less cumbersome and expedite the naturalization process for the stateless as
compared to aliens
10) create a special legal status for the stateless when naturalization is not deemed
feasible that allows them to reside and work legally within the State and grants them
certain protections
11) convene an international forum wherein States may share their successful birth
registration programs and naturalization campaigns with interested States and
governmental and non-governmental organizations
12) consider the creation of an Optional Protocol to the 1961 convention that allows for
the creation of an international Committee (“Citizenship Review Committee) that
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will hear citizenship disputes and provide evidence concerning the State to which an
individual has effective ties so that the individual may become naturalized
13) allow an already constituted international court to hear and judge individual claims to
citizenship if the suggestion presented in recommendation 11 is not deemed possible
14) permit individuals to deliberately choose their citizenship.

This latter recommendation is considered in more detail in the final chapter as it is forms
the crux of the argument that involuntarily statelessness could be reduced if individuals were
permitted to choose their State membership. It is also the basis for a more equitable citizen-State
relationship wherein both parties have rights to determine the extent of their political and legal
association to each other.
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NOTES
1

The term “national” may sometimes be used in lieu of “citizen” in domestic law, however, as seen in the case of
the United States (refer to footnote 27 on p. 23).
2
The stateless Bidoon of Kuwait, for example, are Arab nationals, but are citizens of no State. Refer to the Bidoon
section in “A Human Rights Approach in the Middle East” (Doebbler 542-44).
3
Hanjian notes how race and ethnicity were used in the “mass denationalizations of Jews under Nazi Germany,
Armenians under Kemalist Turkey, Koreans in post-war Japan, and blacks under white-ruled South Africa” (10).
Bertocchi and Strozzi also comment on the use of ethnically-based denationalizations in Africa, as does the “Report
of the African Citizenship and Discrimination Audit” by the Open Society Justice Initiative.
4
As noted in the Literature Review chapter, Faulks and Wiener argue for the separation of the ethnically-based
“nation” from the State because of the conflict that their combination generates.
5
Ellen Grieper criticizes the 1961 convention for its inability to address the plight of those who are currently
stateless. She states that Article 4 of this convention (which stipulates that a State may request that one of the
stateless individual’s parents first be a citizen before granting citizenship) currently “limits the number of stateless
persons who can benefit from its application” (449-50).
6
As noted in Chapter Seven, the UNHCR is formally charged with assisting and protecting refugees in Article 35 of
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
7
The UNHCR states that “the number of stateless persons appears bound to continue growing for the foreseeable
future” (“The Problem of Statelessness”).
8
Consult http://www.un.org/events/microcredit/ and http://www.un.org/sport2005/index.html for information on
these 2005 “International Year” subjects.
9
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), a branch of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, is another UN body that advocates birth registration. The convention produced by the CRC is the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Contracting States (only the United States and Somalia are not
Contracting Parties) are expected to ensure that all children are registered as soon as possible after birth (Article 7).
10
Plan International is a non-governmental organization dedicated to spreading awareness about the importance of
birth registration. See Plan International’s website at http://www.writemedown.org/.
11
Plan International notes that “[s]uccessful lobbying by Plan and other NGOs resulted in birth registration
receiving priority in the Action Plan from the 2002 UN General Assembly Special Session on Children (UNGASS)
– a remarkable achievement as this issue was not even mentioned in the 1990 World Summit for Children” (7).
12
Consult http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm for more information on the Human Rights
Committee and its functions.
13
This quote was taken from the title (“A United Nations Priority”) of the webpage at
http://www.un.org/rights/HRToday/declar.htm.
14
For example, the Thai Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Newin Chidchob commented the
following about the stateless Thai Hill Tribe people: “I feel for the Thai who have no place to sleep, no land to till,
nothing to eat. However, the state should take care of the Thai citizens first and the other groups later” (qtd. in
Ritchie).
15
See the “Globalization” portion of the “International Location Literature” of Chapter Two for more information.
16
Some States actively seek to draw in the capital of this class of people. Canada, for example, grants permanent
residency to anyone that invests $300,000 in the State. The United States created an “investor” in 1990 that
permitted persons who invested a million dollars in the State (and created 10 jobs in the process) to obtain a Green
Card (Glenn 11).
17
Wagner cites the European Union as one such transnational institution.
18
Linklater points out that “[t]he achievements of transnational citizenship are strictly regional or continental, and
there is always a possibility that the new polity will become closed in on itself” (206). Transnational institutions,
therefore, will not necessarily be open to those individuals who do not fall within the regional boundaries of their
institutional jurisdiction.
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CHAPTER NINE: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE
Citizenship-as-choice is not a novel idea. John Locke pronounced that a child was born a
subject of nowhere and that only when “he c[a]me to Age of Discretion” could he freely choose
to which State he wished to be a citizen. The participants of the American and French
Revolutions held steadfastly to the idea of volitional citizenship, although once these republics
were formed this notion was largely discarded. Citizenship-as-choice, instead of automatically
conferred status or absence of choice (as in the case of the stateless), requires the recognition that
individuals may both opt out of and opt into a particular citizen-State relationship.
Limited Choice
The opting out of citizenship is largely accepted (expatriation) with the exception of
States like Costa Rica that do not recognize voluntary renunciation of citizenship. As noted
previously, however, many States place restrictions upon individuals who wish to renounce their
citizenship (military requirements must first be fulfilled, debts must be paid and other obligations
must be carried out). State permission is often needed in the majority of cases when one seeks to
leave a particular citizen-State relationship since approval by the relevant State authority is
required in order for one’s renunciation to be “recognized.” In addition, international law does
not permit the opting out of the citizen-State relationship entirely since citizenship may only be
renounced if an individual is going to obtain another one.1 Thus, individual choice in renouncing
citizenship is often severely circumscribed by States and international law.
The ability to opt into a particular citizen-State relationship is just as restricted as the
ability to leave a given citizen-State relationship. Individuals, while having the “right” to a
nationality do not have the “right” to choose whichever citizenship they desire. One cannot
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simply decide that she no longer wants to be a citizen of State X and become a citizen of State Y
without first going through the relevant expatriation process of the former State and the
necessary naturalization procedure of the latter one. At the end of such a process there is still the
possibility that her application for membership will be denied. A person does not decide her
citizenship without State permission.
Although State consent (or at least “recognition” in the case of renunciation) is required
to enter and leave the citizen-State relationship, “citizen” consent is not needed when the State
wishes to leave the citizen-State relationship with a given individual (denationalization). Chapter
Four illustrated that States may denationalize their citizens on several grounds.2 That a particular
person may not want to lose her citizenship in a given State is of no importance if that State has
decided otherwise. The person’s choice in the matter is irrelevant.
Thus, except for those rare individuals who are able voluntarily to abjure citizenship
entirely (the voluntarily stateless), people are either citizens of some State or they are stateless.
In both instances the status is acquired and not deliberately chosen.3 While many people may be
quite content with the State membership they were born with and not question their automatic
acquisition of such citizenship (especially those from wealthy democratic States that generally
respect human rights), not all citizenships are equal. Persons holding citizenship from
impoverished States, for example, will generally not have the same standard of living or life
opportunities as those who hold citizenship from wealthier States.
The Need for Choice
That a person is tied to a given State because of birth on the territory or because of
descent from individuals born on that State’s territory is reminiscent of feudalism and does not
sit well with the principles of freedom of association, movement and conscience promulgated in
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human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. People appear to have a
right to citizenship; they just do not have the right to any citizenship they want. While this thesis
does not analyse the case for open (or closed) borders in terms of State membership,4 it does
examine the effects of lack of citizenship choice (statelessness) upon the lives of millions of
people around the globe. As seen in Chapter Six, these effects are very serious and citizenshipas-choice should therefore be an option for this group of people. That is, they should be allowed
to choose to have the citizenship of the State with which they have the strongest effective ties.5
In this manner they will be afforded some security and extended certain rights and protections.
Permitting the stateless to choose to hold the citizenship of the State where their ties are
strongest (in terms of birth, residency, family relations and other factors) will not only reduce
statelessness globally, but it may reduce inter-State tensions in those instances when one more
than one State is involved in a stateless group’s condition.6 It may even strengthen the stateless’
commitment to the State of residence. The argument that granting the stateless citizenship might
increase ethnic tensions within certain States is not entirely valid since such tensions already
exist within many of these States (as individuals were denationalized or denied membership
within these States precisely on ethnic grounds). Instead, it is possible that the granting of
citizenship to the stateless in these States might actually decrease inter-ethnic tensions as
avenues for political participation and judicial action become open to everyone equally.
The Practicality of Choice
While citizenship-as-choice is not currently feasible for everyone on the planet in terms
of choosing membership to any State they would like,7 it is possible within a particular citizenState relationship. That is, citizens could choose whether they wish to maintain the citizenship
that they acquired at birth or opt out of it at a given age. This would remove the citizen-State
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relationship from the realm of assumed (tacit) consent to that of deliberate and explicit consent.
Such an act would restore some balance to the citizen-State relationship in that both parties must
expressly consent to their association with the other. It could also counter the possible negative
effects of tacit consent that were presented in Chapter Four (ignorance, apathy and hostility on
the part of the citizenry).
Schuck, Smith and Hanjian believe that it is entirely possible to establish an agency
whose function is to notify citizens at a given age of their right to decline or maintain citizenship
within a particular State.8 In fact, Hanjian argues that individuals should sign contractual
agreements when they wish to maintain citizenship. These agreements are then deposited in
registries “[b]ecause government without consent is unacceptable, proof of express consent is
necessary in order to clearly define the limits of a state’s authority” (248).
The implementation of an oath system for all citizens (not just those who are naturalized)
could be used to the same effect. At age 21, for instance, after being informed of the rights and
responsibilities of membership in a particular State, an individual could be summoned to a
“Bureau of Citizen Affairs” where they simply make known their desire to maintain the
citizenship they acquired at birth or not (much like the current naturalization process that an
individual undergoes in order to become a citizen of the United States).
The requirement that individuals go to an agency to renounce or maintain their
citizenship at a given age could also alleviate the cases of statelessness that result when
individuals reside abroad without informing the relevant State authority. As noted in Chapter
Seven, naturalized citizens may be rendered stateless because they are unaware of the need to
claim that they wish to maintain their citizenship while residing abroad. A State-wide
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requirement that all citizens take an oath, or assert their desire to keep their citizenship, at a
stipulated age can prevent such citizenship loss.
The act of taking such an oath, or formally signing a contract as Hanjian suggests, to
maintain citizenship should not be cumbersome, but it could be very meaningful. It would
remove the legal status of citizenship from the realm of passivity (passive status) to that of
activity (active status). It would place some sort of control over political and legal membership
into the hands of the individual as she could either maintain that State’s membership or abstain
from that particular citizenship (and consequently be rendered stateless if no other State
naturalizes her). It is unlikely that individuals would renounce their right to the citizenship they
acquired at birth for two principal reasons: 1) people do not at present voluntarily denationalize
on a mass scale even though most States allow for the voluntary renunciation of citizenship
(albeit with several restrictions) and, 2) statelessness is generally unappealing to people as rights
and protections are not properly extended to individuals outside of the State forum.
Thus, citizenship-as-choice could be beneficial for the stateless, for those who hold a
citizenship and for States. The stateless would be permitted to elect the status of citizenship to
the State where they hold the strongest effective ties9 and secure the associated rights and
protection. Citizens would be able to partake in the citizen-State relationship on a more equitable
basis and perhaps learn more about what their particular citizenship means. States would achieve
a more informed (and possibly committed) citizenry and perhaps forestall future intra- and interState tensions with regard to the membership and resource rights of the stateless. The provision
of citizenship to the stateless, and ensuring that their basic rights are protected, could also
decrease the possibility of the spread of contagious disease and physical conflict.10 Globally
there could be benefits for humankind as the rights and the will of individuals are taken into
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account in a matter as consequential as that of choosing one’s citizenship (the traditional domain
of States). Declarations, conventions and treaties pronouncing individuals’ rights to freedoms of
thought, movement and association would actually exist in deed instead of just word.
Conclusion
Statelessness and citizenship are two statuses of crucial import in the lives of people.
Each status circumscribes the rights that a person may secure, the opportunities she may have,
the protection she may be granted and the dreams she may realize. The one status is more
favourable to providing these rights and opportunities (citizenship), while the other is far less
amenable to such provision (statelessness). Regardless of these significant differences, both
conditions are State-determined. The State creates the criteria for membership, judges who meets
these criteria, and decides whether or not an individual will be granted citizenship. Citizenship is
not a choice. If it were, there would be no involuntary stateless people.
It can be ventured that citizenship is the right to have rights. One may claim that she has
the right to liberty, security, protection of the law, movement, work, and freedom of speech and
religion, and freedom from degrading punishment and arbitrary arrest.11 These rights and
freedoms are merely claims, however, when there is no State to endorse, extend and ensure such
rights and freedoms to the individual. Citizenship at least gives a person the opportunity to
legally lay claim to the rights and freedoms proclaimed in the laws of the varied States. The
stateless may make no such claim if they are not recognized by their State of residence.
Citizenship, therefore, is a human right.12
That States are failing to provide membership to all persons equally is evidenced by the
examples of stateless peoples presented in this thesis. Not only do States sometimes refuse
naturalization to the stateless and ignore the stipulations of their own citizenship laws, but some
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States even go so far as to manipulate such laws in order to denationalize certain portions of their
population. Such behaviour is threatening to both people and the State system. As the
repercussions chapter demonstrated, the stateless live in perpetual insecurity and States must
confront the reality that stateless groups exist outside of the jurisdiction of the international
system and the citizen-State relationship upon which this system is based.13
It is not only States engaged in the refusal of naturalization of the stateless or the
discriminatory denationalization of peoples that are implicated in the perpetuation of
statelessness. Those States that do not act to prevent and reduce its occurrence are involved as
well. That is, all States belong to the State system that was instituted in the wake of the Treaty of
Westphalia. This institution is composed of laws, shared practices and norms that condition
relations between States. According to Pogge, members of an institution share the indirect
responsibility “not to participate in an unjust institutional scheme (one that violates human
rights) without making reasonable efforts to aid its victims and to promote institutional reform”
(50).
Pogge provides the example of the human right not to be enslaved. While those who
enslave are directly responsible for violating the aforementioned right, those who do not enslave,
yet who are part of the social institution that allows slavery to take place, are just as responsible
for violating this right. “We are asked to be concerned about human rights violations not simply
insofar as they exist at all,” he says, “but only insofar as they are produced by social institutions
in which we are significant participants” (52). Since States are all participants in the institution of
the post-Westphalian international system, all States are indirectly implicated in the perpetuation
of statelessness if they do not make efforts to prevent and reduce it. Thus, simply because the
problem of statelessness does not touch a particular State’s territorial borders, does not mean that
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the State is not responsible for helping to resolve the problems statelessness generates elsewhere.
For this reason accession to the two statelessness conventions is essential.
While State accession to the 1954 and 1961 statelessness conventions is important,
accession is not the only manner in which States can help to prevent and reduce statelessness.
Chapter Eight demonstrated that assistance in this endeavour can take many forms: from
increasing birth registrations, creating a special legal status for the stateless, providing the
stateless judicial recourse and sharing successful campaigns to prevent and reduce statelessness
with other States and interested parties. Statelessness is not a condition that should be ignored as
its repercussions are far-reaching. The responsibility of improving the lot of these peoples lies
primarily with the States, but non-stateless persons, the United Nations and humanitarian
organizations also have the duty to ameliorate the status of the stateless where they can, for all
are participants in the international system of States.
The stateless may be legally invisible and outside the realm of the citizen-State
relationship, but they need not be invisible to the human conscience and they should never fall
outside the reach of humanity. This thesis ends with the hope that involuntary statelessness will
one day be resolved and that by highlighting this theme, consciousness of the plight of the
stateless will be raised and renewed efforts will be made to provide them the right to which they
are already entitled, but to which they are currently restricted from enjoying – citizenship.
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NOTES
1

Article 7 of the 1961 convention states that denationalization is permitted only when the person is able to obtain
another citizenship in its place. David Maxey notes that “[t]he crystallization of a rule in international law which
provides for expatriation only on the acquisition or election of another nationality might lead to injustice,
particularly in those cases where, because of oppression, an individual would prefer to be stateless rather than to
preserve his present nationality” (157).
2
Refer to pp. 57 to 61.
3
Again, this work does not refer to naturalized citizens who freely choose to elect membership in another State
(State consent, of course, still being necessary to naturalize).
4
See “The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For” by Roger Nett and “Reconsidering Open Borders” by Carens for
arguments for the opening of State borders.
5
A “Citizenship Review Committee,” described briefly in the preceding chapter, could aid the stateless precisely in
their endeavour to prove the existence of effective ties with a particular State.
6
Consult pp. 72 to 78 for the regional implications of statelessness.
7
Such an act would raise serious questions that could be examined in future research. Questions include: What
would prevent people from flocking to one particular State? How would States regulate membership so as not to
expend vital resources? What would the implications be for wealthy States? Would this infringe upon the rights of
groups to self-determination? etc.
8
See Schuck and Smith p. 124 and Hanjian p. 248.
9
It is well-documented that stateless groups have citizenships of choice: the Lhotshampas want Bhutanese
citizenship, the Crimean Tatars want to be Ukrainian, the majority of Biharis want membership in Bangladesh and
the list goes on.
10
Chapter Four discusses the regional implications of statelessness in terms of disease, physical conflict, human
trafficking and the possibility of stateless individuals taking part in militant activities. These are all serious
consequences that could be abated, if not entirely eradicated, by providing stateless persons membership in the State
polity with which they have the strongest effective ties. Chapter Four also provided examples of how tensions
between States are generated because of their involvement with stateless groups. For example, Nepal is pressuring
Bhutan to solve the status of the stateless Lhotshampas, and Sri Lanka must take into account its treatment of the
Estate Tamils because of India’s Tamil minority.
11
These are all freedoms and rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
12
This does not mean that individuals do not have the right to renounce membership in the State system completely
(as Hanjian argues). It simply means that all people should have the right to a citizenship if they want one.
13
As Belgium observed at the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, “nationality is the very basis of the formation
and preservation of the state” (Muthraika 38).
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Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the
conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny
and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion
of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization
of this pledge,
Now, therefore,
The General Assembly,
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind,
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures,
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the
peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Article 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any
other limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Article 4
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
Article 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
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Article 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to
such discrimination.
Article 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
Article 11
Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in
a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal
offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.
Article 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks
upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.
Article 13
Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.
Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Article 14
Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 15
Everyone has the right to a nationality.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
Article 16
Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to
found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
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Article 18
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Article 20
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Article 21
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent
free voting procedures.
Article 22
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national
effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.
Article 23
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to
protection against unemployment.
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an
existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
Article 24
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays
with pay.
Article 25
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.
Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26
Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.
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Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available
and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations,
racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.
Article 27
Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author.
Article 28
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration
can be fully realized.
Article 29
Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by
law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.
Article 30
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

SOURCE: http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm
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This appendix consists of an explanation of the rules used to code the Citizenship Laws of the
World report followed by a table with the coded data.

Rules
The textual information provided in this report is coded according to the following rules:
a) Jus soli
a. A State that currently permits citizenship acquisition via jus soli is coded 1 while
a State that does not permit jus soli is coded 0.
i. States like Cyprus, Indonesia and Malta that previously permitted jus soli
but stopped this practice prior to the publication of the Citizenship Laws
of the World Report are coded 0.
b. A State that permits jus soli regardless of the restrictions posited below are coded
1 because they do not prohibit such citizenship acquisition.
i. Restrictions
1. One parent must be a citizen
2. Residency requirements
3. Must be sought at a stipulated age
b) Jus sanguinis
a. A State that permits citizenship acquisition via jus sanguinis is coded 1 while a
State that does not permit jus sanguinis is coded 0.
i. No State prohibits citizenship acquisition via this method
b. A State that permits jus sanguinis regardless of the restrictions posited below are
coded 1 because they do not prohibit such citizenship acquisition.
i. Restrictions
1. One parent must be a citizen
2. Residency requirements
3. Racial requirements
4. Must be sought at a stipulated age
5. Must be a descendant of a non-naturalized citizen
6. May only be acquired through the paternal line
a. Citizenship acquisition through the maternal line is coded 0
if the principal means of citizenship acquisition is through
the father and the State only permits citizenship acquisition
through the mother when the child is born out of wedlock
or the father is unknown or stateless
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TABLE 1: Citizenship Laws of the World Coded Data

STATE

Afghanistan
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

FATHER

MOTHER

BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS

BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS

Y
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

N
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1

Y
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

N
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

147

STATE

Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo
Congo Republic
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Germany
Ghana
Greece

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

FATHER

MOTHER

Y
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0

N
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
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BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS
Y
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS
N
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

STATE

Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
North Korea
South Korea
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

FATHER

MOTHER

Y
1
1
0
1
0
1
0

N
0
0
1
0
1
0
1

1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
1
0
0
0

1
0
1
1
1

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
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BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS
Y
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS
N
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

STATE

Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

FATHER

MOTHER

Y
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1

N
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0

1
0

0
1

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Y
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
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BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS
Y
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS
N
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

STATE

Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
Samoa
Sao Tome & Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan

Y
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1

BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS
Y
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS
N
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

FATHER

MOTHER

Y
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1

N
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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STATE

Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
TOTAL
Percent

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SOLIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

JUS
SANGUINIS

FATHER

MOTHER

Y
0
0
0
1
0
0

N
1
1
1
0
1
1

0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
58
33.72

1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
114
66.28

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
176
100

N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Y
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
176
100

Y
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
133
75.57

SOURCE: Citizenship Laws of the World Report (United States, Office of Personnel Management)
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BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS
Y
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
15
8.52

BOTH
PARENTS
CITIZENS
N
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
161
91.48

APPENDIX C: 2004 GLOBAL REFUGEE TRENDS
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TABLE 2: Others of Concern to the UNHCR

Country
of
Residence
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belarus
Belgium
Cambodia
Croatia
Democratic Rep. of
the Congo
Egypt
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia

Description/origin
Persons holding
temporary asylum status
Stateless
Stateless
Uzbekistan
Stateless
Asylum seekers of
concern to UNHCR
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless
Stateless
Iraqi Christians
Afghanistan
Iraq
Myanmar
Somalia
Thailand
Timor Leste

Pop. begin year *
of which:
UNHCRTotal
assisted

Pop. end-year
of which:
UNHCRTotal
assisted

Change (%)
of which:
UNHCRTotal
assisted

29
*
*
430
250,000

29
-

125
524
30,000
430
250,000

125
-

331%
..
..
0%
0%

331%
..
..
..
..

2,536
13,836
*
*
-

-

2,458
10,465
93
*
14

-

-3%
-24%
..
..
..

..
..
..
..
..

*
125
162,075
*
*
*
13,951
3,000
136
16,176

125
-

*
113
7
150,536
*
708
32
10,619
3,000
62
139
8
10
2
16,176

113
7
-

..
-10%
..
-7%
..
..
..
-24%
0%
..
2%
..
..
..
0%

..
-10%
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
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Pop. begin year *
Country
of
Residence
Indonesia
Iraq
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Kuwait
Kuwait
Kuwait
Latvia
Latvia
Liberia
Lithuania
Malaysia
Malaysia
Mauritania
Mauritania
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Nepal
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation

Description/origin
Timor Leste (separated
children)
Stateless
Stateless
Ethnic Kazakh stateless
persons
Iraq
Palestinians
Somalia
Stateless (Bedoons)
Non Citizens
Stateless
Third Country Nationals
Stateless
Myanmar
Philippines (Muslims)
Mali
Western Sahara
Stateless Kazakhs
Stateless
Stateless returnees
Bhutan
Tibetans (recent arrivals)
Guatemala/Nicaragua
Stateless
Stateless
Daru (West Papua New
Guinea)
Vietnam (rejected cases)
Stateless
Stateless Roma
Afghans in a refugee-like
situation

Pop. end-year

of which:
UNHCRassisted

Total

Total

Change (%)

of which:
UNHCRassisted

Total

of which:
UNHCRassisted

385
*
*

-

*
886

-

-100%
..
..

..
..
..

18,594
13,000
6,000
2,000
80,000
*
*
15,000
*
4,856
57,197
3,500
26,000
*
*
*
10,000
704
2
*
*

13,000
6,000
2,000
80,000
15,000
4,856
57,197
704
2
-

58,291
13,000
6,000
2,000
80,000
452,003
173
35
9,028
997
61,314
3,500
26,000
*
4
*
10,000
737
923
*

58,291
13,000
6,000
2,000
80,000
35
61,314
737
-

213%
0%
0%
0%
0%
..
..
-100%
..
-79%
7%
0%
0%
..
..
..
0%
5%
-100%
..
..

..
0%
0%
0%
0%
..
..
-100%
..
-100%
7%
..
..
..
..
..
..
5%
-100%
..
..

135
1,691
*
*

-

135
1,829
6,000
400

-

0%
8%
..
..

..
..
..
..

100,000

-

100,000

-

0%

..
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Pop. begin year *
Country
of
Residence
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Serbia and
Montenegro
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Rep.
TfYR Macedonia

TfYR Macedonia
TfYR Macedonia
Thailand
Thailand
Ukraine
Ukraine
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
Venezuela
Vietnam
Total

Description/origin
IRPs (forced migrants)
excluding IDPs
Meskhetians
Non-CIS asylum-seekers
Stateless
Local residents at risk
Stateless
Citizens of former
Yugoslavia
Stateless
Stateless
Former Eritrean
Refugees
Stateless
Stateless
Long-term habitual
residents without
effective citizenship de
facto stateless
Rejected asylum-seekers
Stateless
Laos (Prison or Detention
Centre)
Stateless
Abkhazia
Crimean Tatars (formerly
deported persons)
Stateless
Stateless
Colombia
Stateless

Pop. end-year

of which:
UNHCRassisted

Total

Total

Change (%)

of which:
UNHCRassisted

Total

of which:
UNHCRassisted

290,689
11,000
5,793
*

97,935
11,000
5,793
-

192,584
10,755
5,177
*

73,004
10,755
5,177
-

-34%
-2%
-11%
..

-25%
-2%
-11%
..

85,000
13

85,000
-

85,000
7

85,000
-

0%
-46%

0%
..

779
10
170,000

779
-

584
14
-

584
-

-25%
40%
-100%

-25%
..
..

22,024
*
300,000

-

37,416
25
300,000

-

70%
..
0%

..
..
..

761
*

761
-

761
6
5,000

761
6
-

0%
..
..

0%
..
..

5
*
2,926

5
300

5
*
2,809

5
273

0%
..
-4%

0%
..
-9%

2,987
79,353
*
26,192
*
1,798,890

935
505
381,926

6,500
71,260
*
26,350
*
2,053,029

3,107
97
400,391

118%
-10%
..
1%
..
..

232%
-81%
..
..
..
..
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* The population beginning 2004 includes new groups of stateless persons which were not included in the statistics end-2003;
therefore, the total does not equal the total from UNHCR statistics end-2003 (912,000).
Important note:
When comparing data in this table with previous years, it should be noted that data collection on stateless persons has been
improved which makes direct comparison difficult.
Data is not complete and includes estimates. Countries where UNHCR has information about stateless persons but no reliable data
has been included in the table with an asterix (*).
SOURCE: Table 14, 2004 Global Refugee Trends (Population and Geographical Data Section, Division of Operational Support)

157

APPENDIX D: STATE SIGNATORIES TO THE 1954 AND 1961
STATELESSNESS CONVENTIONS
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Table 3: Convention Signatories

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961)
Ratification,
Accession (a),
Participant
Signature
Succession (d)
Albania
9 Jul 2003 a

Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954)
Ratification,
Accession (a),
Participant
Signature
Succession (d)
Albania
23 Jun 2003 a
Algeria
15 Jul 1964 a
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia

25 Oct 1988 d
1 Jun 1972 a
18 May 1994 a
13 Dec 1973 a

Azerbaijan
Barbados
Belgium
Bolivia

16 Aug 1996 a
6 Mar 1972 d
27 May 1960
6 Oct 1983 a

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Chad
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Czech Republic

28 Sep 1954

28 Sep 1954

Sep 1993 d
25 Feb 1969 d
13 Aug 1996
12 Aug 1999 a

12 Dec 1954
28 Sep 1954

2 Nov 1977
12 Oct 1992 d
19 Jul 2004 a
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Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan

18 May 1994 a
13 Dec 1973 a
22 Sep 1972 a
16 Aug 1996 a

Bolivia

6 Oct 1983 a

Bosnia and Herzegovina

13 Dec 1996 a

Canada
Chad

17 Jul 1978 a
12 Aug 1999 a

Costa Rica

2 Nov 1977 a

Czech Republic

19 Dec 2001 a

Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954)
Ratification,
Accession (a),
Participant
Signature
Succession (d)
Denmark
28 Sep 1954
17 Jan 1956
Ecuador
28 Sep 1954
2 Oct 1970
El Salvador
28 Sep 1954
Fiji
12 Jun 1972 d
Finland
10 Oct 1968 a
France
12 Jan 1955
8 Mar 1960
Germany
28 Sep 1954
26 Oct 1976
Greece
4 Nov 1975 a
Guatemala
28 Sep 1954
28 Nov 2000
Guinea
21 Mar 1962 a
Holy See
Sep 28 1954
Honduras
Sep 28 1954
Hungary
21 Nov 2001 a
Ireland
17 Dec 1962 a
Israel
Oct 1 1954
23 Dec 1958
Italy
Oct 20 1954
3 Dec 1962
Kiribati
29 Nov 1983 d
Latvia
5 Nov 1999 a
Lesotho
4 Nov 1974 d
Liberia
11 Sep 1964 a
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
18 May 1989 a
Liechtenstein
Sep 28 1954
Lithuania
7 Feb 2000 a
Madagascar
[20 Feb 1962 a]
Mexico
7 Jun 2000 a

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961)
Ratification,
Accession (a),
Participant
Signature
Succession (d)
Denmark
11 Jul 1977 a

France
Germany

31 May 1962
31 Aug 1977 a

Guatemala

Ireland
Israel
Kiribati
Latvia
Lesotho
Liberia
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
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18 Jan 1973 a
30 Aug 1961
29 Nov 1983 d
14 Apr 1992 a
24 Sep 2004 a
22 Sep 2004 a
16 May 1989 a

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961)
Ratification,
Accession (a),
Participant
Signature
Succession (d)
Netherlands
30 Aug 1961
13 May 1985
Niger
17 Jun 1985 a
Norway
11 Aug 1971 a

Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954)
Ratification,
Accession (a),
Participant
Signature
Succession (d)
Netherlands
Sep 28 1954
12 Apr 1962
Norway
Philippines
Republic of Korea
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
Senegal
Serbia and Montenegro
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Fmr. Yugoslav Rep. of
Macedonia
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Uganda
U.K. of Great Britain &
Northern Ireland
Uruguay
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Sep 28 1954
19 Nov 1956
Jun 22 1955
22 Aug 1962 a

Sep 28 1954
Sep 28 1954

27 Apr 1999 d
21 Sep 2005 a
12 Mar 2001 d
3 Apr 2000 a
6 Jul 1992 d
12 May 1997 a
16 Nov 1999 a
2 Apr 1965
3 Jul 1972
18 Jan 1994 d
11 Apr 1966 d
29 Jul 1969 a
15 Apr 1965 a

Sep 28 1954

Slovakia

3 Apr 2000 a

Swaziland
Sweden

16 Nov 1999 a
19 Feb 1969 a

Tunisia

12 May 2000 a

U.K. of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
Uruguay

16 Apr 1959
2 Apr 2004 a
1 Nov 1974 d
1 Dec 1998 d

30 Aug 1961

29 Mar 1966
21 Sep 2001 a

Source: Data received via email from UNTreaty.org pertaining to the status of the conventions since 13 Sep. 2005. Data on Senegal obtained from
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterV/treaty3.asp.
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APPENDIX E: PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE
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This is the letter sent to the UNHCR (hqpa00@unhcr.ch) inquiring whether there were any
publications on the stateless. No answer was ever received.

October 2, 2005
Hello, my name is Kristy Belton. I am currently writing my thesis at the University of Central
Florida (focusing on citizenship and the lack thereof - statelessness) and have been asked to
chair a Young Professionals for International Cooperation event in December on the subject (via
the Greater Orlando chapter of UNA-USA). I was looking in the “Teacher’s Tools” section of
the UNHCR website and noticed that all the materials seem to be geared toward teaching people
about refugees. I know that the prevention and reduction of statelessness is part of the UNHCR's
mandate and was wondering if there were any teacher's kits/books/games that teach people
specifically about statelessness and stateless persons who are not refugees?
Thank you kindly.

Sincerely,
Kristy Belton
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